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Abstract: This thesis assesses the social-welfare implications of modifications to the post transfer 
distribution of income, in the context of welfare maximising policy design. Both the inequality-
distributional efficiency and inequality-growth relationship are assessed.  An Atkinson social welfare 
function is employed in a novel fashion to model the inequality distributional efficiency relationship, 
including direct effects that result from the concavity of the personal utility function, and external 
losses operating via positional income effects. This analysis produces estimates of the social welfare 
losses from inequality across a data set of 137 countries, where the unweighted average of total 
losses is found to be equivalent to be 47% of GNI. The equality-growth relationship is analysed from 
the standpoint of both endogenous growth theory and post-Keynesian theories of demand and 
investment. The relationships between the functional and personal distribution of income and key 
macroeconomic variables including the rate of savings, and physical and human capital accumulation 
are assessed. Crucially, these relationships are found to be highly modifiable by economic policy and 
structural reform, and in theory, no growth–equality trade off need exist. On the contrary, equality 
may be growth promoting at moderate to high inequality levels. Combined with the large static 
welfare losses from inequality uncovered in this analysis, the welfare optimum level of inequality is 
likely to be close to the level associated with distributional efficiency maximisation. This is likely to 
be a very low level of inequality in comparison to existing levels in most countries and regions, and 
large welfare losses result from levels of inequality significantly above this level.  
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Introduction 
 
What constitutes an ideal distribution of income and wealth is a pervasive question within 
philosophy, politics, political economy, and economics. It is a question which, more than any 
other, divides political and economic traditions. Despite the question’s relevance in its own 
right, and it’s relation to a series of other important questions, mainstream economic 
analysis has largely been unable, or unwilling to provide direct answers. Arguably, 
unwillingness, rather than inability, has been the larger barrier. Given a suitable degree of 
willingness, some pertinent answers can be obtained.  
The basic tools for assessing distributional issues have existed for more than a century, with 
the framework being sketched by utilitarian pioneers such as Gossen and Marshall.1  
Unfortunately, genuine problems associated with operationalizing cardinal concepts of 
utility, alongside arguably specious and politically motivated positivist critiques, have led to 
utilitarian methods being overshadowed for much of the twentieth century. The dominant 
Paretian approach to welfare economics has, partly by design, being incapable of addressing 
distributional questions. However, from the 1970’s onwards, neo-utilitarian approaches, as 
pioneered by Tony Atkinson and Amartya Sen, addressed some of the formal problems of 
traditional utilitarian welfare economics, providing a framework for conducting 
mathematical analysis of distributional efficiency.2 More recently, following from Richard 
Easterlin’s pioneering work on the relationship between  income and happiness, a new 
literature focusing on the relationship between mean income, income inequality, and 
various indicators of wellbeing has emerged which cuts across the fields of epidemiology, 
psychology, political economy, and economics. 3 Together with the neo-utilitarian methods 
pioneered by Atkinson this fresh approach to welfare and distribution hold the promise of 
providing more satisfactory answers to classical questions of distribution. This thesis is a 
contribution to this literature. In particular, it re-examines the classical distributional issue- 
the growth-equity trade-off, in light of relatively recent advances in welfare economics and 
growth theory. 
                                                          
1
 Hermann Heinreich Gossen, The Laws of Human Relations and the Rules of Human Action Derived Therefrom, 
trans. Rudolph C. Blitz (Michigan: The MIT Press, 1983). 
2
 See these important works: Amartya K. Sen and E. Foster, On Economic Equality, Updated edition with 
substantial annexe. (New York: Norton, 1997); Anthony Atkinson, Social Justice and Public Policy (Sussex: 
Wheatsheaf, 1983). 
3
 See for example: Richard A. Easterlin et al., “The happiness–income paradox revisited,” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 107, no. 52 (December 28, 2010): 22463 -22468; R. Layard, Happiness: has social 
science got a clue, Lionel Robbins Memorial Lectures, 2003; Benjamin Radcliff, “Politics, Markets, and Life 
Satisfaction: The Political Economy of Human Happiness,” American Political Science Review 95, no. 4 (2001); 
Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers, “Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being: Reassessing the Easterlin 
Paradox,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2008 (April 1, 2008): 1-87; Mathias Binswanger, “Why does 
income growth fail to make us happier?: Searching for the treadmills behind the paradox of happiness,” 
Journal of Socio-Economics 35, no. 2 (April 2006): 366-381. 
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This thesis applies a series of neo-utilitarian methods to analyse the relationship between 
income inequality and social welfare, both statically and dynamically. Firstly, the 
relationship between income inequality and a series of measures of social welfare is 
assessed, utilising a series of Atkinson social welfare functions. In this analysis, income is 
considered fixed, and equality is modelled as an income multiplier. Once time is 
incorporated into the analysis, the effect of inequality on growth, and hence future income 
levels, must also be assessed. This is the subject of the second part of the thesis. Together, 
the analysis in these two parts provides a framework to assess the likely impacts of changes 
to the distribution of income on long-run social welfare. I find that static social welfare 
losses from inequality, operating via reduced distributional efficiency, can be very large, on 
average close to 50% of GDP. In addition, greater equality imposes no strong negative 
effects on growth. On the contrary, equality may be conditionally conducive to growth, 
especially at high levels of inequality. In this situation, social-welfare maximisation in both 
the short and long-run implies a significant reduction in income inequality in all but the most 
equal countries. At low levels of inequality, negative growth affects may emerge, however 
the parameters of any trade-off are modifiable by economic policy.  In particular, 
investment promoting policies can greatly modify the relationship between profitability and 
investment, attenuating any negative growth effects from egalitarian polices which reduce 
the rate to return to capital. 
The first chapter introduces the Atkinson social welfare function (SWF) which is employed in 
this thesis, and presents some novel methods for addressing some potential shortcomings 
that emerge when utilising the standard Atkinson SWF. Utilising statistical analysis, a 
method for easily estimating the Atkinson SWF from the ubiquitous Gini index is derived.  
This is an imperfect method of estimation; however it is also rather accurate and greatly 
simplifies the estimation of the Atkinson SWF, hopefully enabling Atkinson adjusted income 
to be utilised as an alternative indicator of economic performance by non-econometricians.  
The second chapter conducts a significant review of the existing literature devoted to 
estimation of the elasticity of marginal utility from income. This is a key parameter of the 
Atkinson SWF, and unfortunately existing estimates of the Atkinson index generally utilise 
arbitrary values for its calculation.4 In this review, a value of 1.5 is obtained as a consensus 
value from the literature review. Utilising this value, the direct losses from income 
inequality that result from the concavity of the personal utility function can be readily 
estimated. These estimates are presented in the appendix.  
The third chapter is devoted to an estimation of the total social-welfare losses from income 
inequality. These arise directly from the concavity of the personal utility function, as 
outlined in chapter 2. In addition various external and positional effects add to these direct 
losses. This chapter employs an Atkinson SWF to estimate total losses from inequality, 
                                                          
4
 For example, the U.S Census Bureau reports Atkinson indexes for arbitrary values of   between .25 and .75, 
which, as demonstrated in this thesis, are far lower than existing empirical work suggest as plausible figures.  
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inclusive of these external effects, in regards to both health outcomes and total social 
welfare.  The obtained parameters are then applied to discount the health and non-health 
portions of GNI for 137 countries. The unweighted average losses from inequality across this 
dataset are equivalent to 47% of GNI.  These results are presented in the appendix.  
Chapter four assesses the equality-growth-welfare relationship, from the standpoint of 
welfare maximising policy design. Due to the possibility of a negative equality-growth 
relationship, maximising long run welfare is not a simple question of maximising 
distributional efficiency, as over long period of time, relatively minor changes to the rate of 
growth can lead to large variations in total income, potentially offsetting any distributional 
efficiency gains. Firstly, I introduce the relevant theoretical and empirical issues via the 
formulation of a somewhat comprehensive semi-endogenous growth model. Secondly, I 
theoretically assess the potential growth and welfare impacts of shifts in the functional and 
personal distribution of income via a stylised systematisation of the relationship between 
distribution and physical and human-capital accumulation. This analysis breaks the 
determinants of the growth-equality relationship into several policy modifiable 
relationships: 
1. The profit share-income inequality relationship 
2. The profit share -investment relationship 
3. The income inequality-human capital accumulation relationship 
4. The income inequality-aggregate savings relationship  
On the basis of theoretical and empirical insights, these functions can produce contradictory 
partial effects from modifications to the distribution of income, producing a non-linear and 
highly modifiable equality-growth relationship. At very low levels of inequality, negative 
growth effects may be present due to reduced physical capital accumulation, with this 
relationship operating via a positive relationship between inequality and profit share. 
However, relationships 1 and 2 are highly modifiable. Relationship two is modifiable via 
asset redistribution and egalitarian wages policy, whereas relationship one is determined by 
economic structure, including modes of enterprise financing and control, and industrial 
policy. In order to demonstrate the variability of relationship 1, I present estimates of the 
profitability-investment relationship for both China and the United States.  
Section 5 presents a summary of key findings. On the basis of the analysis presented here, 
and abstracting from political constraints to policy formation, the welfare optimal 
distribution is likely to be very low in comparison to existing levels of inequality, and there is 
a very large scope to improve welfare outcomes via egalitarian reform, with the possible 
gains increasing in rough proportion to existing levels of inequality. The static welfare losses 
from inequality are calculated to be very large, and both theoretical and empirical 
examination of the relationship between inequality and growth suggest no strong negative 
growth effects at moderate levels of inequality. On the contrary, equality may be conductive 
to positive growth outcomes, especially at high levels of inequality. At low levels of 
10 
 
inequality, and where asset redistribution is constrained, there may be some negative 
effects on physical capital accumulation, but these effects can be greatly attenuated via 
investment promoting and stabilising policy. The welfare optimum long-run level of equality 
is likely to not be significantly higher than the distributional efficiency maximising level. In 
terms of a numerical estimate, the long-run welfare optimum level of post transfer 
inequality is likely to be somewhere between a Gini index of 0.15 and 0.20.  
1 A novel method for estimating the Atkinson 
Social Welfare Function 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, a method for estimating the direct social welfare losses from income 
inequality is presented, utilising the Atkinson social welfare function (SWF). Direct losses are 
defined as those that result from the concavity of the personal utility function. No external 
or positional effects are considered; they are addressed separately in the next chapter.  
Firstly, a very brief outline of the rational for adopting a utilitarian framework is presented. 
Secondly, the Atkinson index is introduced, and some practical problems relating to its 
utilisation are addressed via statistical methods. Three potential problems exist in regards to 
the use of the Atkinson SWF.  
 The function assumes perfect equality to be the social optimum. Any deviation from 
this incurs a social-welfare loss. However, when there is variability in needs and 
tastes, and hence in the shape of personal utility functions, some degree of 
inequality is associated with the equalisation of marginal utility from income, and 
hence optimal distributional efficiency.  
 The basic function requires the estimation of the complete income distribution 
across all persons. In addition, the function is sensitive to very low incomes, and no 
income can be zero or negative. These downsides can both slow and complicate the 
estimation process, and make the results obtained sensitive to estimation 
procedure. 
 Arguably, consumption inequality, rather than income inequality should be utilised 
as the inequality metric for input to the Atkinson SWF. However, consumption 
inequality data is often unavailable. Utilising income inequality data will arguably 
lead to an overestimation of the welfare losses from inequality. 
 In order to apply the function as a proscriptive measure of social welfare, reliable 
estimates of the elasticity of marginal utility from income are required. This 
parameter determines the sensitivity of the SWF to income inequality. 
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This chapter addresses these potential problems via the following methods: 
 An estimate for the warranted or ideal portion of inequality is obtained. This portion 
of inequality can then be subtracted from the total observed level of inequality.  
 A method for estimating the Atkinson SWF from the ubiquitous Gini index, and for 
estimating consumption inequality from income inequality is derived via statistical 
methods. 
The second chapter of this thesis addresses the problem of estimating the elasticity of 
marginal utility from income. Combined with the methods outlined here, the direct losses 
from income inequality can be calculated. Estimates of direct and total losses are given for 
137 countries in table 27 (in appendix A). 
1.1 The utilitarian approach to social-welfare 
 
This thesis applies a series of utilitarian methods, in particular the Atkinson SWF, to estimate 
social welfare losses resulting from income inequality. The rational for this choice of 
framework is briefly outlined below. 
I define an applied utilitarian approach to social-welfare via the following axioms; 
 The life satisfaction or happiness of individuals, hereafter referred to as utility, is 
calculable, and can be expressed in cardinal terms. 
 Utility, defined in the above manner, is comparable across persons 
 The proper aim of social policy is to maximise total utility over an infinite timeframe5 
Such an approach has a series of advantages for assessment of policy outcomes, and the 
approach is particularly useful for assessing the social-welfare effects of modifications to 
existing income distributions. Some of the obvious advantages of the utilitarian approach 
are outlined below; 
 Only very minimal normative judgments are required to be made, chiefly a decision 
to assign equal utility weighting to all persons regardless of income level, sex, or 
race. Once such a basic and readily defensible normative framework is adopted, 
policy assessment can be undertaken largely on positive grounds. 
 Within the utilitarian framework, the net effect of a policy change is in theory always 
calculable, via an assessment of the net effect on aggregate social utility. Given 
appropriate data, and sufficiently powerful econometric techniques, cost-benefit 
                                                          
5
 This definition removes the problem associated with an alternative aim of maximising mean utility, which 
could be achieved be drastically reducing population. The infinite timescale removes the alternative problem, 
of massively increasing population in order to maximise aggregate utility, as such an approach would be 
counterproductive in the context of an infinite timeframe. Practically, adopting a hypothetical fixed or given 
population or population growth rate is a valid heuristic device. This solution is presented in Sen and Foster, 
On Economic Equality. 
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analysis can be readily conducted for a whole series of policy options, in particular 
redistributive policy. This is clearly not the case when a Paretian approach is 
adopted.6 
Under the first set of conditions, it has been long known that when total income is given, 
the maximisation of social utility requires that income be distributed such that the marginal 
utility from consumption across persons is equalised.7It has also been shown that a rational, 
personal utility maximising individual tasked with choosing an ideal distribution of income 
for a hypothetical society, into which they would be randomly placed, would adopt an 
identical approach. 8  This provides a normative rational for utilitarianism, which stems from 
a basic principle of impartiality and equality.9 
Deviations from utilitarianism require unequal weights to be ascribed to the utility of 
different individuals. In practice, social policy has tended to adopt various forms of at least 
implicitly discriminatory and elitist utility weighting.10 Without any plausible and valid 
rational for unequal utility weighting, classical utilitarianism appears to be the only valid 
option for conducting social-welfare calculations.11 
                                                          
6
Yew-Kwang Ng, “Beyond pareto optimality: The necessity of interpersonal cardinal utilities in distributional 
judgements and social choice,” Journal of Economics 42, no. 3 (September 1, 1982): 207-233; Yew-Kwang Ng, 
“Welfarism and Utilitarianism:A Rehabilitation,” Utilitas 2 (1990): 171-193. Some hybrid approaches have also 
been employed to address the shortcomings of ordinal utility, see Michael Mandler, “Cardinality versus 
Ordinality: A Suggested Compromise,” The American Economic Review 96, no. 4 (2006): 1114-1136; C. 
Blackorby, “Degrees of Cardinality and Aggregate Partial Orderings,” Econometrica 43, no. 5/6 (1975): 845-852. 
7
See for example, Gossen, The Laws of Human Relations and the Rules of Human Action Derived Therefrom; 
Abba Lerner, The Economics of Control (New York: Macmillan, 1944); R. Jennings, Natural Elements of Political 
Economy (London: Macmillan, 1855); J. Dupit, “On the measurement of utility of public works,” International 
Economic Papers 2 (translated reprint of 1884 original 1992): 83-110. 
8
 The usual caveat of ignoring offsetting efficiency effects applies. It can be shown that a rational individual 
operating behind a Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’ would operate in a similar manner to a utilitarian social 
planner, see; John C. Harsanyi, “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of 
Utility,” Journal of Political Economy 63, no. 4 (1955): 309-321; William Vickrey, “Measuring Marginal Utility by 
Reactions to Risk,” Econometrica 13, no. 4 (October 1, 1945): 319-333; Juan D. Moreno-Ternero and John 
Roemer, “The Veil of Ignorance Violates Priority,” Economics and Philosophy 24, no. 2 (2008): 233-257. On 
Rawl’s ‘veil of ignorance’ see J. Rawls, A theory of justice (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
Although Rawl’s use of this principle is the most widely acknowledged, precedence can be found in the works 
of both Harsanyi and Vickrey 
9
 On this principle as a foundation of social justice, see Brian Barry, Justice as impartiality (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995). 
10
The existent of large, unaddressed differentials in income is equivalent to assigning a much larger weight to 
the utility of the rich than the poor. 
11
 The approach suggested by Sen of additionally applying an aversion to inequality in total utility outcomes is 
rejected here, as there are no solid grounds for such an adjustment when external effects of total utility 
inequality (for example resentment, envy, and positional concerns) are incorporated into the analysis. These 
effects are explicitly incorporated into the analysis here, and so no further ‘utility weighting’ is applied. On 
maximising utility outcomes as a basis of public  policy, including utility weighting, see Amartya K. Sen, “From 
Income Inequality to Economic Inequality,” Southern Economic Journal 64, no. 2 (October 1, 1997): 384-401; 
Donald Davidson, “Judging interpersonal interests,” ed. J. Elster and A. Hylland (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986); Sen and Foster, On Economic Equality; Amartya K. Sen, “Equality of What ?,” in Tanner 
lectures on human values, ed. G. Peterson, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); G.A. Cohen, 
13 
 
The classical utilitarian principle of accounting for distributional efficiency in policy appraisal 
is now a somewhat common approach in formal cost benefit analysis.12 For example, the 
British Treasury has adopted a practice of applying welfare weights to GDP increases in 
regions with varying income levels, with a greater weight given to poorer regions.13 The 
logical next step would be to apply welfare weights to individuals. This approach, pioneered 
by Atkinson, is employed in this thesis.  
1.2 The Atkinson Social Welfare Function 
 
The Atkinson SWF utilises an isoelastic utility function to estimate personal utility at 
different income levels;14 
  ( )  {
    
   
           
                  
 
Where   is income, and   is the elasticity of marginal utility from income as defined below; 
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Social welfare can then be calculated as mean personal utility 
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of Utah Press, 1992); L. S. Temkin, Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Brian Barry, Theories 
of Justice, vol. 1 (Berkley: University of California Press., 1989); T. Scanlon, What we owe to each other 
(Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). For arguments against this tradition, in particular the 
rejection of utility weighting, as adopted in this thesis, see Stefan Trautmann, “Individual fairness in Harsanyi’s 
utilitarianism: operationalizing all-inclusive utility,” Theory and Decision 68, no. 4 (April 1, 2010): 405-415; 
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Decision Making 14 (2001): 243-255. 
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 For some pioneering works in this tradition, see R. Layard, Cost–benefit Analysis (London: Penguin, 1972); A. 
R. Prest, “Cost–benefit analysis; a survey,” Economic Journal 75 (1965): 683-735; F. Seton, Shadow Wages in 
the Chilean Economy (Paris: OECD, 1972); E. Neal Blue and Luther Tweeten, “The estimation of marginal utility 
of income for application to agricultural policy analysis,” Agricultural Economics 16, no. 3 (August 1997): 155-
169. 
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David J. Evans, E. Kula, and H. Sezer, “Regional welfare weights for the UK: England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland,” Regional Studies 39, no. 7 (2005): 923-937. 
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Anthony Atkinson, “On the measurement of inequality,” Journal of Economic Theory 2, no. 3 (September 
1970): 244-263. 
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The Atkinson Index is a derived coefficient which expresses social welfare losses from 
inequality as the proportion of income that could be sacrificed by a society and still maintain 
an identical level of mean utility, if income inequality was also reduced to zero. This 
property can be formalised as; 
   ̅(   ) 
Where A is the Atkinson index, and W is the equally distributed equivalent income.  
This property makes the Atkinson incredibly useful for assessing policies which have inverse 
effects on inequality and income levels. The percentage increase in mean incomes, required 
to exactly offset a percentage increase in the Atkinson index is given by;  
    
    
 
 
   
 
The equation for calculating the Atkinson index is given below; 
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The Atkinson index has been employed for some time as a measure of social-welfare losses 
from inequality, however, its utility as a proscriptive measure for policy assessment is 
dependent on methodologically sound and empirically accurate methods for estimating  . 
Some estimation methods and the results obtained are presented in Chapter 2.  
1.2.1 Optimal levels of inequality 
 
The Atkinson SWF implicitly treats full equality as the distributional-efficiency optimum. This 
is a result of attributing to all persons an identical utility function. In reality, the shape of the 
personal utility function is likely to vary across individuals, due to variation in ‘needs’ and 
‘tastes’. Due to this variation, equalising the marginal utility of income across persons 
requires some dispersion in incomes.15 Ideally, this level of inequality should be associated 
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 It is worth noting that this dispersion should not, as suggested by Amartya Sen and others, lead to significant 
variation in total utility outcomes. For example, those who have lower total utility due to some disability, for 
example health problem, are likely to obtain more sustained benefit from increases in expenditure on certain 
classes of goods (for example healthcare) than those without such problems, suggesting their marginal utility 
curves will intersect. Beyond this intersection point, more resources should be allocated to those with greater 
needs and less total utility. In addition, feelings of resentment that result from highly unequal outcomes 
should be incorporated into the analysis as external effects. Together, these points suggest that in practice 
utilitarianism is somewhat consistent with some of the concerns of ‘utility egalitarians’. On external effects of 
this sort, see Trautmann, “Individual fairness in Harsanyi’s utilitarianism: operationalizing all-inclusive utility.” 
In addition, the approach of consistent utilitarianism, in which varying needs are incorporated into the 
analysis, is consistent with Marx’s principle of ‘to each according to their needs’. On Marx and utilitarianism, 
see George G. Brenkert, “Marx and Utilitarianism” 5, no. 3 (November 1975); Michael Green, “Marx, Utility, 
and Right,” Political Theory 11, no. 3 (1983): 433-446; Rescher Nicholas, “The Utilitarianism of Marx and 
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with zero welfare losses when imputed to the Atkinson SWF. This outcome can be achieved, 
via estimating this ideal portion of inequality, and then subtracting it from the observed 
level.16 This section provides an estimate of this level of inequality.  
In an ideal world with equal earnings capacities, flexible labour hours, and equal non-work 
responsibilities, the only source of income inequality would be differing needs and tastes. 
These variables would induce different trade-offs between work and leisure and hence 
result in some modest level of income inequality. This level of inequality would approach 
the optimum level associated with marginal utility equalisation.17 In this case, desired 
working hours can be utilised as an imperfect proxy for needs or tastes, and the dispersion 
in desired working hours can also be used as a source to infer the dispersion in these 
variables. 
Utilising recent data from Australia on preferred working hours for single males (who are 
likely to have less variation in non-work responsibilities than other categories), and 
assigning a minimum value of ten hours (below this value it is reasonable to assume some 
form of barrier to greater workforce participation) and a maximum of 50 hours (increased 
equality would very likely remove the compulsion to work longer hours) yields a value of 
0.167 for the Gini index; 0.045 for the Thiel-T index, and 0.057 for the mean log-deviation or 
Theil-L.18In comparison, the lowest reported level of observed inequality obtained from a 
search of the relevant literature is a figure of 0.11 for the Gini index, reported for urban 
China in 1978.19In this paper, I adopt a round value of 0.04 for the mean-log deviation of 
warranted income inequality. This is between the estimated value for urban China from 
1978 and the estimate from Australian data on desired working hours, and is a very low 
level of inequality in comparison to observed levels for most countries. It should be noted 
that the choice of this value within reasonable ranges, for example a Gini index of between 
zero and 0.20 has only marginal effects on calculated relative distributional efficiency.  
1.3 Estimating the Atkinson index from the Gini index 
 
In this section, I outline a novel, statistically based method for estimating a consumption 
inequality based Atkinson index from the readily available Gini index of post-transfer 
incomes. No algebraic conversion exists, because of fundamental differences in the way that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Engels,” American Philosophical Quarterly 10, no. 3 (1973): 189-199; Adam Schaff, A Philosophy of Man (New 
York: Dell Publishing, 1963). 
16
 Due to the decomposability of the generalised entropy class of inequality indexes, (one of which is utilised to 
estimate the Atkinson Index) this is a trivial process.  
17
 They would be equivalent under an assumption of equal disutility of labour.  
18
 Data source is: Yi-Ping Tseng and Mark Wooden, Preferred vs Actual Working Hours, Working Paper, 
Melbourne Institute Working Papers (The University of Melbourne, June 2005), 
http://melbourneinstitute.com/wp/wp2005n07.pdf. 
19
Jiwei Lou, “Comment on: Equity and Growth in Developing Countries: Old and New Perspectives on the Policy 
Issues,” in Income Distribution and High-Quality Growth, ed. Vito Tanzi and Ke-young Chu (Cambridge Mass.: 
The MIT Press, 1998), 147-153. 
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information is encoded to produce the different indexes of inequality. In particular, the 
Atkinson index is not a monotonic transformation of the Gini index, and reversals in order 
are possible when comparing these metrics for a series of countries or regions.20 Whilst this 
introduces a potentially serious and irresolvable problem in attempting to estimate the 
Atkinson index directly from the Gini, for moderate values of ε and typical income 
distributions, remarkably consistent and accurate estimations can be achieved in practice.  
The estimation of the Atkinson index, even from accurate income distributions, is prone to 
inconsistency, as it depends on the value of ε chosen, and the treatment of very low or zero 
reported incomes.21 These issues potentially introduce greater variability in results, even 
when utilising identical data, than the conversion method outlined here.  
In order to convert the Gini index of income inequality into an Atkinson index of social 
welfare losses from consumption inequality, a chain of regressions have been run on a 
series of large and varied  data sets compiled from a number of secondary sources. The 
order of transformation is shown below 
                                          
The Theil-l index, also known as the mean-log deviation (MLD) can then be utilised to 
estimate the Atkinson index using an algebraic transformation;22 
           
An additional step can be added at the start to transform income inequality to consumption 
inequality 
           (      )             (           ) 
The reason for adopting this roundabout conversion method is that no large data set could 
be constructed with values for both the Gini index of income inequality, and an Atkinson 
index of social welfare losses from consumption inequality; however large data sets exist 
with estimates at either end of each link in the chain outlined above. These conversion 
processes are outlined in turn below.  
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This is because the Gini index is especially sensitive to income levels at the middle of the income distribution, 
whereas the Atkinson index is very sensitive to income levels at the bottom of the income distribution.On this 
point, see Atkinson, Social Justice and Public Policy, 29. 
21
 All incomes must be non-zero to compute the Atkinson index, and a small number of very small incomes can 
lead to very large values for A. In practice, a minimum level of income consistent with subsistence is imposed 
in order to produce consistent results. The choice of this income level can create large deviation in the 
estimate.  
22
 On the relationship between the Theil-L and the Atkinson index, see Sen and Foster, On Economic Equality, 
140–141; Francois Bourguignon, “Decomposable Income Inequality Measures,” Econometrica 47 (1979): 913. 
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1.3.1 Converting post-transfer income inequality to consumption inequality 
 
This conversion is conducted on the grounds that consumption, rather than income, 
determines utility outcomes.23 Through the use of savings and credit, consumption can in 
theory be considerably smoothed over the life cycle and in response to income volatility.24 If 
this is the case, then utilising income inequality to compute the Atkinson index may 
significantly overstate the social-welfare losses from inequality. Although some smoothing 
does occur, the magnitude of the adjustment is small.  The data used to perform the 
estimation is presented in table 1. 
In order to estimate the relationship between two indexes normalised to the range 0-1, a 
standard linear regression cannot be performed, as (meaningless) outputs of less than zero 
or more than one could result. To resolve this problem, a log de-normalisation 
transformation is applied to the Gini data: 
     (
 
   
) 
 
Where D is the resultant de-normalised inequality measure. The relationship between these 
measures of inequality is then estimated utilising a basic equation; 
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 Although, when the elasticity of marginal utility from income is the input to an Atkinson type function, there 
is good reason to utilise income inequality as the input as well. In general, it is often difficult to discern 
whether the elasticity of marginal utility from income of consumption is being calculated by a particular 
estimation method. The transformation is conducted here largely in response to those that claim such a 
transformation greatly diminished the magnitude of welfare losses. For example, there is some debate on the 
nature of the relationship between consumption and income inequality in the United States. According to 
Krueger and Perri, consumption inequality is significantly lower than income inequality, and has not risen in 
line with income inequality since the 1980’s. However, there is evidence that this has been a result of 
unsustainable use of credit to augment lower incomes. In addition, Aguir and Bills, (whose results I utilise) take 
issue with the CEX data utilised by Krueger and Perri to obtain their estimates, which they find to significant 
underestimate luxury consumption. Computing consumption from savings and income data and the CEX, they 
find a tighter correlation.  I find that internationally, there is a close correlation, and it is difficult to see how 
consumption and income inequality could permanently diverge by a large margin, unless there is constantly 
diminishing inequality in lifetime income and offsetting rise in income volatility at the personal level. See Dirk 
Krueger and Fabrizio Perri, “Does Income Inequality Lead to Consumption Inequality? Evidence and Theory,” 
The Review of Economic Studies 73, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 163-193; Mark A. Aguiar and Mark Bils, Has 
Consumption Inequality Mirrored Income Inequality?, Working Paper, NBER Working Papers (National Bureau 
of Economic Research, February 2011); Johnson and Stephanie Shipp, “Trends in Inequality using 
Consumption-Expenditures: The U.S. from 1960 to 1993,” Review of Income and Wealth 43, no. 2 (1997): 133-
152. 
24
 There is evidence that savings are capable of significantly smoothing consumption in the face of transitory 
income shocks, but not shocks to lifetime income or persistent unemployment. In particular, during recessions, 
personal credit can dry up, and consumption inequality tends to converge towards the level of income 
inequality, whilst the poor have difficult self-insuring as a result of credit constraints. See Richard Blundell, 
Luigi Pistaferri, and Ian Preston, “Consumption Inequality and Partial Insurance,” The American Economic 
Review 98, no. 5 (December 1, 2008): 1887-1921; Richard Blundell, “From income to consumption: 
Understanding the transmission of inequality” (Institute for Research on Poverty, 2010),  
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Where    is the denormalised Gini index of consumption inequality;    is the 
denormalisedGini index of post-transfer income inequality; and   is the constant to be 
estimated. The relationship between the Gini index of income inequality can then be 
expressed as; 
      
      (
 
    
)
 
The regression results and statistics are given in table 2.  
Table 1: Income and consumption inequality data 
Source Place Scope Observation pairs 
Naseem (1973) Pakistan Rural 6 
Naseem (1973) Pakistan Urban 6 
Alauddin (1975) Pakistan Rural 6 
Alauddin (1975) Pakistan Urban 6 
Keane and  Prasad (2002) Poland National 26 
Harding and Greenwell (2002) Australia National 4 
Bhalla (2002) World Global 5 
Idrees (2002) Pakistan National and regional 16 
Azfar (1973) Pakistan National 1 
Gradin et. al. (2008) Spain National 11 
Krueger et. al. (2010) 8 industrialised countries National 8 
Domeij and Floden (2009) Sweden National 2 
Aguiar and Bils (2009) USA National 6 
    Total: 103 
 
Table 2: Regression statistics: Income and consumption inequality 
a 0.9286     
De-normalised values (OLS) Final results (OLS) 
R^2 0.996 R^2 0.997 
F stat 25971 F stat 33257 
T stat (.01) 161.16(2.63) T stat(.01) 182.36(2.63) 
P null 0 P null 0 
 
1.3.2 Converting the Gini index to the Thieil-T index 
 
The Atkinson index can be readily estimated from the Theil-l index, also known as the mean 
log-deviation (MLD); however this index is rarely calculated, in comparison to the Theil-T. 
Given that the Thiel-T and Theil-l share a common mathematical structure, under certain 
assumptions, for example an approximately log-normal distribution of income, they can be 
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shown to be almost identical in value.25 I therefore utilise observation pairs for the Gini and 
Theil-T index as a first step towards a conversion to the Thiel-L index, in order to allow for a 
much expanded data set. The date used for this conversion is summarised in table 3.  
Table 3: Income inequality data: Gini and Theil-T index 
Source Country/Region No. of observation pairs 
Chotikapanich et. al. 2009 Africa 34 
  Asia 38 
  EE and Central Asia 36 
  Latin America 36 
  Europe, NA and Oceania 46 
  World 2 
Lin et. al. (2008) China 24 
Ferranti et. al. (2003) Latin America 51 
Berry  and Serieux (2002) World 3 
Sala-i-Martin (2002) World 58 
Bourguigona and Morisson(2002) World 4 
Dikhanov and Ward (2002) World 4 
Sala-I-Martin (2006) World 31 
Dowrick&Akmal(2005) World 2 
CEDLAS (2011) Argentina 35 
  Total: 404 
 
A similar problem to that encountered when converting Gini indexes arises when conversion 
from the Gini to Theil is considered, however in this case the following conditions apply for 
large populations; 
   
   
     
   
  
The following equation satisfies these conditions and provides an accurate fit to the 
available data; 
    (  
 
   
)
 
 
Where    is Theil’s T Index 
Running the regression, two data sources (Berry and Serieux 2002, Ferranti et. al. 2003) 
appeared to overstate the Theil index in comparison to the other data sources by a 
consistent margin, and to display a significant Y intercept when one was allowed for. 
                                                          
25
 There is evidence that income distributions are approximate log-normal, see John Creedy, Dynamics of 
Income Distribution (Basil Blackwell, 1985); Frank A. Cowell, Measuring Inequality, vol. 2 (New York: Prentice 
Hall, 1995). 
20 
 
Therefore, 2 dummies were inserted for these data sets, removing the implicit Y intercept 
but retaining the curve and gradient data. The final equation for estimation is thus; 
   (  
 
   
)
 
       
Where B and F are dummies for Berry and Serieux(2002), and Ferranti et. al. (2003) respectively. 
Further, 6 obvious outliers were removed from the data set. The final results of the estimation are 
presented in table 4 and figure 1. 
Table 4 Regression statistics:              
Variable: A B C D 
Value: 0.7695 1.55 0.1181 0.054 
T statistic: 424 N.A 8.1431 14.5251 
Null: 0% R^2: .998 F:72613 Critical T (.01)=2.588 
 
Figure 1: Estimated vs actual values of Theil’s T index 
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The Theil-t and Theil-L are both special cases of the generalised entropy index;26 
  ( )  
 
  (   )
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Where    is income for individual i,   ̅ is mean income, and   is a parameter that determines 
the sensitivity of the index to incomes at different ends of the income spectrum. For low 
value of  , the index is sensitive to incomes at the bottom of the income spectrum 
(increasing more rapidly as the incomes of the very poor approach zero).  For higher values 
of  , the index becomes increasingly sensitive to incomes at the upper end of the spectrum 
(increasing more rapidly as the incomes of the very rich approach infinity) 
For the Theil T index,   =1, for the Theil L index,   =0. Equations for these special cases are 
given below; 
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Where    is the Theil-T index, and    is the Theil-L index, also known as the mean log-
deviation (MLD). 
The advantage of converting from    to    is that the normalised version of   is equivalent 
to the Atkins index for   =1. For     the following conversion can be utilised to produce a 
close approximation of the Atkins Index.27 
           
Due to the commonalities in functional form between   and   , they become almost 
identical in value for income distributions that are approximately log-normal, which is 
somewhat typical.28 In order to account for differences that result from skewness in typical 
distributions, the relationship between    and    can be estimated via standard OLS 
regression techniques. Although a smaller data sample is available for this regression as 
opposed to others in the chain, the commonality in functional form should provide added 
weight to the results. Data sources and regression statistics are given in table 5. 
Table 5 Data sources and regression statistics -Theil T and Theil L indexes 
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Sen and Foster, On Economic Equality, 140. 
27
 For the relationship between the Theil-L and the Atkinson index, see Ibid., 140–141; Bourguignon, 
“Decomposable Income Inequality Measures,” 913. 
28
Creedy, Dynamics of Income Distribution; Cowell, Measuring Inequality,2:. 
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Source Place Scope Observation 
pairs 
Shipp (1997) U.S. National 5 
Sali-i-Martin (2002) Global, across 
and within 
countries 
Global 87 
Regression statistics       
a: 1.04 Observations 92 
R^2 0.9999 F statistic 87840 
P null 0 T statistic (.01) 296.37(2.63) 
 
Given this relationship,  can be estimated directly from the Gini index: 
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Combined with the transformation equation;          , the Atkinson index can then be 
directly estimated from the Gini Index. The calculated relationship between the Gini and Atkinson 
indexes is shown graphically in figure 2 
1.3.3 Checking estimates against secondary sources 
 
Each step in the chain process outlined above has produced very strong results; however, it 
is still possible given the number of steps in the process that the overall results of this 
estimation method may be unsatisfactory. In order to guard against his possibility, the 
results have been checked against estimates for the Atkinson index in the secondary 
literature calculated from income shares. A standard linear OLS regression is used to check 
the results utilising the following equation to be estimated 
       
Where A is the Atkinson measure calculated from an estimate of income shares, and    is 
the estimate derived from the Gini index. If the estimation method is accurate both   and 
the r^2 should be close to 1.  
The results suggest that that the conversion in incredibly accurate for value of e between .5 
and 1.5. Some inaccuracy exists for estimates utilising e=2 for Argentina, where the 
conversion equation under-estimates the Atkins measure by around 4 per cent.29 Results are 
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This inaccuracy is a result of the sensitivity of the Atkins measure at high values of e to low incomes; and 
therefore also to the incomes share at the lowest decide, and to variability in the treatment of very small, zero, 
or negative reported incomes. The problem of dealing with very low incomes affects all estimation techniques; 
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presented in table 6, showing separate regression statistics for e=.5, 1, and 1.5, and the less 
accurate estimates for Argentina when e=2. The results are shown graphically figure 3 
Table 6 Data and regression statistics: conversion equation accuracy check 
Source Place Scope 
Observation 
pairs 
Sali-i-Martin 
(2002) 
World Global aggregate 116 
Francois &Rogas-
Romagosa (2006) 
many countries National  50 
Sali-i-Martin 
(2006) 
World Global aggregate 62 
CEDLAS (2011) Argentina 
National & 
Regional 
115 
LIS (2011) 35 countries National 70 
Regression statistics:             
a: 1.002 Observations 400 
R^2 0.9989 F statistic 376772 
P null 0 T statistic (.01) 613 (2.59) 
Regression statistics:         
a: 1.04 Observations 35 
R^2 0.9982 F statistic 18626 
P null 0 T statistic (.01) 136.47 (2.73) 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter outlined a method for estimating the Atkinson SWF from the ubiquitous Gini 
index. The method outlined in this chapter can enable researchers to readily adopt 
inequality adjusted income as an alternative or additional indicator of social welfare. The 
advantage of utilising this indicator over unadjusted per-capita income is that the former 
explicitly accounts for distributional efficiency in a transparent and non-ad-hoc manner. The 
method outlined in this chapter alongside the point estimate for   of 1.5 obtained in chapter 
2 is later employed to produce a series of estimates of the direct social welfare losses from 
inequality across time and place. These results are presented in appendix A, alongside 
estimates of total losses, inclusive of external and positional effects. 
 
Figure 2 Gini-Atkinson index functions for selected values of   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
however variability in the skewness of the income distribution creates additional problems for the Gini-
Atkinson conversion method outlined here. When the Atkins measure is estimated from the Gini index, a 
typical income distribution is assumed, and where the income share of the lowest decile is lower than in the 
typical distribution corresponding to a given Gini index, the estimation is biased downwards 
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Figure 3 Correlation of Atkinson index estimates – from Gini index and income shares 
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2 Review of estimates of the personal elasticity 
of marginal utility from income 
Introduction 
 
This chapter conducts a review of an extensive literature devoted to the estimation of the 
elasticity of marginal utility from income, with a view towards obtaining a suitable value for 
estimating the direct social-welfare losses from income inequality. A series of estimation 
methods, alongside the results obtained, are presented and discussed in turn. From this 
review, a value of 1.5 is obtained. As discussed in the conclusion, this is consistent with 
other literature reviews.  
The elasticity of marginal utility from income can be estimated through direct surveys, and 
through a variety of econometric techniques focused on expenditure and savings behaviour 
under conditions of uncertainty or inter-temporally variant income. A very large number of 
studies have been conducted utilising these two classes of methods over the last 35 years, 
although the results are not always consistent or commensurable. It should be noted that 
only a subsection of a very large number of studies are suitable for estimating   in the 
context of an individualistic interpretation of the Atkinson index-in which case a generalised 
personal utility function in a context of fixed reference incomes is being estimated. A 
number of studies have been excluded for consideration on two criteria; firstly, those that 
utilise   as a subjective parameter of social preferences; secondly, those that estimate   in 
the context of varying reference incomes.30 
Regarding variable reference income, some studies have utilised a ‘veil of ignorance’ lottery 
where individuals are asked to rank various income distribution in which they are told to 
imagine they will be placed at random.31 This approach is consistent with the established 
practice of deriving cardinal utility functions from preferences under uncertainty, but the 
existence of variable reference incomes means external and positional affects are also 
captured by the estimation method. In these studies the Pareto or monotonicity principle is 
                                                          
30
 For subjective estimates of the elasticity of marginal (social) income, see Michele Bernasconi, “How should 
income be divided? questionnaire evidence from the theory of ‘Impartial preferences’,” Journal of Economics 9 
(December 1, 2002): 163-195-195; Jukka Pirtilla and Roope Uusitalo, Leaky Bucket in the Real World: 
Estimating Inequality Aversion Using Survey Data (CESIFO, June 2007), http://www.cesifo-
group.de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1187588.PDF; Yoram Amiel, John Creedy, and Stan Hurn, “Measuring 
Attitudes Towards Inequality,” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 101, no. 1 (March 1, 1999): 83-96. 
31
F. Carlsson, G. Gupta, and O. Johansson-Stenman, “Choosing from behind a veil of ignorance in India,” 
Applied Economics Letters 10, no. 13 (August 11, 2011): 825-827; Olof Johansson-Stenman, Fredrik Carlsson, 
and Dinky Daruvala, “Measuring Future Grandparents’ Preferences for Equality and Relative Standing,” The 
Economic Journal 112 (April 1, 2002): 362-383. 
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often violated, and the social marginal utility of income of those on higher incomes can be 
negative, which is inconsistent with the functional form of the standard Atkinson SWF.32 
These studies provide excellent information on the magnitude of external and total social-
welfare losses from inequality, and are utilised to that end in Chapter 3. 
 
2.1 Estimates of ε derived from surveyed and revealed risk 
aversion 
 
The elasticity of marginal utility of income can be readily derived from estimates of personal 
risk aversion, obtained from surveys and indirect estimation methods. As demonstrated by 
von Neumann, Morgenstern, Arrow, and Pratt, under conditions of uncertainty (or inter-
temporal variation in income), expected utility from income or consumption takes a cardinal 
form, and the marginal utility across income levels can be derived from the implicit or 
explicit utility weight individuals give to consumption or income at different possible income 
levels.33 This approach, usually known as Expected Utility Theory (EUT), has been widely 
employed to study a variety of economic behaviours, and has, often as a by-product, 
produced a large number of estimates for ε. 
Both surveyed and revealed preferences have been utilised by EUT to estimate Constant 
Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) functions, which are conceptually and formally equivalent to 
the isoelastic utility function utilised by Atkinson.34 In survey methods, respondents are 
asked to rank lotteries on future income, where the mean and dispersion across options 
vary.35Relative risk aversion functions can also be estimated from actual decisions in the 
context of options with varying risk and mean payoff. Estimates from these two methods 
are summarised in table 7. 
 
 
                                                          
32
 On violation of the Pareto principle, see Chew Soo Hong, “A Generalization of the Quasilinear Mean with 
Applications to the Measurement of Income Inequality and Decision Theory Resolving the Allais Paradox,” 
Econometrica 51, no. 4 (July 1, 1983): 1065-1092; Bernasconi, “How should income be divided? questionnaire 
evidence from the theory of ‘Impartial preferences’”; Yoram Amiel and Frank Cowell, “Monotonicity, 
dominance and the Pareto principle,” Economics Letters 45, no. 4 (August 1994): 447-450. 
33
 On this approach, see Kenneth J. Arrow, “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care: Reply 
(The Implications of Transaction Costs and Adjustment Lags),” The American Economic Review 55, no. 1/2 
(March 1, 1965): 154-158; John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic 
Behaviour (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944); Kenneth J. Arrow, Aspects of Risk-Bearing (Helsinki: 
Yrjo Hansson Foundation, 1965); John W. Pratt, “Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large,” Econometrica 32, 
no. 1/2 (January 1, 1964): 122-136. 
34
Atkinson, “On the measurement of inequality.” 
35
Whilst several studies have employed this method, many also vary reference incomes, and are therefore 
unsuitable for the reasons explained above 
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Table 7 Estimates of ε derived from surveyed and revealed risk aversion 
Table sources 
Source Data source/Method Population/Indicator e estimate  
Survey results      
Biswanger (1980) Survey & experiment, 
lottery 
Semi-arid rural India 1.37*  
Barsky (1995) Survey on retirement 
income prospects, middle 
aged respondents 
U.S., first income quintile 3.91  
  Q2 4.23  
  Q3 4.33  
  Q4 4.33  
  Q5 3.98  
  mean of above 4.16  
Guiso and Paiella 2001 Lottery type question on 
security payoff. Bank of 
Italy 
Italy 4.80  
Eisenhaur and Ventura (2011) as above Italy 7.18-8.59 
 Dohmen et. al. 2005 Hypothetical lottery Representative Sample, 
Germany 
~4.0 
 Revealed preferences     
 Friedman (1973) Health Insurance U.S. ~10 
 Friend  and Blume (1975) Demand for risky assets U.S. 2.0-3.1 
 Farber (1978) Union negotiations U.S. Mine Workers,      
1948-1973 
3.0-3.7 
 Szpiro (1986) Property & Liability 
Insurance 
U.S. 1.29-1.79 
 Rozenweig and Wolpin (1993) Investment in risky assets: 
Livestock 
Rural India 0.96* 
 Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) Life insurance U.S. 3.74 
 Azar (2007) Demand for risky assets U.S. ~1.0 
 Kreisner, Vicusi, and Ziliak 
(2010) 
Avoidance of risk of death U.S. ~1.44 
 Bombardini andTrebbi (2011) Lottery type game show Italy ~1.0 
 *model has been calibrated to adjust for credit constraints (including self-imposed quasi-constraints)  
or uncertainty aversion 
 
The estimates derived from these methods tend to be both rather high in comparison to 
estimates derived from other methods, and highly inconsistent, and this variability can be 
attributed to a series of conceptual and econometric problems. For example, the high 
estimates for   that are often obtained from revealed preferences can be partly attributed 
to habitual or myopic risk aversion.36When data consistent with these effects is utilised to 
estimate a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) equation, especially in the context of low 
relative risk, unreasonably high estimates for ε are often obtained- in some instances 
                                                          
36
Evidence from surveys and direct experiments suggest that some absolute risk aversion exists, due to myopia 
or habit formation, even in cases where potential losses are insignificant in comparison to life-savings or 
permanent income. On this point, see for example Pierre Chiappori and Monica Paiella, Relative Risk Aversion 
Is Constant: Evidence from Panel Data, Working Paper, Department of Economic Studies Working Papers 
(Naples: University of Naples, 2008), http://economia.uniparthenope.it/ise/sito/DP/DP_5_2008.pdf. 
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producing three to four digit estimates.37In these instances, there is an element of model 
misspecification- risk aversion is not consistent with the specified CRRA model. Additionally, 
when revealed preferences are utilised, there is also often an assumption made that perfect 
information exists in regards to the mean payoffs and probabilities associated with 
alternative options. In the absence of sufficient information required to assess various 
options, various heuristic devices, or social norms may be utilised to inform decisions on risk 
taking behaviour, introducing various biases and noise. In addition, there is likely to be a 
degree of ‘uncertainty aversion’ which compounds pure risk aversion.38 
These potential problems have motivated strident attacks on the ability of EUT to model risk 
aversion.39 However, it has been shown that in general mean risk aversion (defined as the 
percentage premium for the risky option) is small for small gambles, as predicted by EUT.40 
In addition, various methods have been devised for adjusting for myopic or habitual risk 
aversion, and for credit constraints. Both credit constraints and heuristic or habitual 
approaches to risk aversion (‘firewalling’ some savings or income from risky decisions) can 
be modelled by estimating the portion of lifetime income that is capable of or willing to be 
brought forward, in order to smooth consumption in response to negative income shocks. 
Studies that have made corrections of this nature, for example Biswanger (1980) and 
Rozenweig and Wolpin (1993) have produced lower and more realistic estimates for ε, as 
have those where large or transparent risks are involved, such as  Kreisner, Vicusi, and Ziliak 
(2010) and Bombardini and Trebbi (2011).41 These results can be treated with some degree 
of seriousness, as opposed to the much higher figures, which could be cautiously 
interpreted as setting an upper bound for  . Finally, it should be noted that the low variance 
                                                          
37
 See Hans P. Biswanger, “Attitudes towards Risk: Experimental Measurement in Rural India,” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 62 (August 1980), 
http://karlan.yale.edu/fieldexperiments/pdf/Binswanger_Attitudes%20Toward%20Risk_Experimental%20Mea
surement%20in%20Rural%20India.pdf; Hans P. Biswanger, Attitudes Towards Risk: Implications for Economic 
and Psychological Theories of Behaviour under risk in an Experiment in Rural India, Working Paper, Economic 
Growth Centre Discussion Papers (New Haven: Economic Growth Centre, 1978); Shlomo Benartzi and Richard 
H. Thaler, “Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, no. 
1 (February 1, 1995): 73-92. The results obtained by Biswanger are not included because a CRRA equation was 
not utilised and hence the results are incommensurable.  
38
 On uncertainty aversion, see P. Anand, “Analysis of Uncertainty as Opposed to Risk: An Experimental 
Approach,” Agricultural Economics 4 (1990): 145-63; David Kelsey, “Maxmin Expected Utility and Weight of 
Evidence,” Oxford Economic Papers 46, no. 3, New Series (July 1, 1994): 425-444; D. Ellsberg, “Risk, Ambiguity 
and the Savage Axioms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 75 (n.d.): 643-69. 
39
M. Rabin, “Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility: A Calibration Theorem,” Econometrica 68 (2000): 1281-1292. 
40
 Whilst some risk aversion can be observed in some instances for small risks, negative risk aversion can also 
be observed (i.e. gambling). See Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, Roberto Serrano, and Oscar Volji, “Rejecting Small 
Gambles Under Expected Utility,” Economics Letters 91, no. 2, Economics Working Papers (2006): 250-259. 
41
 In the latter case, the context of a game show is likely to reduce the effect of myopic/habitual risk aversion, 
as the situation is so different from normal life choices where habits or heuristics may be employed. On the 
other hand, the situation may select those with low risk aversion.   
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across income quintiles obtained by Barsky lends support to the practice of utilising a 
constant elasticity of marginal utility function in the Atkinson SWF.42 
 
2.2 Estimates for ε derived from intertemporal consumption 
behaviour 
 
The value of   can also be derived from data on consumption and saving behaviour over the 
life-cycle. The basic approach relies on estimating a ‘Euler equation’, where expected utility 
is maximised over time, in the context of variable interest rates and income. In this 
approach,    is calculated as the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 
consumption (EIS)- a measure of the level of indifference to the allocation of lifetime 
consumption over time (and hence income level).43 When the EIS is high, consumers are 
unconcerned about smoothing consumption over the life cycle- they will therefore save 
more when interest rates rise in order to maximise mean lifetime income. In contrast, when 
the IES is below one, consumers are primarily concerned with smoothing consumption 
rather than maximising lifetime income, and the income effect of increases in interest rates 
will outweigh the incentive effect. When the EIS is unity, the income and incentive effects of 
interest rates balance each other, and interest rate changes should have no effect on 
savings behaviour.44 
Despite some troubling econometric issues, some consistent results have been obtained by 
this method. Estimates for   derived from intertemporal consumption patterns range from 
.32 to 4.24 for developed countries; however a significant proportion of reported estimates 
are within a moderately tight band around the mean of 1.58. Especially noteworthy are the 
results obtained by Ogaki, Ostry and Reinhart (1996), which range from 1.57 to 1.63 for 
developed countries.  Estimates for high income countries are summarised in table 8.  
In general, the application of EUT to model consumption behaviour is dependent on an 
assumption of near-perfect capital markets and rational agents; although corrections have 
been introduced in some instances to model credit constraints. When results are estimated 
for developing countries with rudimentary capital markets, estimates for   are likely to be 
biased upwards. Such an effect can arguably be found in the results of Ogaki, Ostry and 
Reinhart for low and middle income countries, where high estimates are found for low 
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 Other studies have confirmed that relative risk aversion is largely invariant of income, see Neal Blue and 
Tweeten, “The estimation of marginal utility of income for application to agricultural policy analysis.” 
43
 The model generally relies on determining the degree of variation in consumption patterns that result from 
pure time preferences and variation in needs across the life cycle- this is equivalent to the consumption 
pattern that would be chosen when interest rates are zero and no credit constraints exist. Form this baseline, 
the effect of changes in the interest rate on consumption over time, and the EIS, can be estimated.  
44
Timothy J. Besley and Costas Meghir, Tax Based Savings Incentives, unpublished paper, World Bank Savings 
Project (World Bank, September 1998), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMACRO/Resources/besley.pdf. 
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income countries, although some of this variation may be due to genuinely higher levels of 
risk aversion amongst low income earners.45 These results and Reinhart are reproduced in 
table 9. These are some of the very few consistent and plausible results for developing 
countries.46 
A series of econometric issues arise in the context of estimating the EIS, and a lively debate 
exists in regards to the most appropriate and fruitful modelling techniques.47 In particular, 
criticism has been levied against estimates derived from the Euler equation on grounds that 
is susceptible to the often large errors in available consumption data, and that it requires 
(largely unavailable) long panels to obtain robust estimates.48 These modelling issues may 
explain the considerable variation in results obtained by different studies. Some additional 
variation across and within studies can be explained by the consumption measure utilised.49 
The lower estimates obtained by Blundell et al. can also be explained by variation in model 
                                                          
45
 Evidence suggesting that the EIS increases with wealth can also be found in: Andrew Atkeson and Masao 
Ogaki, “Wealth-varying intertemporal elasticities of substitution: Evidence from panel and aggregate data,” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 38, no. 3 (December 1996): 507-534. However, if the wealthy have greater 
access to capital markets, then this does not imply differing value of  . On the effect of credit constraints on 
Euler equation type models, see: Fatih Guvenen, “Reconciling conflicting evidence on the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution: A macroeconomic perspective,” Journal of Monetary Economics 53, no. 7 (October 
2006): 1451-1472. 
46
 Other plausible results have been obtained for India in: Atkeson and Ogaki, “Wealth-varying intertemporal 
elasticities of substitution: Evidence from panel and aggregate data.” 
47
Alan Sule and Martin Browning, Estimating Intertemporal Allocation Parameters using Synthetic Residual 
Estimation (Cambridge: Centre for Financial Analysis & Policy, Cambridge University, January 2008), 
http://www-cfap.jbs.cam.ac.uk/publications/downloads/wp32.pdf. 
48
 On data error, see David E. Runkle, “Liquidity constraints and the permanent-income hypothesis : Evidence 
from panel data,” Journal of Monetary Economics 27, no. 1 (February 1991): 73-98; J. G. Altonji and A. Siow, 
“Testing the Response of Consumption to Income Changeswith Noisy Panel Data,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 102 (1987): 293-328; Matthew D. Shapiro, “The permanent income hypothesis and the real interest 
rate : Some evidence from panel data,” Economics Letters 14, no. 1 (1984): 93-100. According to Carroll, these 
data issues make Euler Equation estimated utilising micro-data insufficiently robust- see C. Carroll, “Death to 
the Log-Linearized Consumption Euler Equation! (And Very Poor Health to the Second-Order Approximation),” 
Advances in Macroeconomics 1, no. 1 (2001), 
http://www.bepress.com/bejm/advances/vol1/iss1/art6/.Anatsio& Low have countered that a sufficiently 
long panel allows for robust estimates- see Orazio P. Attanasio and Hamish Low, “Estimating Euler equations,” 
Review of Economic Dynamics 7, no. 2 (April 2004): 406-435. 
49
 Studies that utilise non-durables as the consumption measure produce higher results than those that have 
utilised a broader measure.  The lower value obtained by Fauvel & Samson contains a bias in the other 
direction, due to the exclusion of services. As services clearly are ‘non-durable’, their exclusion increase the 
weight of the durable component of the consumption measure. Unlike the exclusion of durable goods, there 
are no theoretical grounds for excluding services; however the problem of calculating price indexes for 
services may produce practical reasons for exclusion. Yvon Fauvel and Lucie Samson, “Intertemporal 
Substitution and Durable Goods: An Empirical Analysis,” The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue 
canadienne d’Economique 24, no. 1 (February 1, 1991): 192-205. The presumed rational for this narrow 
definition of consumption is that purchases of durable goods should be treated as a form of saving and 
investment 
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specification, in this case, by an ad-hoc attempt to control for interest rate volatility in the 
1980’s.50 
Table 8 Estimates of ε from intertemporal consumption behaviour: High income countries 
 
Source Country Data 
period 
Consumption 
measure 
E estimate 
(mean) 
Notes 
Weber (1970)  U.S.   2.72 Asset return + 
Consumption eq. 
Boskin (1978) U.S. 1926-
1969 ex. 
1941-46 
total 
consumption 
2.5-3.33 (2.91)   
Skinner (1985) U.S. 1972-3  2.0-5.0 CES model 
Muellbauer (1987) U.K. 1968-72   0.77   
Attanasio and  
Weber (1989) 
U.K. 1970-84 non-durables 1.46 CES model 
      0.51 Consumption + asset 
eq. 
Fauvel and 
Samson (1991) 
Canada 1961-86 durables & 
nondurables 
0.97   
      0.77 Excluding services 
Patterson and 
Pesaran (1992) 
U.S. 1955-89 Non-durables & 
Services 
4.69   
U.K. 1955-89 3.66   
Zulia (1993) Canada 1960-92 total 
consumption 
.79-2.41 (1.60) Lower and upper 
results are from 
different model 
specifications. 
  France   .98-3.57 (2.28) 
  Germany   .66-3.37 (2.02) 
  Italy   .75-2.42 (1.58) 
  Japan   .51-1.10 (.80) 
  U.K.   .71-1.52 (1.11) 
  U.S.   .85-1.42 (1.13 
Blundell et al. 
(1994) 
UK 1970-86  1.18-1.39 
(1.27) 
Standard model 
   .32-1.04 (.52) Dummy variable for 
interest rate spike in 
1980's  
Beaudry and Van-
Wincoop (1996) 
U.S. 1953-91 non-durables 2.69   
  1978-91   0.95   
  1953-91   2.94   
  1978-91   2.06 Variable tax rates 
Hamori (1996) Japan 1955-93  2.1 Lowest income quintile 
     1.04 Highest income quintile 
Ogaki, Ostry and 
Reinhart (1996) 
Ireland 1968-92 traded & non 
traded 
1.63 Stone-Geary 
consumption model, 
IES allowed to vary with 
wealth 
Singapore   1.59 
U.K.   1.59 
Italy   1.59 
France   1.59 
Switzerland   1.58 
U.S.   1.57 
Average developed 1.58 
    Average all studies 1.6   
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According to Evans this represents the introduction of a ‘relatively crude dummy variable adjustment to an 
otherwise sophisticated empirical model’. David J. Evans, “The Elasticity of Marginal Utility of Consumption: 
Estimates for 20 OECD Countries,” Fiscal Studies 26, no. 2 (2005): 203. 
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Table 9 Estimates by Ogaki, Ostry and Reinhart (1996) for low to upper middle income 
countries 
 
Country   Data 
period 
Consumption 
measure 
E estimate  Notes 
Burkina Fasa 1968-92 Traded & non-
traded 
4.05 Stone-Geary 
Consumption model,  
IES allowed to vary with 
wealth 
India  2.98 
Togo  2.68 
Kenya  2.31 
Sudan  2.22 
Ten poorest countries  5.21 
Phillipines     1.84   
Morocco     1.83   
Peru     1.72   
Chile       1.69   
Lower-Middle income countries   1.74   
Argentina    1.7   
Brazil    1.67   
Portugal    1.66   
Malaysia    1.65   
Venezuela    1.62   
upper-middle income countries   1.65   
 
2.3 Estimating ε derived from consumer demand: The Fisher, 
Frisch and Fellner method 
 
Another method for estimating ε, pioneered by Fisher, Frisch, and Fellner (FFF), relies on the 
demand for preference independent goods, which enables a direct estimation of   from 
consumption data, utilising the following equation.51 
  
(    )
 
 
Where y is the income elasticity of demand, p is the compensated price elasticity of 
demand, and w is the budget share of the preference independent good utilised.52 
The FFF model produces relatively consistent results; however its utilisation is not without 
controversy. Firstly, the method is dependent on relatively strict preference independence- 
the class of goods selected must be neither substitutes nor complements to other goods in 
the consumption bundle. Whilst this strict condition has been utilised to discredit the FFF 
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I. Fisher, “A statistical method for measuring marginal utility,” in The Economic Essays Contributed in Honour 
of J. Bates (London: Macmillan, 1927), 157-93; R. Frisch, New Methods of Measuring Marginal Utility 
(Tubinger: J. C. B. Morh, 1932); W. Fellner, “Operational utility: the theoretical background and a 
measurement,” in Ten Economic Studies in the Tradition of Irving Fisher, ed. W. Fellner (New York: Wiley, 
1967). 
52
Evans, “The Elasticity of Marginal Utility of Consumption: Estimates for 20 OECD Countries,” 204. 
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method, the assumption of preference-independence has been found to be valid for broad 
aggregates, and for food.53 
As with other estimation methods, the FFF approach is sensitive to model specification. The 
constant demand elasticity model (CEM) has been the default method for estimating y and 
p, however alternatives exist, including the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) and the 
quadratic almost ideal demand system (QAIDS).54 Support for the constant elasticity 
assumption can be found in data from the UK, where the income elasticity of demand for 
food was found to be largely constant during 1979-2000.55 Cointegration methods have 
been utilised to test the validity of the CEM and AIDS models, with both options 
outperforming each other in different cases.56 
One novel approach for estimating   with some similarities to the FFF model is also 
considered here. In this approach, pioneered by Raj Chetty,   is calculated from the income 
side, utilising the ratio of the income elasticity of labour to the compensated wage 
elasticity.57 Utilising a variety of secondary sources to obtain data on these variables, Chetty 
obtained results ranging from .15 to 1.78 (mean .71) for the basic model, and .30-2.25 
(mean .97) for an upper bound adjustment for labour-consumption complementarity. 
However, no adjustment was made to account for barriers to employment, which may lead 
to a significant understatement of ε.58 A summary of relevant results is given in table 10. 
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For criticism of the FFF method, see Nicholas Herbert Stern, “Welfare weights and the elasticity of marginal 
utility of income,” in Proceedings of the Annual Conference of University Teachers of Economics, ed. M. Artis 
and R. Norbay (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977); Angus Deaton and John Muellbauer, “An Almost Ideal Demand 
System,” The American Economic Review 70, no. 3 (June 1, 1980): 312-326. On the credibility of the want-
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measurement”; David J. Evans and Haluk Sezer, “Social discount rates for member countries of the European 
Union” 32 (2005): 47-59; E. A. Selvanathan, “A cross-county analysis of consumption patterns” 25 (1993): 
1245-59; E. A. Selvanathan, “A System-Wide analysis of international consumption patterns: advanced 
econometric series” (University of Western Australia, 1988). 
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Jan Van Daal and Arnold H. Q. M. Merkies, “A Note on the Quadratic Expenditure Model,” Econometrica 57, 
no. 6 (November 1, 1989): 1439-1443; Deaton and Muellbauer, “An Almost Ideal Demand System”; James 
Banks, Richard Blundell, and Arthur Lewbel, “Quadratic Engel Curves and Consumer Demand,” The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 79, no. 4 (November 1, 1997): 527-539. 
55
MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, UK), The National Food Survey (London: Office for 
National Statistics, 2001), 97–98. 
56
 For studies where the CEM outperforms the AIDS model, see E. Kula, “Estimation of the social rate of 
interest for India,” Journal of Agricultural Economics 55, no. 1 (2004): 199-217; Evans, Kula, and Sezer, 
“Regional welfare weights for the UK: England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.” For the alternative 
case, see David J. Evans, “A social discount rate for France,” Applied Economics Letters 11 (2004): 803-808. 
57
Raj Chetty, “A New Method of Estimating Risk Aversion,” The American Economic Review 96, no. 5 
(December 1, 2006): 1821-1834. 
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Raj Chetty, Consumption Commitments, Unemployment Durations, and Local Risk Aversions, Working Paper 
(Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004), http://www.nber.org/tmp/35654-w10211.pdf. 
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Table 10 Estimates for ε derived from the FFF method 
Source Model Country Data Period e estimate 
Kula (1984) CEM U.S.A 1954-76 1.89 
  CEM Canada 1954-76 1.56 
Kula (1985) CEM UK 1954-77 0.71 
Blundell (1988) AIDS UK 1970-84 1.97 
Blundell et al. 
(1993) 
Agreggate QUAIDS (GMM) UK 1970-84 1.06 
Micro QUAIDS (OLS) UK   1.06 
Micro QUAIDS (GMM) UK   1.37 
Blundell et al 
(1994) 
Generalised AIDS/QUAIDS UK  1.29 
Banks et. al. 
(1997) 
QUAIDS UK 1970-86 1.07 
Clements at. al. 
(2001) 
Various Various  2.41 
Evans and Sezer 
(2002) 
CEM UK 1967-97 1.64 
Evans (2004) CEM UK 1965-01 1.6 
Evans (2004b) AIDS France 1970-01 1.33 
Chetty (2006) Supply of labour, meta-study Various Various .71-.97 
    Average all studies: 1.42 
 
2.4 Estimates for ε derived from taxation progressivity: The 
equal absolute sacrifice model 
 
Another method that has been employed to estimate ε is the equal absolute sacrifice 
taxation model. This method relies on an assumption that governments set their income tax 
rates in a manner that is designed to impose an equal absolute sacrifice of utility (EAS) on 
each citizen.59 If this is the case, then estimates for ε can be derived in a rather 
straightforward manner from the progressivity of the income tax schedule. In the opinion of 
the author, this is not a very promising estimation method; however a discussion of the 
method and summary of results is provided in order to provide a complete survey. 
It should be noted that the EAS model should not be interpreted as producing a ‘subjective’ 
estimate for ε, and should therefore not be immediately ruled out for consideration. No 
normative judgement need be made on the equal absolute sacrifice principle- one simply 
has to accept that the rule is faithfully (even if unconsciously) applied by governments that 
have an accurate picture of the utility functions of their citizens.60 This assumption is, 
however, rather tenuous. Whilst some evidence exists that governments do adopt principles 
consistent with the equal sacrifice model, the significant variation in tax progressivity across 
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H.P. Young, “Progressive taxation and the equal sacrifice principle,” Journal of Public Economics 32 (1987): 
203-12; D.F. Vitaliano, “The tax sacrifice rules under alternative definitions of progressivity,” Public Finance 
Quarterly 5 (1977): 489-94. 
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 The equal absolute sacrifice principle is strongly anti-egalitarian in comparison to a utilitarian framework, 
and in keeping with the perspective of this paper, should be rejected on normative grounds.   
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time and place suggest that other principles are employed in setting taxation schedules.61 In 
particular, it is plausible that governments would depart from the equal sacrifice principle in 
both utilitarian/egalitarian or elitist directions due to political pressure for more or less 
equal post-transfer income distributions. Even if the principle of equal absolute sacrifice can 
be shown to be robust, there is little reason to suggest that governments are able to 
correctly estimate a representative utility function, and then apply that information to 
produce a taxation schedule that even approximately reflects the actual variation in 
marginal utility across income levels. Although little weight should be given to the results 
obtained by the method, they are remarkably consistent with the results obtained by the 
life-cycle and FFF models. A summary of estimates derived from the equal absolute sacrifice 
model is given in table 11. 
Table 11 Estimates of ε derived from taxation progressivity and the equal absolute 
sacrifice model 
Source Country    value 
(income tax) 
  value (income 
tax and social 
security 
Stern (1977) U.K. 1.97   
Cowell and 
Gardiner (1999) 
U.K. 1.41 1.28 
Evans (2004b) France 1.33   
Evans (2005) 20 OECD countries 1.4   
Percoco (2006) Italy  1.35 
Lopez (2008) Argentina 1.3   
  Bolivia 1.5   
  Brazil 1.8   
  Chile 1.3   
  Colombia 1.8   
  Honduras 1.1   
  Mexico 1.3   
  Nicaragua 1.4   
  Peru 1.9   
  Average Latin America 1.5   
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 For recent discussions in defence of the equal sacrifice model, see David Evans and Haluk Sezer, “A time 
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2.5 Discussion of Results: Choosing a value of ε for 
discounting income in relation to direct losses from 
inequality 
 
This chapter has outlined a series of methods for estimating  . The most consistent and 
methodological sound estimates have arguable been derived from intertemporal 
consumption data, utilising the FFF or intertemporal consumption approaches. These 
methods have produced estimates which are concentrated in the range of between one and 
two, with a mean of 1.4 and 1.6 respectively. On these grounds a mid-point value of 1.5 is 
adopted for the calculations in this paper.  
This adopted value is somewhat consistent with results produced from other surveys of the 
existing literature. For some time the British Treasure recommended the use of a value of 
1.5 for cost-benefit analysis, although it has been later reduced to 1.0, on the grounds of 
evidence given in Peace and Ulph (1989), which itself recommends a value of 1.25.62  In a 
series of papers which a times criticise this downward adjustment, Peter Evens has provided 
evidence suggesting that the Treasury adopt a value close to the previous value of 1.5.63 
Earlier surveys have also produced estimates somewhat consistent with a value of 1.5. 
Surveying results obtained from studies of choices under uncertainty, Dasgupta (1998) 
obtained a best bet figure of around 2.0, or slightly higher, whilst Blanchard & Fischer (1989) 
report that results based on intertemporal choices suggest a value close to but somewhat 
higher than unity.64 
The survey conducted here is to my knowledge the most extensive to date of the literature 
on the personal utility function. A large body of consistent evidence has been compiled and 
reviewed, sufficient to enable an estimate to be obtained with a degree of confidence.  
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3 Estimating the indirect and total costs of 
income inequality 
Introduction 
 
The role of reference incomes and social patterns of consumption in determining the 
relationship between personal consumption and satisfaction has been long known to 
political economy, with Smith, Marx, and Veblen focusing attention on the social nature of 
consumption.65 According to Marx: 
 “A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small it 
satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But if a palace arises beside the little house, 
the little house shrinks to a hovel … the dweller will feel more and more uncomfortable, 
dissatisfied and cramped within its four walls.”66 
More recently, the role of positional effects in determining health and welfare outcomes 
has been the subject of rapidly growing literature within and across the disciplines of 
economics, political economy, psychology, and epidemiology. This literature suggests that 
income inequality can impose large social-welfare costs in addition to those that can be 
attributed to the convexity of the relationship between income and various outcomes, 
including reduced health outcomes and life satisfaction. In this regard, these costs can be 
treated as a form of negative externality.  
Section 3.1 of this chapter outlines the pathways through which these external effects 
operate. The second section is devoted to the estimation of the social-welfare costs that are 
imposed in a series of areas. Mechanisms through which external effects operate include; 
 Direct positional income effects (the envy and snob effect) 
 Secondary positional effects(induced positional good consumption) 
 Primary psychosocial effects (neuroendocrine responses) 
 Secondary psychosocial effects (increased high risk and anti-social behaviour) 
 Corrosive effects on social cohesion and coordinative capacity 
 Corrosive effects on democratic culture and institutions (the oligarch effect) 
Operating through these and possibly other mechanisms, indirect negative effects of income 
inequality can be observed in the following areas; 
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 Health outcomes, including mental health 
 Happiness and life satisfaction 
 Transaction costs 
 Costs from crime, including defensive costs  
 Resolution of conflicts, and adoption of innovations and reforms, (including those 
that are Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficient)  
 Environmental outcomes 
Section 3.2 and 3.3 are devoted to estimates of the effect of income inequality on health 
outcomes and total welfare respectively.  In these estimates, an Atkinson type SWF is 
estimated from micro and macro data. At the micro level, surveys utilising an income 
lottery, as discussed in Chapter 2 can be employed, except in this case reference incomes 
also vary. In these ‘Haryanyi lotteries’ positional income effects are uncovered, and some, 
but not all of the negative external effects of high incomes (the induced envy effect) can be 
calculated, alongside values of   that can be utilised to calculate an approximation of total 
social welfare losses from inequality. Additionally, Atkinson SWF functions can be calculated 
via the correlation between mean income, inequality, and life satisfaction, and between 
mean healthcare expenditures, background income inequality, and life expectancy. In this 
case, the Atkinson index is utilised as an expenditure divisor, reducing the expected effects 
of health expenditures and mean income on health and experienced utility outcomes in 
monotonic proportion to inequality. Utilising an iterative process, a value for   can be 
calculated that provides the best possible fit to the available data.  
When values for   obtained from these methods are higher than those obtained in the 
previous section where only direct effects were considered, this can be taken as evidence of 
significant external effects. This is the case, and significantly larger values for   are obtained 
when the aggregated direct and indirect costs are estimated. These values are generally 
between two and four. It should be noted that several of these effects can also be seen as 
imposing negative effects on economic growth. Discussions of these effects are deferred to 
chapter 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
3.1 Positional income effects and social-welfare 
3.1.1 Direct positional income effects 
 
It has long been known that people compare their level of consumption and income to 
others, and that when personal income is well below a social standard or some social 
reference point, various feelings of resentment, inadequacy, and envy are likely to result.67 
Crucially, however, the effects of income inequality on happiness and life satisfaction do not 
operate purely through psychological channels. Envy can be a rational counterpart to class-
based discrimination, which is generally exacerbated or facilitated by income inequality.68 
Increases in reference incomes can impose negative, material impacts on those who cannot 
keep pace with reference levels of consumption.  A series of pathways exist through which 
these losses can accrue; 
 The price of goods which are supply-inelastic, for example land and housing in some 
cities, will tend to rise with mean incomes. Increased income inequality can reduce 
the real purchasing power of those on less than mean incomes in relation to these 
assets or goods, even when their absolute incomes rise.69 The price rises of some of 
these good can be further inflated by inequality induced positional expenditures.70 
 
 Due to positional discrimination, the level of personal consumption, in relation to 
socially determined reference levels, can determine one’s ability to take advantage 
or certain opportunities or access non-market ‘goods’. When levels of personal 
consumption are below certain standards, the ability to access education, socialise 
with peers, enter into relationships, and obtain certain forms of employment is 
restricted as a result of discrimination or positional screening.71 This discrimination is 
much less pronounced in more equal societies, where the dispersion in ability to 
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purchase positional goods is restricted by the reduced dispersion in disposable 
income.72 
In these instances, Pareto improvements in income distribution which involve small relative 
gains for the poor and large relative gains for the rich may actually reduce mean social-
welfare.73 As the incomes of the rich increase, so do social reference incomes, and without 
corresponding increases in income across the spectrum, the absolute level of social 
opportunity for large sections of society can decrease. As aspirations and abilities are not 
distributed in proportion to wealth, stratification reduces the mean or aggregate level of 
social opportunity.74 If, as hypothesised by Veblen, reference patterns of consumption are 
set by the wealthy, the effect of increased income inequality on reference consumption 
patterns can be especially pronounced.75 
3.1.2 Secondary positional effects: Increased positional consumption 
 
When access to various forms of opportunity is determined by ones consumption of 
positional goods in relation to social standards, it can be a rational response for an 
individual to increase consumption of those goods, to, in effect, signal a higher position in 
the income ladder than is actually achieved.76 Collectively such a response is irrational and 
self-defeating.77 Therefore, inequality induced increases in positional goods consumption 
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represents a pure welfare loss. Additionally, positional concerns can lead to excessive 
working hours, and attendant negative secondary effects, in an attempt to match reference 
incomes or consumption patterns.78 
Positional consumption has also been associated with increased levels of indebtedness and 
reduced levels of personal and aggregate savings.79 These effects may have negative effects 
in relation to the level and stability of economic growth. These potential growth effects are 
assessed in Chapter 4.  
3.1.3 Direct and indirect psychosocial effects 
 
In the last 15 to 20 years, a series of studies, following from the ground-breaking Whitehall-
II study, have established a relationship between low social status and autonomy over life 
and workplace decisions, and a series of illnesses, in particular cardiovascular disease.80 This 
relationship operates at least partly through the inducement of damaging stress and low-
esteem related neuroendocrine responses, including elevated corticosteroid and fibrinogen 
levels.81 
These effects can be significant, and crucially, cannot be significantly ameliorated through 
increasing absolute incomes, or, at least in wealthy countries, through increased healthcare 
expenditures.82 In high income countries where the marginal effect of aggregate healthcare 
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expenditures is low, the cost of these psychosocial effects, expressed in terms of the 
increase in healthcare expenditure that would be required to offset them, can be 
exceptionally large. I provide estimates of these costs in section 3.3 for a large combined 
dataset, however the estimated costs for a high income subsample cannot be computed as 
the negative effects of inequality completely overshadow and positive effect of 
expenditures.83  
A series of secondary negative effects can also result from income inequality via increased 
high risk and anti-social behaviours, which impose health and other costs, both on those 
with low status, and on society as a whole.84 
3.1.4 Corrosive effects on social cohesion, coordinative capacity, and democratic 
institutions 
 
Income inequality is also associated with reduced social-cohesion, trust, and to the 
concentration of political power amongst those at the top of the income distribution.85 
These outcomes can impair the ability of society to respond to a series of health, social and 
environmental problems- especially when the response is likely to be costly; the benefits 
accrue to those with low incomes and political power, and the cost fall at least partly on 
those with high levels of income and political power.86  When both income and political 
power are highly concentrated, the policy formation process can become indifferent to the 
welfare of those on low incomes, and highly sensitive to the desires, including myopic 
desires, of those on high incomes.87 In this situation, policy responses which may have very 
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high cost effectiveness may be frustrated, whilst far-less cost effectiveness or even 
counterproductive polices are pursued.88 
3.1.5 Inequality and transaction costs  
 
Additional losses are likely to result through increased transaction costs. There are several 
mechanisms through which income inequality may increase transaction costs: 
 The demand for particular classes of positional goods is likely to be highly responsive to 
advertising and marketing efforts. The psychological effects that come with social-
stratification, including low-esteem and competitiveness, are likely to make advertising 
more effective. To the extent that inequality increases positional concerns and 
positional consumption, it may also induce increased expenditures on advertising.89 This 
can take the form of increased expenditure on advertising designed to impart 
positionality to otherwise non-positional goods.90 
 Reduced levels of trust and social cohesion are likely to lead to increased transaction 
costs. In situations of low social capital, contracts and litigation may be used as 
substitutes for moral codes and informal regulation via communities.91 
 When income inequality is also associated with income volatility, a greater use of credit 
and forms of insurance is employed to smooth consumption. Various transaction cost 
are associated with an increased use of these instruments to smooth consumption.92 
 Inequality and positional driven consumption rises at the bottom of the income ladder 
can lead to high, and often unsustainable borrowing by low income earners. This 
expansion in credit provision can impose standard transaction costs, as well as financial 
instability.93 
The relationship between advertising expenditures and income inequality is demonstrated 
for 23 industrialised countries in figure 4.94 Advertising expenditures are only a small 
proportion of total transaction costs, especially in developed economies, and if total costs 
have a similar inequality gradient to advertising expenditures, then large welfare losses 
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could result from induced transaction costs.95. For a sense of proportion, estimates for the 
size of transaction costs in the US are given in figure 5.  
Figure 4 Income inequality and advertising expenditures 
 
 
Figure 5 Estimate of transaction costs in the US economy by Wallis and North (1989) 
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3.1.5.1 Estimates of the relationship between income inequality and size of the 
financial sector 
 
In this section, I present estimates for the relationship between the size of the finance, 
insurance, and real estate sector (FIRE) and income inequality in the United States. The 
method of estimation is a basic OLS linear regression with the Gini index of income 
inequality as the main explanatory variable, alongside the year and a dummy to account for 
the rapid growth in FIRE between 1948 and 1956. This dummy value is equal to 1956 minus 
the date (negative values set to zero). 96  Regression statistics are given in table 12, and time 
series results are shown graphically in figure 6.  
These results suggest a close relationship between inequality and development of the FIRE 
sector in the US. Although some reverse causality is likely, on theoretical grounds there is 
reason to suggest that inequality can induce extra expenditures on financial services, as a 
means to smooth or insure consumption in the context of income volatility and uncertainty. 
These additional, inequality induced transaction costs represent a deduction from the funds 
available for actual consumption, and hence represent an additional external welfare loss. 
 
Table 12 Regression statistics, income inequality and FIRE sector size, US 1948-2010 
Variable Gini Index Date (year) Pre 1956 Y intercept 
Coefficient 0.472093 0.000681 -0.004020 -1.378450 
T stat 11.47 7.90 -8.65 -8.81 
R^2 F stat Critical T (.01) P null Observations 
0.9822 1011.36 2.67 6.1 * 10^-44 63 
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Figure 6 Predicted and historical values, FIRE sector as percentage of GNI, US 1948-2010 
 
 
3.1.6 Inequality and environmental impacts 
 
Inequality can be associated with environmental degradation via two mechanisms: 
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instances, negative external effects of production and consumption are less likely to 
be addressed, either via moral codes or policy. When income inequality is associated 
with the concentration of political power, environmental policies which benefit the 
majority but impose costs on a wealthy minority may be politically unviable. 
 In more unequal societies, a higher level of mean income is required to obtain the 
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society. Inequality induced positional concerns can drive such political demands for 
ever increasing capabilities to engage in positional consumption.97 
When there are very strong environmental constraints to growth, welfare maximisation will 
be dependent on reducing inequality and maximising distributional efficiency.  
 
3.1.7 Positional effects in low-income countries and across nations: do reference 
incomes negatively affect the welfare of the global poor? 
 
Positional income effects are arguably more pronounced in wealthy countries. In order to 
investigate the likely effects of inequality on social welfare in developing countries, or at the 
international level, the relationship between income level and positional income effects 
must be known. In particular, the modelling of positional related losses in low income 
countries will result in biased estimates if relationships obtained from data relevant to 
wealthy countries, where positional concerns are strong, is applied to discount income in 
countries where positional concerns are weaker.  
For analysis of welfare outcomes in low-income countries or globally, another important 
question is the strength of global positional effects.  Do global mean incomes, or patterns of 
consumption in wealthy countries impact on the welfare effect of consumption in low-
income counties? 98 If such an effect is present, then low income countries will over-
consume in an attempt to emulate consumption patterns in high-income countries, possibly 
reducing both savings rates (and possibly growth) and distributional efficiency, and hence 
welfare outcomes. In recent years, a number of empirical studies have begun to address 
these questions. The findings of these studies are summarised in table 12. 
Although the results from these studies are mixed, some basic generalisations from the 
results can be obtained in combination with some basic theoretical inferences. These 
insights can be summarised as: 
 When people are very poor, absolute income level is the major determinant of 
welfare levels 
 Reference incomes can have a major negative effect on welfare in developing 
countries, where incomes are above very low levels.  
 There is evidence that positional effects increase with both personal and mean 
population income level 
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These finding suggest that positional externalities will be present in developing countries; 
however they may be weaker than those in higher income countries. This has implications 
for the discounting of income in low-income countries. In this case, numerical estimates of 
positional effects derived from high income countries should be treated as upper bound 
estimates for developing countries. This approach is suggested for interpreting the results 
presented in appendix A. 
 
Table 13 Review of empirical studies on positional and reference income effects on 
welfare in developing countries 
 
Paper Context Finding 
Ravalllin and Lokshin 
(2005) 
Malawi Relative income concerns exist among upper income groups 
Bloch et. al. (2005) India The poor spend large amounts on weddings in order to signal 
status, leading to large welfare losses 
Solnick, Hong, and  
Hemenway (2007) 
China Positional concerns in China and U.S. are of equal intensity 
Kingdon and Knight 
(2007) 
South Africa Income level of distant neighbours and other racial groups 
reduces experienced utility. Effect rises with personal income 
level. 
Bookwalter and 
Dalenberg (2009) 
South Africa Reference income effect set by parent’s level, not 
community. Positive and negative effects of local reference 
incomes tend to balance. 
Guillen-Royo (2008) Peru Reference income level negatively affects wellbeing 
Knight et. al.  (2009) China Reference incomes a major determinant of happiness  
Knight and 
Gunatiliaka (2010) 
China Rural residents who migrate to urban regions are less happy 
than absolutely poorer rural residents who remain in poor 
regions.  
Corrazini et al. (2011) 8 countries Strength of positional concerns is positively related to 
counties mean income level 
Corazinni et al.(March 
2011) 
8 countries Major  relative income effect in low  income countries that 
strengthens with country mean income level 
Brown et al. (2010) rural China High expenditures on positional goods, including by very 
poor. Large welfare losses from positional expenditures, 
including funerals, weddings, and gifts 
Linssen et al. (2011) rural India Major negative observed welfare effects from positional 
consumption by rural poor who forgo basic goods 
consumption to match positional consumption patterns set 
by wealthier neighbours 
Akay et. al. (2011) very low income groups 
in Ethiopia 
No positional effects amongst the very poor 
van Kempen (2011) Bolivia Poor consumers will pay a premium for the status signalling 
effects embodied in brand name goods 
 
50 
 
3.2 Estimating the relationship between income inequality 
and social-welfare 
 
In this section, the Atkinson SWF is applied to estimate the effect of income inequality on 
health outcomes, and to total utility, when measured through revealed preferences or 
indexes of happiness and life satisfaction. These estimation methods produce values for   
that incorporate external as well as direct effects of inequality. In this instance,   is utilised 
as a general inequality aversion parameter which imperfectly reflects the elasticity of social 
utility from income.99 
3.2.1 Inequality and health outcomes 
 
In this section, a value for   is derived to discount health expenditures due to direct and 
indirect losses induced by background income inequality. Existing estimates for direct losses 
suggest a value of around unity, which is considerably less than the value of 3.6 that I obtain 
from a large cross sectional analysis. This suggests that losses from positional and external 
effects outlined in section 3.2 can be very large. I estimate the unweighted average of total 
inequality induced losses across a dataset of 137 countries to to be equivalent to 52 % of 
healthcare expenditures.100 
3.2.1.1 Inequality and the individual income effects on health outcomes 
 
Income inequality directly reduces the effect of increases in mean income and health 
expenditures on mean health outcomes, due to the convexity of the expenditure-outcome 
relationship. Put simply, there is a declining marginal effect of increases in healthcare 
expenditures at the personal, and country level. In the same way that inequality reduces 
mean inequality in the context of declining marginal utility at the personal level, it also 
reduces mean health outcomes in the context of declining marginal health improvements 
from income and healthcare expenditures. The first two chapters of this thesis showed how 
this effect could be modelled through the use of the Atkinson index, and that a suitable 
                                                          
99
 It is an imperfect representation because the standard Atkinson SWF cannot return a negative marginal 
utility of income, although the aggregate effect of such positional externality derived losses can be imperfectly 
but accurately modelled by a suitably high value of  . When such an approach is applied, the resulting 
estimation process is somewhat less sensitive to high incomes than is actually the case. An adjusted Atkinson 
type function can be utilised to properly model high income earners with negative marginal social utility from 
income, see Fredrik Carlsson, Dinky Daruvala, and Olof Johansson-Stenman, “Are People Inequality-Averse, or 
Just Risk-Averse?,” Economica 72, no. 287 (2005): 375-396; Carlsson, Gupta, and Johansson-Stenman, 
“Choosing from behind a veil of ignorance in India.” 
100
See results in appendix A.  
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value for e was around 1.5. Evidence suggests that for health care expenditures, the 
equivalent figure is close to 1- the ubiquitous logarithmic function.101 
Although significant, the individual income effect generally cannot explain the total 
observed negative effects of income inequality on health outcomes.102 I find that the total 
observed effect of inequality is best modelled by utilising a much higher   value of 3.6 to 
discount healthcare expenditures due to total income inequality. This result is similar to the 
conclusions of Wolfson et al. (1999), which finds that only a small fraction of the observed 
negative effect of inequality on health outcomes across U.S states could be attributed to the 
individual income effect.103 It is also consistent with a large body of evidence and literature 
which provides independent evidence for large relative income effects.104 
3.2.1.2 Estimating aggregate effects of income inequality on health outcomes 
 
A two-step process is adopted to estimate the impact of inequality on life expectancy, which 
is utilised as a proxy for general health outcomes. Firstly, the statistical significance of the 
inequality effect is confirmed with a standard OLS regression. Secondly, an Atkinson index is 
employed as an expenditure divisor to model the effect of inequality, and an appropriate 
value for e is obtained for discounting health expenditures. The following equation is 
estimated; 
    (    ).E + b 
Where L is life expectancy, E is per-capita real (PPP adjusted) expenditure on healthcare, b is 
the Y intercept, and   is an Atkinson index computed from the Gini index and an inequality 
aversion parameter (to be estimated),  . This function therefore models life expectancy as 
                                                          
101
 For papers providing evidence of a convex relationship, see R. Ecob and G. Davey-Smith, “Income and 
health: what is the nature of the relationship?,” Social Science & Medicine 48 (1999); E. Backlund, P. D. Sorlie, 
and N. J. Johnson, “The shape of the relationship between income and mortality in the United States. Evidence 
from the National Longitudinal Mortality Study.,” Annals of Epidemiology 6, no. 1 (1996): 12-22; John W. Lynch 
and George A. Kaplan, “Understanding How Inequality in the Distribution of Income Affects Health,” Journal of 
Health Psychology 2, no. 3 (July 1, 1997): 297 -314. 
102
 However, a small number of papers have found it can explain all or most of the negative effect of income 
inequality on health outcomes. See Hugh Gravelle, “How much of the relation between population mortality 
and unequal distribution of income is a statistical artefact?,” BMJ 316, no. 7128 (January 31, 1998): 382 -385; 
Kevin Fiscella and Peter Franks, “Poverty or income inequality as predictor of mortality: longitudinal cohort 
study,” BMJ 314, no. 7096 (June 14, 1997): 1724. 
103
Michael Wolfson et al., “Relation between income inequality and mortality: empirical demonstration,” BMJ 
(British Medical Journal) 319, no. 7215 (October 9, 1999): 953 -957. Evidence for effects beyond the personal 
income effect can also be found in; Mah-Jabeen Soobader and Felicia B. LeClere, “Aggregation and the 
measurement of income inequality: effects on morbidity,” Social Science & Medicine 48, no. 6 (March 1999): 
733-744; M. C. Daly et al., “Macro-to-micro links in the relation between income inequality and mortality,” 
Milbank Quarterly 76, no. 3 (1998); Robert S. Kahn et al., “State income inequality, household income, and 
maternal mental and physical health: cross sectional national survey,” BMJ 321, no. 7272 (November 25, 
2000): 1311 -1315. 
104
 For a brief outline, see Marmot and Wilkinson, “Psychosocial and material pathways in the relation 
between income and health: a response to Lynch et al.” 
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the natural logarithm of health expenditures, discounted utilising the Atkinson method due 
to losses induced from background income inequality.  This function is not readily estimable 
through traditional OLS regression methods, and an iterative process is instead adopted. In 
this approach, the regression is run for a series of values of  . In each case, the R^2 is 
recorded, and the   value that produces the best fit is returned as the estimated value. 105 
Unlike other studies, no controls are added for other determinates of welfare outcomes, 
including corruption, democracy, political violence etc., as these have been shown to be 
positively correlated with income inequality.106 In this case, their inclusion would 
downwardly bias the estimate of losses. Unfortunately, the introduction of these 
confounding variables is a common feature of other related studies.  
Values for L, E and the Gini index of income inequality were obtained for 141 countries. 
World Bank data was utilised for health expenditures and life expectancy, and an average of 
UN and CIA estimates were utilised for the Gini index. In a few cases both UN and CIA 
estimates for the Gini index were unavailable, and in these cases a suitable figure was 
obtained from the secondary literature. As in other studies utilising large global datasets, 
dummies were adopted for the ex-communist countries and for Sub-Saharan Africa.107 The 
initial OLS regression results for the full sample are shown in table14.  
Table 14 OLS statistical significance check: Gini index and life expectancy 
Variable Gini Index Log 
expenditure 
sub-Sahara 
dummy 
Ex-comm 
dummy 
Y 
intercept 
Coefficient -20.04 3.27 -12.78 -3.79 59.79 
T stat -5.36 11.74 -14.02 -4.43 21.97 
R^2 F stat Critical T 
(.01) 
P null Observations   
0.88 258.10 2.61 2.6 * 10^-33 137.00   
 
The iterative process adopted relies not on estimating the general shape of the income-
outcome function across countries, which is given, but on minimising deviations from this 
general function that are induced by variations in inequality across countries. This is 
advantageous, because the concavity of the expenditure-life expectancy function across 
countries is different to the function being estimated, which captures the positional and 
                                                          
105
 Utilising the T value for adjusted income yields equivalent results.  
106
 See for example Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, “Income distribution, political instability, and 
investment,” European Economic Review 40, no. 6 (June 1996): 1203-1228; Y. Vanieris and D. Gupta, “Income 
Distribution and Sociopolitical Instability as Determinants of Savings: A Cross-Sectional Model,” Journal of 
Political Economy 94 (1986): 873-83; Philip Keefer and Stephen Knack, “Polarisation, Politics and Property 
Rights: Links between Inequality and Growth,” Public Choice 111, no. 1 (1996): 127-154. 
107
 These dummies are highly significant. Other regional dummies including Latin America and North Africa 
were tested, but were found to be insignificant and were hence not adopted. 
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external effects of background inequality (which likely operate within, but not across 
countries).108 It is hypothesised that high inequality will lead to underperformance in health 
outcomes, in comparison to more equal countries with similar unadjusted incomes. As the 
inequality aversion parameter increases, the predicted outcomes for these countries will be 
reduced, and vice versa, improving the R^2. 
One potential problem with this approach is that the functional form adopted must fit the 
data well. When there is a poor fit, and in cases where inequality varies across income 
levels, adjustments to the inequality aversion parameter can lead to improved fit, not by 
correcting for individual deviations from the local average, but by shifting this average back 
towards the line of best fit. Such a possibility of spurious results exist in regards to the data 
set utilised here, where increased expenditures cease to have an observed positive effect on 
life expectancy beyond $2500, as shown in Figure 7.109 
Figure 7 Life expectancy and per-capita health expenditures for high expenditure 
countries (expenditure >$2500) 
 
In order to account for this non-linearity, a separate regression was run for a dataset with 
the over $2500 expenditure countries excised. In this data set, a very good general fit is 
observed. However, the result was found to be almost identical to that obtained from the 
                                                          
108
 Reference incomes are deemed to be set by regional or national, as opposed to global, consumption 
patterns. 
109
 This non linearity could bias the estimate downwards, as lower values for   would reduce the estimated life 
expectancy of wealthy countries and hence spuriously ‘fix’ the under-prediction ‘problem’, as inequality is on 
average lower at high incomes.  
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full dataset.110 Therefore, the results from the full dataset are presented here with some 
confidence. Regression results are given in Table 14, for both the obtained value of e=3.6 
and the poorer fitting results without any inequality adjustment (   ). Figures 8 and 9 
display scatters for the correlation between estimates and actual life expectancy values for 
both   = 3.6 and   = 0 respectively. In these scatters, the considerable improvement in fit 
that results from utilising the obtained   value of 3.6 is clearly demonstrated.  
 
Table 15- Regression statistics: ε estimate, full dataset 
              
Variable log of Atkinson 
adjusted income 
Sub-Sahara 
dummy 
Ex-Comm 
dummy 
Y intercept 
Coefficient 3.36 -12.67 -3.70 54.91 
T stat 15.73 -14.38 -4.69 44.40 
R^2 Critical T (.01) P null Observations  F Statistic 
0.89 2.62 0.00 141  365.31 
         
Coefficient 3.74 -13.18 -2.32 48.78 
T stat 12.89 -13.24 -2.61 24.92 
R^2 Critical T (.01) P null Observations  F Statistic 
0.86 2.62 0.00 141  278.52 
 
 
3.2.2 Estimating the relationship between income inequality and total utility 
utilising the Harsanyi lottery and reported life satisfaction 
 
In this section, estimates for   are obtained for total utility from personal income. Two 
methods are utilised for this estimation. Firstly, results from ‘Harsanyi lotteries’ are 
surveyed. In these survey based experiments, respondents are asked to rank various 
possible income distributions, which they are asked to imagine themselves of a family 
member being placed at random. This ‘veil of ignorance’ approach captures positional 
affects, as reference incomes vary across the different options. Secondly, I present results 
from a series of cross country regressions which produce estimates for   from data on 
reported life satisfaction and happiness.  
 
 
                                                          
110
 A value of 3.575 was found for the restricted dataset, in comparison to 3.6 for the full dataset. A figure of 
larger than 100 was found for countries with health expenditures over $2500, suggesting inequality completely 
overshadows any income effect at this expenditures level.  
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Figure 8 Predicted and actual life expectancy,     
 
Figure 9 Predicted and actual life expectancy,       
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3.2.2.1 Estimates for   from Harsanyi Lotteries 
 
The Harsanyi lottery is an application of the veil of ignorance thought experiment, which 
enables the explicit extension of the von Neumann-Morgenstern approach of deriving 
cardinal utility from preferences under uncertainty to the problem of interpersonal 
comparison.111 According to Harsanyi: 
Value judgements concerning social welfare are a special case of judgments of 
preference, inasmuch as they are nonegoistic impersonal judgements of 
preferences . . . Now, a value judgement on the distribution of income would 
show the required impersonality to the highest degree if the person who made 
the judgement had to choose a particular income distribution in complete 
ignorance . . . of his own relative position . . . This choice in that hypothetical 
case would be a clear instance of ‘choice involving risk’.112 
For Harsanyi, the ‘ethical preferences’ revealed by such an experiment would reflect a 
utilitarian social-welfare function.113Crucially, the estimates obtained in such experiments 
capture inequality aversion motivated by positional concerns and, implicitly, negative 
external effects from living in a more unequal society. As stated by Hong (1986), when 
options similar to those presented in Harsanyi Lotteries exist, ‘a rational individual may 
choose society A over society B fearing the high likelihood of having to envy the millionaires 
in society B’ 114. Only a few known studies have employed this method to produce estimates 
of  , and these have employed a similar design.115 Results from Harsanyi Lottery type studies 
are given in table 14. 
Table 16 Estimates for ε from Harsanyi Lotteries 
Source Demographic Indicator   estimate 
Johansson-Stenman (2002) Swedish University Students Mean 3 
Carlsson et. al. (2003) Indian University Students Mean 3.38 
Carlsson et. al. (2005) Swedish University Students Mean 2.65 
Pirtila and Uusitalo (2007) Representative sample, 3000 Finns Median >3.0 
                                                          
111
B. G. Dahlby, “Interpreting inequality measures in a Harsanyi framework,” Theory and Decision 22, no. 3 
(1987): 187-202. 
112
John C. Harsanyi, “Cadinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Thoery of Risk-Taking,” Journal of Political 
Economy 63 (1953): 434–5.Quoted in Ibid. 
113
John C. Harsanyi, “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,” Journal 
of Political Economy 63, no. 4 (1955): 309-321. For a recent formalisation of the concept, see Simon Grant et 
al., “Generalized Utilitarianism and Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem,” Econometrica 78, no. 6 (2010): 
1939-1971. 
114
Hong, “A Generalization of the Quasilinear Mean with Applications to the Measurement of Income 
Inequality and Decision Theory Resolving the Allais Paradox.” 
115
A common method is to ask respondents to make a series of pairwise decisions between two income 
distributions, into which they are asked to imagine a hypothetical grandchild of theirs will be placed at 
random. 
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Harsanyi Lotteries and related methods can also be utilised to produce independent 
measures of inequality aversion, and measures of negative positional effects. For example, 
Carlssonet. al. (2005) finds that persons are often significantly inequality averse in the sense 
that they will choose to be individually poorer in order to live in a more equal society. Such a 
result is consistent with the respondent taking into account likely negative external effects. 
In Johansson-Stenman (2002) and Carlsson et. al. (2005), the marginal social utility from 
consumption, including induced external envy effects is estimated across the income 
spectrum. According to Johansson-Stenman (2002): 
Even with quite conservative parameters of relative risk aversion and positionality, the 
marginal social utility of income becomes negative above certain non-extreme income 
levels. At these income levels, it may then seem rational to increase taxes even if no 
one else would benefit in terms of increased consumption. Hence, taking money from 
the very rich and throwing (it) into the sea would be welfare improving, if no indirect 
effects would occur.116 
Such a finding is also consistent with the series of positional based external effects outlined 
in section 3.2. 117 
3.2.2.2 Estimating   from reported life satisfaction 
 
In this section, I apply the method utilised in section 3.2.1 to estimate a value of   for 
discounting total income in reference to its correlation with reported life satisfaction. The 
use of life satisfaction as the metric of utility is an operationalisation of Kahneman’s concept 
of ‘experienced utility’.118 This approach has the advantage of in theory better reflecting 
actual outcomes, as opposed to often myopic preferences.119However, the approach 
adopted is prone to the myriad of problems associated with utilising self-reported metrics, 
which can be influenced by cultural and reference effects. In particular, it is possible that 
inequality is associated with a culture of exaggerating personal capabilities and 
‘achievements’.120 If life satisfaction is seen by as related to life achievements, these effects 
will downwardly bias estimates of the negative effect of inequality.  
                                                          
116
Johansson-Stenman, Carlsson, and Daruvala, “Measuring Future Grandparents’ Preferences for Equality and 
Relative Standing,” 381. 
117
 See also Amiel and Cowell, “Monotonicity, dominance and the Pareto principle.” 
118
 See for example Daniel Kahneman, Peter P. Wakker, and Rakesh Sarin, “Back to Bentham? Explorations of 
Experienced Utility,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 2 (May 1, 1997): 375-405; Daniel Kahneman 
and Alan B. Krueger, “Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being,” The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 20, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 3-24; Daniel Kahneman and Robert Sugden, “Experienced Utility as a 
Standard of Policy Evaluation,” Environmental and Resource Economics 32, no. 1 (March 2005): 161-181. 
119
This is advantageous, because it is possible that preferences for equality that are driven by positional 
concerns are partially myopic. Such an effect would appear to be minor or not present if strong negative 
effects of inequality on experienced utility are also established 
120
 See Wilkinson and Pickett, The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone. 
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The results from this set of regressions are not as strong as those relating to health 
outcomes, suggesting some of these confounding effects may be present. However, for 
countries with a GNI per-capita in excess of $15 000, I find a very high value of 4.2 for  . This 
is consistent with other studies that have found evidence to support significant effects of 
income inequality on life satisfaction or happiness.121 
Data for these regressions is similar to the dataset utilised for the health outcomes 
regressions, however in this case an index of reported life satisfaction has replaced life 
expectancy, and World Bank data for 2008 GNI per-capita (PPP) has replaced health care 
expenditures.  
As in the health outcome analysis, initial investigation consisted of a standard OLS 
regression with regional dummies, to establish the statistical significance of income 
inequality as an explanatory variable.  For the full data set, the T-stat for the Gini index is 
only significant at the 10% level. A second regression run on a dataset restricted to high-
income countries with GNI per-capita larger than $15,000 per annum is significant at 1%. 
Results are shown in tables 17 and 18 respectively. Estimates for   were then derived 
utilising the method outlined in section 3.33.Regression results for the point estimate for 
  and for  =0 are given for both the full and restricted dataset are given in tables 19 and 20. 
Results are shown graphically in figures 10 and 11.  
Table 17 Statistical significance check: Gini index and reported life satisfaction- full dataset 
Variable Gini Index Log GNI Latin 
America 
dummy 
Ex-Comm 
dummy 
East Asia 
High income 
Y intercept 
Coefficient -1.54 0.57 0.58 -1.43 -1.13 1.79 
T stat -1.79 9.73 2.76 -7.90 -2.06 2.44 
R^2 F stat Critical T (.1) P null Observations     
0.59 37.28 1.66 3.4*10^-4 137     
                                                          
121
 See for example: Monica Hanssen, “Is equality a determinant of well-being? A cross-national analysis of 
income inequality and self-reported life satisfaction” (Master’s Thesis, Georgetown University, 2011); Paolo 
Verme, “Life Satisfaction and Income Inequality,” Review of Income and Wealth 57, no. 1 (2011): 111-127; 
Chau-kiu Cheung and Kwan-kwok Leung, “Ways by which Comparable Income Affects Life Satisfaction in Hong 
Kong,” Social Indicators Research 87, no. 1 (May 1, 2008): 169-187-187; Guglielmo Maria Caporale et al., 
“Income and happiness across Europe: Do reference values matter?,” Journal of Economic Psychology 30, no. 1 
(February 2009): 42-51; Takashi Oshio and Miki Kobayashi, “Income inequality, perceived happiness, and self-
rated health: Evidence from nationwide surveys in Japan,” Social Science & Medicine 70, no. 9 (May 2010): 
1358-1366; Alberto Alesina, Rafael Di Tella, and Robert MacCulloch, “Inequality and happiness: are Europeans 
and Americans different?,” Journal of Public Economics 88, no. 9-10 (August 2004): 2009-2042; Carola Gruen 
and Stephan Klasen, “Growth, inequality, and welfare: comparisons across space and time,” Oxford Economic 
Papers 60, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 212 -236; Takashi Oshio and Miki Kobayashi, “Area-Level Income Inequality 
and Individual Happiness: Evidence from Japan,” Journal of Happiness Studies 12, no. 4 (September 2010): 633-
649. A relationship between equality an happiness or life satisfaction  holds up when equality results from 
redistributive polices, see Alexander Pacek and Benjamin Radcliff, “Assessing the Welfare State: The Politics of 
Happiness,” Perspectives on Politics 6, no. 2 (2008): 267-277; Radcliff, “Politics, Markets, and Life Satisfaction: 
The Political Economy of Human Happiness.” 
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Table 18 Statistical significance check:  Gini index and reported life satisfaction-High 
income countries 
Variable Gini Index Log GNI Ex-Comm 
dummy 
East Asia 
High income 
Y intercept 
Coefficient -5.47 1.05 -1.25 -1.17 -1.83 
T stat -3.84 2.98 -4.84 -2.06 -0.48 
R^2 F stat Critical T 
(.01) 
P null Observations   
0.59 37.28 2.74 5.4*10^-4 35   
 
Table 19 Regression statistics- Health outcomes and income inequality, full sample 
                
Variable log of Atkinson 
Adjusted GNI 
Latin 
America 
Dummy 
Ex-Comm 
dummy 
East Asia 
High income 
Y intercept 
Coefficient 0.59 0.53 -1.40 -1.11 1.22 
T stat 11.76 2.71 -8.01 -2.03 0.42 
R^2 Critical T (.01) P null Observations F statistic   
0.5840 2.61 2.01*10^-4 137.00 46.32   
          
Coefficient 0.62 0.44 -1.34 -1.06 0.77 
T stat 11.57 2.22 -7.64 -1.93 1.65 
R^2 Critical T (.01) P null Observations F Statistic   
0.5772 2.61 2.1*10^-4 141.00 45.05   
 
Table 20 Regression statistics- Health outcomes and income inequality, high-income 
countries 
              
Variable log of Atkinson 
adjusted GNI 
Ex-Comm 
dummy 
East Asia 
High income 
Y intercept 
Coefficient 1.11 -1.22 -1.19 -3.38 
T stat 5.68 -6.29 -3.70 -1.78 
R^2 Critical T (.01) P null Observation
s 
F statistic 
0.83 2.74 3.3*10^-4 37.00 55.14 
         
Coefficient 1.36 -1.06 -1.06 -6.87 
T stat 3.40 -3.56 -2.75 -1.64 
R^2 Critical T (.01) P null Observation
s 
F Statistic 
0.75 2.74 6.7*10^-4 37.00 34.59 
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Figure 10 Estimated vs actual life satisfaction: high-income dataset     
 
 
Figure 11 Estimated vs actual like satisfaction: high–income dataset,       
 
 
3.2.2.3 Choosing an estimate for   to discount income due to total inequality 
effects 
With the exception of the full period estimate derived from reported life satisfaction, the 
results obtained or surveyed in this section have been relatively consistent, ranging from 
2.65 to 4.2. Given the potential problems associated with utilising self-reported life 
satisfaction, and the somewhat inconsistent results obtained, more weight is given here to 
the results obtained from Haryanyi lotteries. From these results, I adopt a value of 3.0 as a 
conservative estimate for  . Given the fact that the results obtained from Harsanyi lotteries 
do not capture all possible positional effects, this result should be treated as a lower bound. 
However, due to the sensitivity of the Atkinson index at high values of   and the small 
number of studies surveyed, a conservative approach to discounting income in relation to 
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total losses from inequality is adopted. The design and running of Harsanyi-lottery studies 
capturing the total-losses from inequality (in which respondents are asked to explicitly take 
into account all external effects) across varied demographics, is a precondition for more 
accurate estimates of  .122  
3.3 Calculating inequality discounted GNI per-capita 
 
In this section, I utilise the estimates for   obtained in the previous sections to compute a 
table of inequality adjusted GNI for a series of countries. For each country, a Thiel-L or MLD 
index of unwarranted consumption inequality is estimated from the Gini index. From this 
index, inequality discounted health expenditures and total GNI can be calculated. Firstly, 
estimates are calculated to remove direct losses from inequality. In this calculation, health 
expenditures are discounted utilising an Atkinson index with   =1, whilst remaining 
expenditure is discounted utilising the value of 1.5 obtained in Chapter 2. Secondly, total 
losses are calculated. In this estimation, a value of   = 3.6, obtained in section 3.2.1 is 
utilised to discount health expenditures. A value of 3.0, taken as a consensus value from the 
methods and results outlined in section 3.2.2, is utilised to discount the non-health portion 
of GNI. Total and Inequality adjusted expenditure, alongside the absolute and relative 
magnitude of losses is given in table 26 for 137 countries, located in the appendix A. In this 
table, the results are ranked by inequality adjusted GNI per capita.  
It should be noted that a decision has been taken to discount the portion of income devoted 
to savings and investment utilising values of   of 1.5 and 3 for direct and indirect losses 
respectively. This is defensible on the grounds that future income streams from these 
investments are likely to be distributed in a manner similar to the current distribution of 
income. The same decision has been made for non-health government consumption. 
Technically, many services provided by governments are pure public goods, for example 
roads and environmental protection. Given the positional concerns outlined above, there is 
a strong argument for increased provision of public goods, especially if this is funded 
through highly progressive taxation, on the grounds that there is likely to be less inequality 
induced losses to distributional efficiency from these expenditures.123 However, there is also 
evidence that increased inequality is associated with increased expenditures devoted to 
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offsetting social problems associated with inequality, whilst education expenditures are 
likely to be less effective in more unequal settings.124 This may mean that high public 
expenditures may be a sign of more problems to address, rather than more thoroughgoing 
attempts to address a given level of social problems. Additionally, the personal utility of 
some classes of public goods is largely determined by personal income- roads are of no use 
if one cannot afford a car, and the enforcement of property rights is of little value to those 
with almost no property. In the absence of any developed method for discounting 
government expenditures, I adopt a second best method of discounting these expenditures 
as if they were personal income. 
It is worth noting that the value utilised to discount income in relation to total, including 
positional losses has been derived from a small number of empirical studies that have 
mostly utilised data obtained from developed countries  with the results obtained by 
Carlsson et. al. (2003) from surveys of Indian students being a notable exception. As 
discussed in section 3.1.7, there is some evidence that positional effects decline with 
country level income, but still remain large and significant. Therefore, for the poorer 
countries in this sample, the total welfare losses computed should be treated as an upper 
bound, with the direct losses forming the lower bound of the estimate. Unfortunately, 
without a larger number of relevant empirical studies, it is impossible to estimate the 
income gradient of positional effects.  
The egalitarian implications of these results are readily apparent. The direct social welfare 
losses from inequality are generally large and significant, with an unweighted average of 
28% of GNI. Total losses are on average equivalent to a massive 48% of GNI. Significantly, 
large changes in rank are observed when countries are ranked by unadjusted and adjusted 
GNI. For example, Sweden, in third place in terms of adjusted income, is well ahead of the 
significantly richer Singapore, in twentieth place. Kyrgystan, with a GNI per capita of $2,190 
outranks South Africa with a much larger GNI per-capita of $10,010. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined a series of mechanism through which inequality can indirectly lead 
to reduced health and welfare outcomes. Utilising a variety of estimation methods, suitable 
values of   for discounting health expenditures and personal income have been obtained. 
The final results for aggregate social welfare losses are on average very large, and comprise 
the greater portion of GNI in many countries. This suggests that social-welfare maximising 
policy should be strongly egalitarian, unless strong negative growth effects are associated 
with progressive redistribution.  
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4 The growth-equality trade off and economic 
policy 
Introduction 
 
Despite the potentially very large social-welfare gains that can be achieved through 
reductions in income inequality, the question of growth and the possibility of an inequality-
growth trade-off is still important. Modest growth effects, compound over time, can lead to 
large variations in mean income and hence income based or determined measures of social-
welfare. Even if it is accepted that in high income countries increased mean income levels 
cease to have any major effect on welfare outcomes, a large proportion of the world’s 
population live in countries where this income level is yet to be achieved.125 In addition, 
growth may itself be equality promoting, to the extent that it reduces unemployment and 
increases the volume of funds available for egalitarian social policies.126 Furthermore, 
egalitarian political strategies and polices may be politically contingent on maintaining a 
suitably high level of economic growth – in order to provide a growing stream of income 
capable of satisfying a series of powerful political agents and the population in general. 
Rapid growth enables the real incomes of low income earners to be raised significantly, 
without necessitating politically difficult absolute reductions in the real incomes of other 
section of society. Even in contexts where growth is seen as an unimportant or unviable aim 
(for example due to environmental constraints), there are good reasons to ensure that 
policy maintains or increases labour productivity, implying a certain degree of capital 
intensity and hence investment. For these reasons, the strongly egalitarian result derived in 
the previous chapters must be combined with an analysis of the likely or potential dynamic 
effects of egalitarian reform.  
Given the previously established strong social welfare promoting effects of income equality, 
social-welfare maximising policy should have a strong preference for egalitarian outcomes, 
unless there are significant and strong negative impacts on economic growth. If no negative 
growth effects from equality exist at any inequality level, then social welfare maximising 
distributional policy is a simple problem of reducing inequality to the level associated with 
marginal utility equalisation. When equality is associated with negative growth effects at 
relevant levels of inequality, the ideal level of inequality will exist at a point where further 
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increases in equality induce negative growth effects that just outweigh further welfare gains 
from distributional efficiency.127 
Economic theory suggests a series of channels through which both positive and negative 
growth effects can result from decreases in income inequality. Whilst this ambiguity leads to 
a general theoretical indeterminacy, different theoretical approaches provide a series of 
empirically testable hypothesis, enabling econometric clarification of the main theoretical 
postulates. Furthermore, many of the theorised channels leading to positive of negative 
growth outcomes are hypothesised or found to be non-linear or situation dependent. These 
theoretical and empirical insights together provide a basis for assessing the likely growth 
impact of egalitarian redistribution in different situations. In general, these analyses lead to 
a view of a non-linear growth-equality relationship, with growth being maximised at 
moderate levels of inequality. In this case, the welfare maximising level of inequality will lie 
somewhere between the level associated with growth maximisation, and that associated 
with distributional efficiency maximisation. Using this bracketing procedure, the long–run 
welfare optimum Gini index is likely to lie between 0.15 and 0.35, although the exact range 
and figure will be determined by policy and structural variables, and may be not very far 
from the level associated with distributional efficiency maximisation.  
Crucially, the growth-equality relationship is open to modification via economic policy and 
structural reform. In the context of both positive and negative partial effects from equality 
on growth, superior outcomes can be obtained via reforms which maximise the positive 
effects of equality and mitigate and suppress the negative effects. In particular, high 
equality and high growth can be simultaneously achieved if equality can be made consistent 
with high levels of profitability, savings and physical capital accumulation. This outcome can 
be achieved by two types of reforms. Firstly, increases in wage and asset equality can 
reduce equality, without negatively impacting on aggregate profitability. Secondly, reforms 
aimed at increasing the rate of profit-reinvestment can increase the volume of productive 
investment at a given level of aggregate profitability. In this regard, structural changes 
associated with ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘financialisation’ can be seen to have negatively 
impacted on the terms of the growth-equality trade-off, lowering the rate of profit 
reinvestment, and asset and wage equality. In this context, it is possible that egalitarian 
shifts in income distribution, particularly those driven by generalised wage explosions, will 
lead to modest distributional efficiency gains and potentially large negative growth impacts, 
unless these egalitarian shifts are accompanied by reforms of the nature outlined above. In 
this case, welfare maximising policy should be seen as comprising a complementary package 
of both equality and investment promoting structural reforms.   
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This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section assesses the growth-equality 
relationship from a supply side analysis. Firstly, endogenous growth theory is employed to 
analyse the determinants of growth. Various mechanisms hypothesised by the theoretical 
literature of leading to positive and negative equality-growth relationships are then 
outlined, alongside relevant empirical evidence. From this analysis, a likely non-linear effect 
of inequality on both human and physical capital accumulation is deemed to be likely. 
However, at common levels of inequality, equality promotes human capital accumulation 
and has a negative or indeterminate effect on physical capital accumulation. This provides a 
basis for systematising the equality-growth and equality-welfare relationship and clarifying 
the relevant trade-off parameters.  
The second section analyses the growth-equality trade-off from the standpoint of post-
Keynesian demand theory. In this approach, increases in profit share can have 
indeterminate effects on aggregate demand. Although evidence suggests that aggregate 
demand can be wage-led, this is unlikely to be the case over the long-run, especially in open 
and credit-constrained economies. Furthermore, macroeconomic interventions can, subject 
to long-run financing constraints, impose near optimal levels of economic activity at any 
plausible functional distribution. Therefore, the optimal functional distribution is 
determined in the long-run by supply-side considerations. The resolution of demand side 
problems and constraints in the context of a flexible functional distribution is dependent on 
the capacity of government to determine the rate of aggregate investment. This implies a 
significant degree of government economic intervention, which is congruent with the pro-
investment policy options discussed in the section three.   
The third section specifically addresses the structural and policy determinates of the 
equality-growth relationship, by way of comparative economic analysis. Both the level of 
wage and asset inequality and the rate of profit reinvestment are found to be highly variable 
across countries. In particular, in their high growth phases, Korea, Japan and Taiwan were 
characterised by very high rates of profit reinvestment, high levels of asset equality, and 
hence a combination of very rapid growth rates and somewhat egalitarian outcomes, 
leading to very rapid increases in welfare levels. In contrast, those economies characterised 
by reliance on equity markets to coordinate investment funding have lower rates of profit 
reinvestment. This variability in structural performance is underlined by original empirical 
research on the profit-investment relationship in both China and the United States. I find 
that, in comparison to the United States, only a small proportion of China’s exceptionally 
high rate of investment can be attributed to high rates of return to capital, and the greater 
portion should be attributed to an investment promoting economic structure. Additionally, 
investment is less sensitive to the rate of return in China than in the United States. This 
variability in structural performance suggests that structural reform can vary by large 
degrees the parameters of the growth-equality trade-off and lead to very large welfare 
gains. In general terms, the central task of welfare maximising redistributive policy is in 
enacting a shift in expenditures from social-welfare diminishing luxury and positional 
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consumption towards productive investment and/or consumption with a high marginal 
social utility. This can be obtained at the firm level by increasing the rate of profit retention 
and reinvestment. 
4.1 Inequality and growth – theory and evidence 
 
In the last 15 years, a large body of literature has been produced devoted to theoretical and 
empirical analysis of the growth-equality relationship. This section reviews this evidence, 
and proceeds to present a stylised systematisation of the equality-growth-welfare 
relationship. In this systematisation, equality has contradictory effects on human and 
physical capital accumulation at levels of inequality near the welfare optimum (low levels of 
inequality).  A negative relationship between equality and physical capital accumulation is 
hypothesised to operate as a counterpart to a positive relationship between inequality, 
profitability, and physical capital accumulation. A key result of this section is that shifting 
the parameters of this equality-capital accumulation trade-off is the key to simultaneously 
achieving high growth and equality. The role of demand constraints in affecting this trade-
off are then assessed in section 4.2. The policy options available for simultaneously 
maximising equality and physical capital accumulation are discussed in section 4.3. 
4.1.1 Endogenous growth theory, factor inputs, and the equality-growth trade-off 
 
One of the major questions within growth theory is the comparative role of exogenous and 
endogenous factors in long-run growth. A related question concerns the comparative role of 
producible (physical and human capital, technology, infrastructure) and non-producible 
(land, environmental inputs, unskilled labour) factor inputs, and the residual which can be 
attributed to none of these inputs (total factor productivity). There are a large number of 
competing growth models proposed in the literature, which include or omit various factors, 
and impose various functional constraints. Without taking a position on these debates it is 
possible to present a generalised growth equation which is capable of capturing the key 
insights of endogenous growth theory.  
I propose the following semi-endogenous growth theory model, in order to help clarify the 
growth-equality trade off problem. I proceed from a basic augmented Solow-Swan growth 
model: 
              
Where P is TFP, K is ordinary physical capital, C is public goods and infrastructure, H is 
human capital, L is unskilled labour, E is environmental inputs, and a, b, c, d and e are the 
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relevant factor shares.128 When there are no direct scale effects,             , 
and hence sustained growth (as opposed to level) effects from variability in factor 
accumulation rates is only possible when      0. As this is unlikely, output growth will 
converge towards the rate of TPF growth as per the Solow-Swan model, although likely at a 
slower pace and with greater effect of broad investment on the equilibrium output level. It 
should be noted that the possibility of positive spill-over effects or, conversely monopoly 
rents means that the relevant factor shares cannot be computed from marginal or average 
private returns, and must instead be derived from macro-level econometric studies. These 
studies suggest that total factor accumulation can explain a large share of economic growth, 
and hence modifications to the rate of factor accumulation can lead to relatively sustained 
increases in the rate of economic expansion.  
Some of these spill-over effects are likely to be non-linear, and hence cannot be captured 
simply by a factor share exponent such as a, b, c etc. In this case they can enter as 
explanatory variables into an endogenous or semi-endogenous total factor productivity 
equation.   
I suggest that TFP can be modelled as a semi-endogenous variable.  I propose the following 
formalisation: 
   (       ) 
Where F is the productivity frontier and T is a measure of emulative (reverse engineering) or 
embodied technology. F is a function of pure and high-level applied research, and is largely 
determined at an international level (somewhat exogenously for the purposes of this 
study).129 T can be formalised as follows; 
   (           ) 
Where r is expenditures on applied or emulative research and development, and e is 
embodied technology (a spill-over effect from investment that is somewhat proportional to 
expenditures on new or advanced capital goods). The other terms are variables that 
determine the efficiency of expenditures on research and embodied technology; o is a 
measure of intellectual openness and information sharing; c is a measure of concentration 
and coordination of research efforts; s is a measure of scale effects; and m is a measure of 
management and institutional proficiency and efficiency.   
One additional option is to nest functions of this type. For example, firms may converge 
towards a national industry best practice, in proportion to their own investments in new 
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machinery and efforts devoted to assimilating national best practices. The same approach 
can be applied to regions and localities.130 
In this model, sustained growth is possible provided there are sufficiently large shares to 
producible factors and/or strong spill-over effects on productivity, and the economy is 
sufficiently far away from the theoretical productivity frontier. Given the variability in 
productivity within regions and sectors across and within even highly developed economies, 
this theoretical productivity frontier is likely to be some distance from average levels of 
productivity even in developed countries. There is therefore likely to be sustained growth 
effects from policies that affect the rate of factor accumulation, with this effect diminishing 
but not disappearing altogether in the wealthy countries. This theoretical outcome is 
consistent with international growth empirics, where the primary finding is one of 
conditional convergence- poorer countries tend to catch up with the richer countries, but 
generally only on the condition of achieving sustained human and physical capital 
accumulation. At the same time, wealthy countries such as Singapore which have 
maintained high rates of physical capital accumulation, and developed good infrastructure 
and a highly skilled workforce, have maintained high labour productivity growth rates. 
Alternatively, where capital accumulation has slowed, such as Japan and the United States, 
so too has labour productivity growth.  
The growth function outlined above has not been calibrated to actual data. Instead, the 
formalisation has been presented in order to clarify some key concepts in growth theory, 
which are consistent with some ‘stylised facts’ obtained by the comparative growth 
literature. These stylised facts, which are remarkable consistent with classical economic 
concepts, are listed below: 
 Factor inputs are the primary forces in economic growth. Internationally, there is a very 
strong correlation between the pace of growth and capital accumulation, defined narrowly 
in terms of physical capital, or broadly to include human capital.131 
 Strongly diminishing returns to physical capital are the exception, rather than the rule of 
growth experiences. Only within a few, mostly autarkic centrally-planned economies, has 
high investment levels coincided with low growth and rapidly rising capital-output ratios.132 
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 Economies of scale and the division of labour are major factors in productivity growth. 
Duplication of research efforts and capital expenditures, and a proliferation of inefficiently 
small capital units or firms, or industries are barriers to productivity growth.133In small 
national economies and in high technology goods, autarkic industrial development is largely 
incompatible with productivity growth.  
In light of these stylised facts, promoting growth seems to be a rather simple problem of 
maintaining a sufficient degree of openness to trade and technological diffusion, obtaining 
sufficient concentration in order to realise economies of scale, and maintaining high rates of 
physical and human capital accumulation. The question in terms of analysing the possibility 
of a growth-equality trade-off is whether equality is consistent with these objectives. 
Arguably this is the case, and the basic solution in terms of pro-growth egalitarian policy is 
to redistribute resources from luxury and positional consumption, which may have a 
negative marginal social utility, to productive investments. Additionally, some variants of 
egalitarian economic policy may be able to address inequality and private ownership 
induced coordination and principal-agent problems, which may lead to additional gains in 
terms of productivity.134 
4.1.1.1 The role of fixed investment in economic growth 
 
Exogenous growth theory has attributed to capital accumulation a minor role in determining 
long term growth outcomes. This is partly a result of an assumption that factors shares in 
national output reflect the relative marginal productivity of these factors. One of the major 
insights of endogenous growth theory is that this assumption is potentially invalid. In 
particular, capital accumulation is hypothesised to be associated with a series of positive 
spill-over effects, including ‘learning by doing’ productivity effects, and economies of 
scale.135 In this case, the factor share of fixed capital cannot be determined by the share of 
profits in national income, but instead must be directly derived from the empirical 
association between capital accumulation and either output or labour productivity growth, 
both over time and across countries.  
Empirical studies have primarily centred on the relationship between the capital/labour 
ratio and labour productivity.  Utilising the basic correlation between capital accumulation 
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and labour productivity suggest a figure for the share of capital as high as 0.7.136 When 
country and time specific effects are incorporated, lower figures between .35 and .5 are 
obtained, obviously varying by location.137 These results are consistent with significant 
external effects from capital accumulation. 
In addition, investment may play a role in promoting growth via its role in effective demand, 
and via complementarities with labour. In situations of significant unemployment, increased 
capital accumulation can be associated with capital broadening, and an increase in human-
capital utilisation.138 Even in situations of high employment, increased capital accumulation 
in a context of physical-human capital complementarily can produce additional investments 
in skills, or human capital deepening, via an induced labour market skill premium.139 
This analysis suggests that egalitarian reforms which suppress the rate of capital 
accumulation can have large negative effects on economic growth. The relationship 
between equality and capital accumulation is therefore a key parameter of the equality-
growth-welfare relationship.  
4.1.1.2 A note on long-run total factor productivity and inequality in duel-
economies 
 
Due to limitations of space, and the difficulties of TFP measurement140, little attention is 
given to the empirical relationship between inequality, redistributive polices, and total-
factor productivity in this thesis. It is only noted that there is likely to be no major negative 
effects of equality on TFP, especially within market economies. For example, the Soviet 
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Union had very low levels of TFP growth in the 1970’s and 1980’s- however this can be 
attributed to its autarkic centrally planned economy, rather than low levels of inequality. 
The Nordic economies demonstrate that central planning is not a prerequisite for achieving 
low levels of inequality.  
One important insight can be derived from the growth model outlined above in relation to 
duel economies- defined by a large variation in physical and human capital intensity and 
labour productivity across regions or sectors. In this case, the existence of a national or 
international productivity frontier will limit growth as the advanced sector pushes up 
against this frontier. Long-run growth will then be dependent on addressing the structural 
inequality in labour productivity, as unlike in the advanced sector growth in the backward 
region is not limited by proximity to the productivity frontier.  
Crucially, although the potential for long-run productivity growth in the backward region 
may be large, this does not necessarily imply a high rate or return to capital in the 
immediate context - a certain level of coordinated investment in human capital and 
infrastructure, which may have low or negative rates of private return over long time 
periods, may be a precondition for unlocking the productivity possibilities in these backward 
regions. Where political power is concentrated in the wealthy region or sector, or there is a 
general opposition to taxation and public expenditures on infrastructure, such major 
investments with long (or external) payoffs are unlikely to be undertaken. Such a situation 
may result from, and would reinforce high levels of income inequality. In contrast, a 
coordinated response of pre-emptive investment in broad capital may lead to a reduced 
regional (and personal) income disparity and an increase in potential long-run productivity 
growth.141 This insight could also be applied to class and ethnically stratified societies, where 
the ‘backward’ sector is not a region, but a sector of society which is locked in a pattern of 
poverty and low human capital accumulation.  
4.1.1.3 A note on sustainable growth and environmental inputs and outputs 
 
Traditional growth accounting does not factor the accumulation or degradation of non-
marketised natural resources into measures of output.142 This is a major oversight, and a 
                                                          
141
Stanislaw Wellisz, “Dual Economies, Disguised Unemployment and the Unlimited Supply of Labour,” 
Economica 35, no. 137, New Series (February 1968): 22-51; P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, “Problems of 
Industrialisation of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe,” The Economic Journal 53, no. 210/211 (September 
1943): 202-211; Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, “Industrialization and the Big Push,” 
The Journal of Political Economy 97, no. 5 (October 1989): 1003-1026; Antonio Ciccone and Kiminori 
Matsuyama, “Start-up costs and pecuniary externalities as barriers to economic development,” Journal of 
Development Economics 49, no. 1 (April 1996): 33-59; Rodrik, Dani, “Coordination failures and government 
policy: A model with applications to East Asia and Eastern Europe,” Journal of International Economics 40, no. 
1-2 (1996): 1-22. 
142
 Clive Hamilton, “Measuring Changes in Economic Welfare: The Genuine Progress Indicator for Australia,” in 
Measuring Progress: Is life getting Better?, ed. Richard Eckersley (Canberra: CSIRO, 1998). 
72 
 
major question arises as to whether growth, as traditionally understood, should be a policy 
goal in the context of already unsustainable demands being placed on the environment.  
The growth model outlined above can suggest some possible ways forward. If 
environmental inputs, E are taken to include damaging or unsustainable use of existing 
resources, then reducing degradation implies a reduction in the flows of services from E- i.e. 
a lower ‘capacity utilisation’ of the environmental capital stock. Ordinarily, this would 
reduce output, but the existence of reproducible inputs in the production function means 
that other inputs can substitute. For example, renewable energy is generally more capital 
intensive and less carbon intensive than traditional energy sources. Skilled labour may be a 
complement to these new technologies. Achieving growth and a reduction in environmental 
inputs can be simultaneously achieved, if investment in green technologies is greatly 
expanded. However, this implies a large increase in the rate of aggregate investment and 
savings.    
This insight suggests that the problems of achieving sustainable growth and growth in 
general are generally similar from a macroeconomic perspective. Policies which increase 
inputs of physical and human capital are virtuous in both cases.  These factor inputs can be 
utilised to increase output in general or alternatively to substitute for environmental inputs. 
The ideal mix of expansion and substitution will depend on the costs attributed to the 
utilisation of the relevant environmental inputs, the returns to capital in various 
deployments, and the marginal utility of consumption function.  
4.1.2 The equality-growth relationship and economic theory 
 
Classical and early Keynesian and post-Keynesian economic theory largely assumed the 
existence of a positive relationship between income inequality and economic growth. 143  In 
these approaches, redistribution from workers to capitalists; and from the poor to the 
wealthy, would increase rates of saving and investment, due to the higher propensity to 
save and/or invest of firms and wealthy households. 144 In the last twenty years, the classical 
idea of a positive link between inequality and economic growth has come under sustained 
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empirical and theoretical challenge. Theoretical modifications or challenges to the classical 
theory of distribution and growth can be divided into a series of categories: 
 Theories of demand-led growth: In this approach, workers’ wages and consumption enters 
the growth equation from two sides; negatively as a deduction from profits (when 
profitability is variable in the investment function), and positively as a component of 
aggregate demand. In certain conditions, it can be shown that increases in wage share can 
positively or negatively impact on the rate of growth , at least in the short-run and in 
demand constrained economies. This approach is dealt with in detail in section 4.2 
 Theories of endogenous growth and human capital accumulation: In this approach, human 
capital (skills) is a major input to the supply side equation. As the poor are credit constrained 
and decreasing returns to education exist at the individual level, increased income inequality 
reduces the rate of human capital accumulation. If human and physical capitals are 
complementary, this can also lead to constraints on physical capital accumulation.145 
 New theories of saving: According to the permanent income hypothesis, savings rates are 
determined by variations in income and desired consumption over the life cycle, and to 
income volatility, risk perception, and forms of insurance against income and expenditure 
shocks. According to the ‘expenditure cascade’ model, increased income inequality can 
increase positional consumption. In addition, as outlined in chapter 3, inequality can be 
associated with reduced levels of trust and social cohesion, which may reduce the ability of 
governments to fully fund expenditures via taxation. These approaches cast doubt on any 
presumed positive relationship between income inequality and aggregate savings. 146  
 Political economy models: In this approach, increased inequality leads to political instability 
and demands for populist redistribution. These political-economic effects can lead to a 
negative relationship between inequality and physical capital accumulation, via increase in 
the risk premium on investment, increased borrowing cost and credit constraints, and/or via 
politically induced dysfunctional economic policies. Additionally, increased inequality can be 
associated with the concentration of political power, and an increased ability of the wealthy 
to pursue rent-seeking behaviour and/or block efficiency increasing economic policies. 147 
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At the level of economic theory, no forgone conclusion can be obtained in regards to the 
exact relationship between equality and growth. The assessment of the growth-equality 
relationship then becomes largely an empirical question. However, not all questions are 
resolvable by empirical examination, because these examinations are limited by the 
available data and breadth of economic experiences. Not all policy options and distributions 
have been extensively deployed or have existed, and therefore no generalised view of the 
growth-equality relationship can be obtained. In particular, the strongly egalitarian result 
obtained in chapters 3 suggests that the range of potentially welfare maximising income 
distribution is likely to be quite low, and therefore the primary concern here is the growth-
equality relationship at low levels of income inequality, where negative effects can be 
expected from further egalitarian redistributions at the level of theory- even if no large 
dataset of countries with very low levels of inequality exist that enables the empirical 
testing of this hypothesis.  
Theoretical views on the growth-equality relationship are summarised in table 21. Space 
constraints preclude a detailed discussion of these theoretical channels, and the reader is 
referred to the relevant footnotes for works outlining these mechanisms.  
4.1.3 A stylised systematisation of the distribution-growth welfare relationship 
 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the relevant empirical evidence, I present here a 
stylised systematisation of the equality-growth-welfare problem, which captures the key 
empirically supported insights of the theoretical literature. In this system, there is a positive 
relationship between profit-share and both investment and inequality, and a non-linear but 
generally negative relationship between inequality and human capital accumulation, which 
becomes positive at some point (where further equality sufficiently diminishes the 
accumulation of indivisible high level skills via incentive effects- e.g. ‘brain drains’ and/or 
funding constraints).148 Combined with the distributional efficiency function obtained in 
previous chapters, this system enables a solution to be found in regards to the optimum 
functional distribution. It can readily be seen that modification of the component functions 
can shift both the level of the optimal welfare outcome, and the optimum functional 
distribution at which this optimum occurs. In particular, shift upwards in the investment-
profitability relationship, and downwards in the inequality profitability relationship, can 
modify greatly the relationship between inequality, the functional distribution of income, 
and fixed capital investment. These insight help enable an investigation of the relevant 
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policy objectives and problems, as well as a guide to analysing and designing empirical 
studies. 
The remainder of this thesis will concentrate heavily on investigating the determinants of 
the profit-share –investment share relationship. However, the profitability-inequality 
relationship is also critical to determining the growth-equality relationship.  This relationship 
is generally up-sloping. When profit share is zero, the distribution of income will be simply 
be determined by the inequality of non-capital income. As profit share increases towards 
100 per cent of income, the degree of total income inequality will approach the level of 
asset inequality (assuming returns on capital are homogenous), which is in all countries is 
significantly higher than the level of non-capital income inequality. However, redistribution 
of assets or the income streams from assets could flatten this relationship appreciably. If 
assets or asset income were to be redistributed on an egalitarian basis, then increases in 
profit share would have no negative impact on income distribution. This type of radical 
redistribution could take the form of various types of  employee ownership schemes- in this 
case capital-labour conflict would also be significantly attenuated.  
In figure 11, the relationship between growth and inequality is derived from a system of six 
functions. These functions include: 
1. The profitability-investment/capital stock function 
2. The functional-personal inequality function 
3. The inequality-human capital accumulation function 
4. The factor input-output equation (standard growth equation) 
5. The inequality-distributional efficiency relationship 
6. The distributional efficiency-welfare efficiency relationship 
Of these, function 5 is derived in chapters 1-3, and 6 is by definition a basic linear function, 
derived from the identity W=YE = Y(1-A) where A is the Atkinson index. Function 4 is a 
reduced form version of a standard growth equation, and this case the relevant parameters 
are the factor shares and spill-over effects of human and physical capital.149 The analysis 
therefore turns to analyse the determinants functions 1-3. These will jointly determine the 
shape of the inequality-welfare relationship, and hence the level of the welfare optimum 
and income distribution associated with this optimum. In subsequent sections, I will show 
that these functions are highly variable and open to modification via policy, enabling large 
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welfare gains to be attained by well-designed structural reform which shifts the key 
parameters of the system outlined above.  
Table 21 Theorised mechanisms determining the growth-equality relationship 
Positive effects Negative effects 
 Physical capital accumulation 
Increased aggregate demand level and stability via increased 
worker consumption expenditures 
Redistributive policy increases government 
consumption and tax burden on capital 
Reduced political instability, and trust, reducing risk 
premiums ,transaction costs, coordination problems, and 
populist dysfunctional economic policy responses 
 
Positive relationship between profits and 
inequality, due to generally high asset 
inequality 
 
 
Poor are credit constrained  and declining return to capital 
exist at individual level 
Poor are credit constrained and  scale effects 
to capital exist at individual level 
Human-physical capital complementarity and positive 
equality human-capital relationship 
  
Savings 
Reduced positional consumption 
 
Marginal propensity to save increases with 
income level 
Reduced wealth effect Bequests are luxury items, and/or wealth is a 
positional good 
Increased social capital raises ability to tax citizens, driving 
upwards government saving 
 
Rich will engage in luxury consumption rather than save if 
investment prospects are risky due to instability 
Higher propensity to save out of capital 
income, esp. by corporate sector 
human capital formation 
Declining returns to scale from human capital at the personal 
level
150
 
Indivisibilities in high-level human capital 
accumulation 
Reduction of budget/credit constraints, (including high 
interest rates) on poor 
Reduced skill premium 
Increased direct provision and subsidisation of education 
associated with income equality
151
 
Physical-human capital complementarity and 
negative equality physical-capital 
accumulation relationship 
Increased  social mobility Inequality reduces life expectancy and 
working life, reducing lifetime returns to 
education 
Reduced material and psychosocial  barriers to learning   
The poor invest relatively more in education, and less in 
financial assets 
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Figure 12 Stylised systematisation of the profitability-equality-growth-welfare relationship in the static frame 
 
Summary of this table: K=capital stock at T=x, G= income inequality; Y= output per capita; E is welfare-income efficiency, defined as,      ̅ = 
 
 
 (   ); and W = social-
welfare. Red lines represent a high profit, high inequality, high growth, low welfare outcome. Blue lines represent a welfare optimal low profit, low inequality, moderate 
growth, high welfare outcome. Modification to the relevant functions will modify the level of the welfare optimum and the level of inequality associated with this 
optimum, and these solutions are therefore presented for illustrative purposes only. 
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It should be noted that the system presented in figure 19 is in a static frame, in order to 
sidestep the problems associated with intertemporal optimisation, which can become 
incredibly complex if not irresolvable in the context of non-convergent growth. In this case, 
the level of K and the investment rate are treated as linear or monotonic functions of one 
another, in which case K can be treated as the equilibrium capital stock, or alternatively, as 
capital stock at time X in non-equilibrium growth situations. In the context of convergent 
(equilibrium) growth, the intertemporal optimisation problem could be solved by the 
augmentation of this model with a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans type optimisation solution. 
It should be noted that the W/Y term is not simply (1-A), as not all income is consumed. 
Only the consumption portion of national income is welfare increasing, and thus the welfare 
term will be given by  
 
 
 
 
 
(   ) , where 
 
 
 is the consumption share of national income, 
and (1-A) is the distributional efficiency of consumption, as derived in chapters 1-3. Thus, 
inequality that promotes growth can only be long-run welfare increasing if the existing level 
of investment is below the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans optimum, in which case increases in 
consumption inequality and reduced distributional efficiency is the price that society pays in 
order to raise investment towards this level. This implies that the non-capitalist sector must 
systemically under-invest (perhaps due to a high pure time preference rate), or that the 
social return to investment is much higher than the private rate of return for the non-
wealthy sector.  These are plausible but challengeable assumptions, which suggest that 
there may be some gains from resources being concentrated in the hands of a capitalist 
class whose propensity to save and invest is sufficiently high that redistribution towards 
them pulls the social rate of savings and investment upwards towards the long-run social-
optimum. When the marginal rate of saving and investment by the high income or capitalist 
sector is very high, greater increases in the rate of investment can be ‘purchased’ at a lower 
social cost of consumption inequality and distributional inefficiency. When the marginal rate 
of saving of the wealthy is very low, or is below the marginal rate of saving of other sectors 
such as the government sector, then there is no utilitarian justification for inequality being 
above the level associated with distributional efficiency maximisation.  
In this model, human and physical capital complementarity has not been explicitly 
modelled. Where complementarity is strong, and there is a sufficiently strong negative 
relationship between human capital accumulation and income inequality, the relationship 
between inequality and physical capital accumulation can turn negative, especially in the 
long-run.  This can be driven via feedback effects on profitability- in the context of strong 
complementarity, there will be strongly diminishing returns to physical capital when 
physical accumulation is not matched by complementary increases in skilled labour.152  
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4.1.4 The equality-growth relationship: Evidence from empirical studies 
 
In light of the complex nature of the functional distribution-equality-growth relationship, 
care must be taken in analysing the results obtained from both cross country and panel 
estimates of the effect of income inequality on economic growth. In particular, the 
correlation between growth and the personal income distribution will depend on the time 
scale, on context, and the reason for the shift in income distribution. For example, when 
inequality increases due to increased profitability, and hence increases in capital income 
(which is generally more highly concentrated than labour income), the likely effect on short 
to mid-term growth is likely to be positive, as investment increases. However, the long-run 
effect is indeterminate, as over time, increases in inequality could be associated with 
reductions in human capital accumulation, or political instability (both of these effects are 
likely to operate on long time horizons). In contrast, downward shifts in the inequality/profit 
function would likely have modest growth effects in either direction in the short run, but 
positive effects in the long run (increasing human capital accumulation via reduced 
inequality, and possibly also physical capital (via reduced instability and human-physical 
capital complementarity). 
From a policy design perspective, it is imperative to known the nature of these exact 
relationships that drive the overall equality-growth relationship. Ideally, for this purpose, 
empirical studies should utilise controls on the functional distribution. In this case, the effect 
of modifications to the level of wage and asset inequality can be separated from the 
profitability effect. In particular, modification to the functional distribution driven by 
exogenous shocks should be controlled for. Knowing, for example, that increases in export 
prices simultaneously increases capital income, inequality, investment, and growth tells us 
little about the effect of asset redistribution, or egalitarian wages policy, especially is these 
are designed in order to have little or no negative effect on profit-share.  When they do, it 
might be better to model this effect via a dedicated investment function. Investment 
functions for both the United States and China are estimated in section 4.3.3. Unfortunately, 
the necessary data is, to my knowledge, not available to enable a cross sectional study of 
growth and personal income inequality, with relevant controls on the functional distribution 
to be conducted. In this case, one second best solution would be to concentrate on studies 
with a long time horizon, in particular true cross sectional studies. Unfortunately, a large 
number of recent studies have been panel studies which only capture relatively short-run 
effects. A summary of empirical studies is given in tables 22 to 24.  
The results of the previous theoretical discussion, and the empirical studies presented here 
could be interpreted as indicating a generally negative, but non-linear inequality-growth 
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relationship, with inequality having a potentially positive effect on short run growth, with 
this relationship tending to be negative in the long-run. Furthermore, as indicated by Chen 
(2003), there is likely to be a generally negative long-run relationship between inequality 
and growth that may turn positive at low inequality levels, if redistributive policy begins to 
diminish physical investment via significant reductions in post-tax profitability.  
The turning point for this potential non-linearity can be utilised to bracket the welfare 
optimal level of inequality. According to the estimates of Chen (2003), the inequality-growth 
relationship turns positive below a Gini index of approximately 0.35, although his exact 
estimate is somewhat dubious given the small number of samples with inequality below this 
level.153 If this is the case, then this inequality level should be treated as the absolute upper 
bound to the long-run welfare maximising level of income inequality, with the lower bound 
having been roughly calculated in section 1.2.1 at approximately Gini=0.15. Unfortunately, 
there are very few examples of countries or regions, excluding the formerly planned 
economies with inequality levels well below 0.35, with the Nordic countries being the 
obvious exceptions. In this case, it is very difficult to determine the exact magnitude of any 
negative long-run effects of inequality on growth at these bracketed levels of inequality via 
empirical analysis. Rather than rely on empirical estimates, a more fruitful method may be 
to isolate the likely theoretical mechanisms by which growth could be severely curtailed. 
The most likely channel for this outcome within a market (even if heavily regulated) 
economy is via possible negative impacts of redistribution on post-tax profitability, and 
hence physical investment.154 Provided that high levels of investment are maintained, on 
theoretical and empirical grounds, there is likely to be no necessary negative effect on 
growth even at very low inequality levels. Where inequality is high, both growth and 
redistributive efficiency may be improved by reductions in the level of inequality, leading to 
very large welfare gains.  
One potential qualification to this result is in regards to human capital inequality, where 
excessive human capital equality may slow growth if there is then an oversupply of mid-
level skills and under-supply of high-level skills. However, such a potential problem can 
easily be averted via the government providing free, heavily subsidised or cost-deferred 
access to education in the relevant area of skills shortage. Such a policy would also, if 
sufficiently expensive, tend to reduce the skill wage premium, leading to positive effects on 
income equality.155 
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Table 22 Studies indicating a negative effect of income or asset inequality on growth 
Paper Method Dataset Finding 
Easterly + Rebello 
(1993) 
panel & x-section cross country Public expenditures on infrastructure promote 
growth, no negative effects of egalitarian 
redistribution or taxation 
Persson & Tabelini 
(1994) 
panel & x-section cross country  Negative effect in democracies 
Perotti (1994,1996) Various cross country  Negative effect, via instability and reduced human 
and physical capital accumulation, no evidence of 
negative effects from redistribution  
Deininger & Squire 
(1998) 
cross-section cross country Negative effect of asset inequality  
Chang & Ram (2000) non-standard 
model 
cross country Growth and equality mutually reinforcing  
Easterly (2001) panel model cross country Negative effect of reduction in middle-class size 
Alesina and Rodrik 
(2004) 
cross-section cross country  Negative effect of income  and land inequality 
Hsing (2005) panel model U.S Negative effect on inequality increases 
Malinen (2009) panel 
cointegration 
cross country Negative effect in high and middle income 
countries 
Alfranca & Miguel-
Angel (2009) 
panel & X section cross country Positive effect of egalitarian distribution and public 
expenditures 
Chambers & Krause 
(2009) 
panel model cross country Negative effect on growth in less educated 
countries via reduced human capital accumulation. 
Effect is stronger as physical capital level increases. 
Herzer & Volmer 
(2010) 
panel 
cointegration 
cross country Strong negative effect, in total and across 
categories (democracy, dictatorship, developed, 
developing) 
 
Table 23 Empirical studies on the human-capital inequality-growth relationship 
Study Method Dataset Finding 
Jungsoo (2006) panel model cross country Increasing dispersion in human capital, controlled for 
level, is associated with increased growth rate 
Rodrigues-Pose & 
Tselios (2008) 
panel model  W. Europe Positive effect of human-capital inequality increases, 
Castello & Domenich 
(2008) 
panel model cross country Robust negative effect of human-capital inequality on 
fixed capital investment and growth 
Castelló-Climent 
(2010) 
panel model cross country Negative effect, except in high income countries 
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Table 24 Studies indicating a positive, non-linear, or inconclusive income inequality-
growth relationship 
Study Method Dataset Finding 
Studies indicating non-linear effects 
Castelló-Climent (2010) panel model cross country Negative effect in low to middle income 
countries, neutral or positive in high income 
countries  
Barro (2000) panel model cross country Weakly negative in poor countries, weakly 
positive in rich countries 
Chen (2003) cross-section cross country Inverted U relationship, mid-level inequality is 
best for growth 
Voitchovsky (2005) panel model cross country Negative effect from inequality at bottom of 
distribution, positive to top of distribution 
Studies indicating positive effects 
Rodrigues-Pose & Tselios panel model  W. Europe Positive effect of inequality increases 
Forbes (2000) panel model cross country Positive short to mid-run effect 
Studies finding inconclusive effect 
Panizza (2002) panel model U.S Non-robust weak negative effect 
 
4.1.5 The distribution of income, savings constraints, and credit-crisis 
 
This model presented in figure 11 can be augmented by the incorporation of a distributional 
and policy determined savings constraint. If the relationship between inequality and 
investment is more strongly positive (or less negative) than the inequality-aggregate saving 
relationship, then increased inequality will decrease the external balance. When capital 
inflows are limited, the savings function will then exert a downward limit of varying 
flexibility or rigidity to investment, depending on the strength of the international credit 
constraint. In the context of such a constraint, increased inequality would be associated 
with unsustainable investment increases that would be eventually limited by credit 
squeezes or crisis.  This possible appendage to the model is illustrated in figure 13, where 
the analysis is extended to analyse differing economic structures.  
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Figure 13 Stylised systematisation of savings constrained growth with functional 
distribution determined investment and personal distribution determined savings 
 
 
In figure 12, growth that is driven by increased capital share is savings constrained, as 
savings do not rise in line with investment, as they are independently (and negatively) 
determined by the level of personal inequality.156 This could be the result if consumption is 
strongly driven by the wealth effect; inequality induced positional consumption; or by 
inequality induced opposition to taxation (driving government dissaving). In this model, two 
systems are presented; a standard system shown in black, and an ‘egalitarian 
developmentalist’ (ED) solution shown in blue, which is characterised by a higher  
investment/profit-share function (driven by investment policy), a lower 
inequality/profitability function (associated with egalitarian wage and asset distributions) 
and a higher savings/inequality function (driven by savings promoting policy). In the ED 
solution, the rate of investment is driven upwards for a given functional distribution, as is 
the rate of savings and income equality, in comparison to the standard solution. This 
outcome is analogous to the developmental path of Korea, Taiwan, and Japan in their rapid, 
state-capitalist growth phases. In the system represented in figure 12, investment can 
exceed savings, but only by a defined margin. This upper limit of capital inflows is shown by 
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the two lines in red, signifying the long run credit constraint, which is a multiple of the 
domestic savings rate. This constraint can determine the nature (stable or unstable) and 
level of growth. Consider that a target for investment, X, is set. In this case, the ED system is 
driven to point A, in which case a modest but sustainable volume of capital inflows is 
induced. In comparison, the ‘normal’ system is driven to point B, which is well above the 
long-run credit constraint. In this case, attempting to maintain investment at level X will 
eventually lead to a credit crisis, and a subsequent deleverage and reduction in growth 
rates.  
This system can be used to model or explain a series of sustainable and unsustainable 
growth experiences. For example, the path followed by Taiwan, Korea, and Japan during 
their rapid growth phase is analogous to the ED solution shown in blue and point A. The 
growth experience in these countries was characterised by high rates of investment in 
physical capital, low levels of inequality, and high rate of human capital accumulation and 
savings.157 In contrast, the initially rapid but eventually unsustainable rapid growth 
experiences that occurred in many countries of Latin America and Africa during the 1970’s 
and early 1980’s can be likened to point B- characterised by high profits and physical 
investment, but also high inequality, low to moderate savings, human capital constraints, 
and reliance on external debt.158 In a similar fashion, countries such as the United States, 
Greece, Spain and Ireland could be seen as being or having been at one stage at points B, 
during the period from the turn of the century or before, till at least 2007. In these 
countries, shifts in the post-tax functional distribution from labour to capital arguably drove 
growth of varying rapidity (ranging from rapid in Ireland to modest in the U.S), but without 
corresponding pro-saving polices, and with consumption driven strongly by the wealth 
effect and possibly by inequality induced positional consumption, these modest levels of 
investment could only be financed by large and unsustainable capital inflows.159 In the case 
of the United States, these inflows have come to account for essentially all of net 
investment.160  Without the reduced credit constraint that is imparted by world currency 
status, it is unlikely that growth and investment would have been significantly slower in the 
Unites States throughout the 2000’s. 
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corporation in the East Asian miracle,” Journal of Development Studies 34, no. 6 (September 25, 2011): 112-
137; Jong-Il You, “Income Distribution and Growth in East Asia.,” Journal of Development Studies 34, no. 6 
(1998): 37; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Income distribution, capital accumulation, 
and growth: A more equal distribution of income can enhance growth,” Challenge, March 1998; Jong-Il You, 
“Income Distribution and Growth in East Asia.,” Journal of Development Studies 34, no. 6 (1998): 37. 
158
 Elson, “The Economic Growth of East Asia and Latin America in Comparative Perspective: Lessons for 
development policy.” 
159
 On induced positional consumption, see  Frank and Levine, “Expenditure Cascades”; Walther, Competitive 
Conspicuous Consumption, Household Saving and Income Inequality; Harringer, “Conspicuous consumption 
and inequality: Theory and evidence.” 
160
 Net aggregate savings for 2009 and 2010 were negative. See NIPA table 5.1 and figure 19 of this work. 
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4.1.6 Inequality and aggregate savings: empirical evidence 
 
Classical theoretical accounts of the inequality-savings relationship have presented strong 
arguments for a positive relationship, based on the higher propensity of the wealthy to 
save, and a higher propensity to save out of capital income. These propositions are generally 
supported by the available empirical evidence.161 However, this does not necessarily imply a 
positive relationship between inequality and aggregate savings. This is because inequality 
induced positional consumption would tend to reduce the rate of personal savings at all 
income levels, even as savings continued to rise with  income across the distribution. This 
effect may impact on corporate savings too, if shareholders utilise their power to increase 
dividend payments in an attempt to maximise positional consumption. Furthermore, if 
reduced trust and increase political power of the wealthy limits the ability of government to 
levy taxes, or induces spending on ‘middle class welfare’ then inequality can be associated 
with increased government dissaving. This effect will be augmented if inequality leads to 
increase in expenditures on healthcare, prisons, etc. as a result of inequality induced health 
and social problems.  
If consumption is driven by the wealth effect, increases in capital share, inclusive of capital 
gains can be associated with increased inequality and reduced personal savings. These 
effects are likely to operate with differing intensity in different places, and therefore the 
entire story on savings and inequality cannot be deduced directly from large cross sectional 
studies. Existing studies present a mixed picture, with no conclusive evidence of a positive 
inequality effect. A summary of empirical studies is given in table 25.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
161
 See K. Gupta, “Personal savings in developing nations: Further evidence,” Economic Record 46 (1970): 243-
9; H. Houthakker, “An international comparison of personal savings,” Bulletin of the international statistical 
institute 38 (1961): 55-69; A. C. Kelly and J. Williamson, “Household savings behaviours in developing 
countries: the Indonesian case,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 16, no. 3; J. Williamson, 
“Personal savings in developing nations: An intertemporal cross-section from Asia,” Economic Record 44 
(1968): 194-202; Karen E. Dynan, Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen P. Zeldes, “Do the Rich Save More?,” The 
Journal of Political Economy 112, no. 2 (April 2004): 397-444; P. Menchik and M. David, “Income Distribution, 
Lifestime Savings, and Bequests,” American Economic Review 73 (1983): 672-90; Yiannis P. Venieris and Dipak 
K. Gupta, “Income Distribution and Sociopolitical Instability as Determinants of Savings: A Cross-Sectional 
Model,” Journal of Political Economy 94, no. 4 (1986): 873-883. 
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Table 25 Inequality and savings: summary of empirical studies 
Paper Dataset Finding (effect of income inequality) 
Cross section studies    
Della Vale and Oguchi (1976) industrialised & developing some positive effect in OECD 
Musgrove (1980) industrialised & developing no effect 
Lim (1980) developing countries some positive effects in some subsamples  
Sahota (1993) 65 countries positive but non-robust effect 
Cook (1993) 49 LDC's positive effect 
Hong (1995) 68 industrialised and 
developing countries 
positive effect of top 20% share in GNI 
Edwards (1995) developing + OECD 
countries 
positive but non-robust effect  
Schmidt-Hebbel and Servern 
(1999) 
large and varied cross-
county dataset 
no effect 
Leigh and Posso (2009) 11 developed countries no effect of top 10% and 1% income share 
     
Time series studies    
Blinder (1975) US negative insignificant effect of inequality 
Cook (1995) developing countries positive effect  
Schmidt-Hebbel and Servern 
(1999) 
large dataset of 
industrialised & developing 
no effect 
Smith (2001) cross country dataset positive effect 
Li and Zhou (2004) cross country dataset weak negative effect on private savings 
Harringer (2010) US Inequality increases conspicuous consumption  
Malinen (2011)  Panel cointegration, nine 
developed economies 
Inequality and consumption are  non-stationary, 
inequality increases savings in Central Europe 
and Nordic Countries, inconclusive effect in 
Anglo-Saxon countries 
 
In addition to these estimates, I present original empirical work on the relationship between 
income inequality and government and aggregate savings, the external balance, and growth 
for OECD countries, utilising a cross section of inequality circa 2005 and the average 
macroeconomic variables over the period 2000-2010.162 These estimates are presented in 
figures 14 to 18. These results, although not all highly significant, suggest that the level of 
inequality exerts a negative effect on savings and growth in this sample, with no non-linear 
effects present. In particular, the negative growth relationship appears to be highly linked to 
the negative external balance relationship. Countries with relatively high inequality have 
tended to have negative external balances, higher debt levels, and have consequently been 
relatively more affected by the GFC than more equal countries. As shown in figure 18, there 
is no relationship between inequality and the rate of private investment.  
 
                                                          
162
 Data is from AMECO, the countries in the sample are; Turkey; Poland; Slovak Republic; Hungary; Czech 
Republic; Korea; Portugal; Greece; Spain; France; Italy; Japan; Finland; Germany; UK; Belgium; Sweden; 
Australia; Canada; Ireland; Austria; Denmark; Iceland; Netherlands; Switzerland; US; Norway; Luxembourg 
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Figure 14 Inequality and external balances, Cross section of 29 OECD countries, balances 
adjusted to remove income level effect 
 
 
Figure 15 Inequality and government savings, Cross section of 27 OECD countries, savings 
adjusted to remove income level effect, excluding outliers163 
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 Korea and Norway have been excluded. They have exceptionally high rates of government savings, and low 
to modest inequality. Their inclusion increases the measured negative effect of inequality.  
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Figure 16 Inequality and aggregate savings, Cross section of 29 OECD countries, savings 
rate adjusted to remove income level effect 
 
Figure 17 Inequality and per-capita growth, cross section of 29 OECD countries, growth 
rate adjusted to remove income level effect164 
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 The income level effect is non-linear, and a control is incorporated to model the high growth rates of low 
and very high income countries in this sample. In this case, additional controls are added with control values 
equal to the extent to which country income is below PPP Euro 15,000 or above PPP Euro 26,000. 
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Figure 18 Inequality and private fixed investment, cross section of 25 OECD countries, 
investment rate adjusted to remove income level effect.165 
 
 
4.1.6.1 Inequality and savings: Time series evidence from the United States 
 
The cross sectional results presented above can be augmented by an investigation of the 
relationship between income inequality and savings across time in the United States. The 
basic approach adopted here is to investigate the correlation between inequality and both 
government, personal, corporate, and aggregative savings as a percentage of GNI, with 
controls on time to remove long-run trends unrelated to the explanatory variable.166 
Graphical demonstrations of the model accuracy are given graphically in figures 19-21, and 
regression statistics in tables 25-27.  
These results show a strong negative relationship between inequality and aggregate savings. 
Decomposition of this relationship shows that this is entirely driven by an even stronger 
negative relationship between income inequality and personal savings, which is partially 
offset by a positive but not highly significant relationship between inequality and 
government savings.  There is no relationship between inequality and business savings 
rates. These results are consistent with personal savings being strongly driven by relative 
income effects, with consumption patterns being set by top income earners.  
 
                                                          
165
 Due to missing data, the following countries are removed from the sample; Turkey; Korea; Japan; New 
Zealand. 
166 Savings Data is from BEA NIPA tables, Gini index is from the US Bureau of Census.  
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Figure 19 Predicted and historical values, aggregate net savings, US 1947-2010 
 
Figure 20 Predicted and historical values, net personal savings, US 1947-2010  
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Figure 21 Predicted and historical values, gross government savings, US 1947-2010 
 
 
Table 26 Regression statistics, savings and inequality, US 1947-2010 
Aggregate net savings      
  Gini  Year Y intercept 
Coefficient -0.42619 -0.00094 2.08841 
T-Stat -3.37140 -4.28291 5.33038 
F stat R^2 P value Critical T (.01) 
99.31250 0.76505 6.53*10^-20 2.65886 
Household net savings     
  Gini  Year Y intercept 
Coefficient -0.68496 0.00057 -0.81671 
T-Stat -10.57654 5.10901 -4.06897 
F stat R^2 P value Critical T (.01) 
83.82152 0.73321 3.15*10^-18 2.65886 
Government gross savings    
  Gini  Year Y intercept 
Coefficient 0.30847 -0.00163 3.11515 
T-Stat 2.12753 -6.49045 6.93225 
F stat R^2 P value Critical T (.01) 
42.25326 0.58077 3.05*10^-12 2.65886 
Business savings    
  Gini  Year Y intercept 
Coefficient 0.012 -0.00126 0.33477 
T-Stat 0.2222 -1.58 1.8853 
F stat R^2 P value Critical T (.01) 
3.54 0.104 0.05451 2.65886 
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4.2 The functional distribution of income, demand 
constraints, growth, and investment 
 
Within classical, Marxist, and neoclassical growth theory, there is a direct inverse 
relationship between wage share and profitability. However, once variability in aggregate 
demand and capacity utilisation is considered, as in neo-Marxist, Keynesian and Post-
Keynesian analysis, the effect of changes in the function distribution of income can become 
indeterminate.167 It is therefore necessary to consider the extent to which positive demand 
side effects of wages can offset the negative effect on profit-share. If the net effect of wage-
share on aggregate demand is neutral or positive at all relevant distributions of income, 
then no short-run growth-equity trade-off could exist via profit-squeeze effects.  
Although wage-led economic growth is possible and empirically observed, it is not clear that 
a wage-led regime is desirable or stable in the long-run.  In particular, the simultaneous 
achievement of a stable and flexible functional distribution and high capacity utilisation can 
only be achieved within the context of demand and supply functions having similar 
relationships to the functional distribution. Furthermore, wage-led regimes can result from 
barriers to profit-reinvestment, such as monopolistic industrial structures. Therefore, the 
possible approach of achieving the nullification of the growth-equity trade-off via a shift 
towards wage-led demand regimes can at best be an imperfect long-run policy response.  
Positive demand effects from increases in wage share result when the marginal 
consumption from wages is larger than marginal investment from profits, which can then 
lead to an increase in the average and marginal rate of capacity utilisation. Increased wage 
share can then positively affect investment through two channels: 
 The accelerator effect: As capacity utilisation goes beyond ‘optimal’ levels, investment is 
induced in order to reduce capacity constraints. Firms that do not increase capacity in 
situations of generalised capacity constraint will lose market share.168 
 The profitability effect of increased capacity utilisation: Increased capacity utilisation 
increases the rate of return on capital by decreasing the capital-output ratio. When 
increased utilisation is driven by wage-led aggregate demand, this effect can offset the 
effects of rising wages on profit share and hence the rate of return to capital. In this 
case, the negative effect on wage-share on the rate of reinvestment via inducement 
effects can be offset or reversed. 
                                                          
167
See S. Marglin and Amit Bhaduri, “Profit squeeze and Keynesian theory,” in The Golden Age of Capitalism. 
Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Amit Bhaduri and S. Marglin, 
“Unemployment and the real wage: the economic basis for contesting politicalideologies,” Cambridge Journal 
of Economics 14 (1990): 375-93. 
168
See  J Steindl, Maturity and Stagnation in American Capitalism (London, 1953). 
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Before considering the possibility of wage-led demand regimes, it is useful to consider the 
classical profit led Goodwin model. In this model, aggregate demand is profit led, as 
investment is sensitive to profit-share. Additionally, the rate of real wage increase is 
determined by the tightness of the labour market, i.e. by demand conditions. In this case, a 
stable equilibrium is possible, as are distributional cycles in the context of short-run positive 
feedback effects and inertia. In the classical cyclical model, high profits induce high levels of 
investment, which then create tight-labour market conditions, above productivity wage 
increases, and falling profit-share. This eventually leads to a breakdown in accumulation and 
a sharp fall in AD, and a consequent profit share restoring rise in the reserve army of labour. 
This cycle is demonstrated graphically in figure 18, alongside the equilibrium point, A, that 
would obtain in the absence of inertia and/or demand being wage-led in the short-run. 
 
Figure 22 Standard Goodwin profit-led distributional cycle 
 
In comparison to the profit-led demand regime, a wage-led regime is capable of extreme 
instability, and is prone to explosive wages and demand growth, or alternatively, to 
implosive wage and demand, on the condition that wage-share is demand driven.169 In this 
case, when demand growth exceeds the rate of distributional stable supply growth, wage 
share increases, leading to an increased gap between demand and supply and an explosive 
positive feedback process. The opposite case obtains in the situation where demand is 
initially below that required to maintain distributional stability. In these cases, a negative 
feedback needs to be introduced via macroeconomic intervention- when wage growth is 
explosive, the entire demand function needs to be brought  downward via contractionary 
policy till demand is below the distributional stable supply function, in which case wage 
                                                          
169
 In the opposite case where profit share is demand driven, a stable cycle similar to the Goodwin model will 
result except the cycle will be in reverse. In this case, wage share driven demand will lead to an increase in 
profit share, and hence a correcting fall in demand.   
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share decreases. A relaxing of this contractionary policy leads to another wage explosion 
cycle, or, if the policy response overshoots past point A, to a wage share and demand 
collapse. The opposite response is necessary to forestall an implosive scenario; the demand 
schedule needs to be driven up such that demand and wage share increase in response to a 
move towards explosive profit share expansion and demand implosion. These dynamics are 
illustrated in figure 23. 
In regards to the relationship between the functional distribution of income and AD, this 
indeterminacy at the level of theory can be resolved through empirical investigation. In 
certain economies, it can be shown that AD is either wage or profit led. A summary of the 
findings of this literature is given in table 22. 
 
Figure 23 Profit led distribution cycles driven by macroeconomic policy or international 
credit constraints in otherwise unstable demand-led economies 
In this figure, the line 
passing through D and E 
is a distribution stable 
supply growth function, 
the line passing through 
B and C is demand 
growth. The equilibrium 
point A is knife-edge 
unstable, and without 
policy intervention, the 
economy will explode 
towards point B, or 
implode towards point 
C. In this case, stability 
can be imposed by 
modifying by policy the 
demand curve to slope 
downwards (via 
contractionary policy) 
to create an equilibrium 
D, or upwards (via 
expansionary policy) to 
create the stable equilibrium E.  Especially strong corrective policy can instead drive the economy back 
towards A, but the instability of this knife-edge will lead either to a resumption of the previous cycle, or a shift 
towards the opposite cycle. In this case, policy imposed Goodwin cycles can result from attempts to impose 
stability in an otherwise unstable system. Alternatively, in a credit constrained economy, the cycle can be 
driven by credit constraints- as the economy heads towards point B, the external balance becomes sharply 
negative, and credit inflows are necessary to sustain demand expansion. A credit squeeze will then substitute 
for CB contractionary policy in driving the cycle rightwards, with deleveraging driving a sustained move 
rightwards. 
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Table 22 
Source Country Period Finding, 
ex. trade 
Finding, 
inc. trade 
Notes 
Weiskopf (1979) USA 1948-78  p Goodwin cycles 
uncovered 
Bowles and Boyer (1995) France   w P   
  Germany   w p   
  Italy   w p   
  UK   w w,n   
  USA   w w,n   
Gordon (1995) USA   P   
Stockhammer and Onoran (2004) USA 1966-97   n   
  UK 1970-97   n   
  France 1972-97   n   
Onoran&Stockhammer (2005) South Korea   n   
  Turkey   n   
Nastepad (2006) Netherlands 1960-00   w, n   
Barbosa-Filho and  Taylor (2006) USA 1948–02  p   
Proaño, Flaschel, Ernst and Semmler (2006) USA 1955-04   p   
Euro area  1955-04   p   
Naastepad and Seervas (2006/7) France  1960-00  w   
  Germany   w   
  Italy   w   
  Netherlands   w   
  Spain   w   
  UK   w   
  Japan   p   
  USA   p   
Ederer&Stockhammer (2007) Austria 1960-05 w p   
Flaschel, Tavani, Taylor and Teuber (2007) USA 1955-04  p g 
Hein & Vogel 2007 France 1960-05 w w   
  Germany   w w   
  UK   w w   
  USA   w w   
  Austria   w p   
  Netherlands   p p   
Flaschel, Kauermann and Teuber (2008) USA 1955-04  p g 
Ederer&Stockhammer (2008) France   w p   
Stockhammer, Onoran and Ederer (2009) Euro Area  1960-06  w   
Stockhammer and Stehrer (2009) Germany 1970-07   w   
  Finland      w   
  France     w   
  Japan     w   
  lux     w   
  Netherlands     w   
  Sweden     w   
  Canada     w   
  Australia     p   
  UK     p   
  Ireland     p   
  USA     p   
Diallo et al (2011) USA 1955-06   p g 
Glossary: p=profit led, w= wage led, n = weak or insignificant result, g= goodwin cycle model 
 
96 
 
These results suggest that both wage and profit-led economic structures are possible. 
However, it should be noted that not all studies properly test the hypothesised negative 
relationship between economic activity and wage-share implied by the Goodwin (reserve-
army of labour) model of profit-led distributional cycles.170 This problem is addressed in a 
number of papers where explicit cyclical models have been employed, which have 
uncovered evidence of short and long-period profit-led Goodwin type distributive cycles in 
the United States.171 
Whilst economies can be empirically classified in terms of the likely effect of changes in AD 
as a result of modifications to the functional distribution of income, the nature of the 
relationship between functional distributions is arguably determined by economic structure 
and policy.172 This opens the possibility of modifying the distribution-growth relationship via 
policy interventions.  In terms of welfare maximisation, a wage-led structure is potentially 
advantageous, because in this context no growth-equality trade-off problem would exist- 
both growth and equality could be promoted by policies designed to increase wages for low 
to middle income earners at the expense of capital- at least in the short-run. However, from 
a policy design perspective, no general preference for a wage-led structure can be given. 
This is because a wage-led structure is arguably less conducive to productivity increases 
than profit led structures. In order for an economy to be wage led, it must be sufficiently 
closed that increases in domestic consumption lead in large proportion to increases in AD. In 
addition, the economy must be sufficiently uncompetitive (or closed to external trade) 
across broad categories of goods that increases in profitability are not associated with large 
increases in export opportunities. This degree of relative autarky can be associated with low 
productivity, especially in small economies where a closed, diversified economy is 
inconsistent with efficient industry size and the realisation of economies of scale. 
Alternatively, in open wage-led economies, demand is likely to be highly correlated with 
imports and trade deficits. In this case, long periods of wage led demand growth are 
unsustainable if credit constraints limit the size of the deficit.  
                                                          
170
R. M. Goodwin, “A Growth Cycle,” in Socialism, Capitalism and Economic Growth, ed. C. H. Feinstein 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967). 
171
Mamadou Bobo Diallo et al., “Reconsidering the Dynamic Interaction between Real Wages 
andMacroeconomic Activity,” Research in World Economy 2, no. 1 (April 2011), 
http://www.sciedu.ca/journal/index.php/rwe/article/viewFile/193/82. 
172
 Structural determinants of the wage or profit led nature of an economy include the degree of exposure to 
international competition, the manner in which investment is financed, and various policy determinates of the 
investment function. See  Lance Taylor, Income Distribution, Inflation, and Growth (Cambridge Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1991); Robert Blecker, “International Competition, Income Distribution, and Economic Growth,” 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 14 (1989): 375-393; Stephanie Seguino, “The investment function revisited: 
disciplining capital in South Korea.,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 22, no. 2 (Winter 1999): 313; 
Stephanie Seguino, “Wages, Income Distribution and Gender in south Korean Growth” (Ph.D. dissertation, 
American University, 1994); Steven M. Fazzario, “Keynsian Theories of Investment and Finance: Neo, Post, and 
New,” in Financial Conditions and Macroeconomic Performance, ed. Steven M. Fazzario and Dimitri 
Papadimitriou (New York: M.E. Sharp, 1992); Jenny Corbett and Tim Jenkinson, “The Financing of Industry, 
1970–1989: An International Comparison,” Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 10, no. 1 
(March 1996): 71-96; Steven M. Fazzario and Tracy Mott, “The Investment Theories of Kalecki and Keynes: An 
Empirical Study of Firm Data,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 9, no. 2 (July 1986): 171-187. 
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Furthermore, even in economies where AD is wage-led, investment still tends to be profit 
led, with Japan and Korea during the 1980’s being notable exceptions uncovered by one 
econometric study.173  Additionally, an economy can be wage-led due to having a very low 
rate of marginal investment out of marginal profits, for example, due to a monopolistic 
industrial structure or strong liquidity preferences, both of which can limit investment even 
when the marginal rate of return to capital is high. In this case policies designed to increase 
investment by increasing the gradient of the profit-investment function, or ‘unkinking’ the 
investment function would also shift the economy towards a profit-led structure.174 This 
possibility is demonstrated graphically in figure 21.  
Figure 24 Kinked and linear investment-profitability functions and aggregate demand 
In this figure, P is profit-share, and y 
is aggregate demand. The grey 
shaded portion is consumption, 
which is a positive function of wages, 
and hence a negative function of 
profit-share. Stacked on top of 
consumption is the investment 
potion of demand. In the baseline, 
kinked, scenario, the investment 
function increases with profit share 
till point B, where additional profits 
are no longer absorbed by 
investment. In this case, aggregate 
demand is weakly profit-led as profits 
increase to the inflexion point B, 
whereupon further increases in profit 
share reduce consumption but have no effect on investment, producing a wage-led demand function. In this 
case, when an economy is at point A, it is in a classic position of Kaleckian stagnation, with profit share being 
‘too high’. One solution would be to increase wages and bring the economy back to point B, however, this may 
still be associated with low investment and productivity growth. Alternatively, addressing the structural limits 
to investment, and ‘unkinking’ the investment function could enable an outcome such as C. Such a shift would 
also result in AD being profit led.   
 
In addition to the productivity issues outlined above, both wage and profit-led economies 
suffer from the problem that for AD increases to be desirable, there is an implication that 
AD is in general sub-optimal.175 Ideally, via active AD management, optimal levels of AD can 
                                                          
173
V. Bhaskar and Andrew Glyn, “Investment and Profitability: The Evidence from the Advanced Capitalist 
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be imposed at any plausible functional distribution.  In such a situation of policy imposed 
high capacity utilisation, growth is determined solely by the supply side.176 
The following principles of demand and investment management can be applied to 
maximise growth and welfare in the context of AD being (in the absence of correcting 
policy) distributional determined: 
 The level of investment should be stabilised around the level necessary to ensure 
optimal levels of capacity utilisation, subject to distributional and price stability 
considerations.  
 The marginal rate of investment out of net profits should ideally be stabilised at a level 
close to unity. In this case, shifts in the distribution from wages to capital automatically 
lead to a corresponding increase in the investment portion of demand- offsetting any 
reduction in workers consumption. Furthermore, a high rate of reinvestment maximises 
the rise in investment, and minimises the rise in rentier income, luxury consumption 
and consumption inequality associated with an increase in profit share.  
  In economies that are ordinarily (passively) wage-led, increases in profit share should 
be accompanied by an increasingly expansionary macroeconomic policy, and/or direct 
government investment. There may be scope to finance government investment from 
increased taxation of ‘surplus profits’ (the portion of profits that is not privately 
reinvested). The converse applies to ordinarily profit-led economies, where decreases in 
profit-share should be accompanied by similar investment inducing or demand 
augmenting polices, and counter-cyclical lending to the enterprise sector.  
 In the context of successful and unconstrained demand management, the optimal 
functional distribution becomes a problem of intertemporal optimisation of 
consumption, complicated by the impact of changes to the functional distribution on 
consumption inequality and hence distributional efficiency. If higher growth is sought, 
then investment should be increased by reducing consumption, ideally at the upper end 
of the income distribution, where the marginal social utility of consumption can be near 
zero or even negative.177 
Achieving these outcomes is by no means uncomplicated or even readily and universally 
feasible. However, crucially, the capacity of governments to undertake such Keynesian 
rebalancing is arguably determined by ‘supply side’ fundamentals, in particular, the financial 
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capacity of government. In order for government to be a significant counter-cyclical 
investor, it must in normal periods be a significant saver.178 
Given combined supply and demand side constraints, the optimal profit-demand function 
will be that which ensures an optimal level of excess capacity associated with functional 
stability, enabling a stable Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans optimal functional distribution. In this 
case, the post-policy profit-share -demand growth curve will closely follow the supply 
growth curve. In an ideal policy framework, with a stable and high rate of profit 
reinvestment, the profit-supply growth function will be sharply up-sloping, and so must be 
the demand function in order to achieve stable capacity utilisation rates. 
 In economies that are in a classic Kaleckian stagnation, where output is constrained by the 
profit share being ‘too high’ an obvious short-run solution is to implement egalitarian 
policies which decrease profit share and raise AD. This is, however, only a second best long-
run solution, because it this case the functional distribution and growth ceiling is inflexibly 
determined by the point of intersection of the demand and supply schedules.  
 
4.3 Economic policy and structure, and the parameters of the 
growth-equality relationship 
 
4.3.1 The policy determinants of the investment function 
 
In general, terms, there is evidence for a positive profit-investment relationship. However, 
there is reason to expect there to be significant policy and structure determined variation in 
the average and marginal rate of investment out of profits, both across place and time. The 
following variables are hypothesised to affect the shape and level of the investment 
function: 
 The extent to which investment is ‘socialised’. Presumably, state directed investment is 
likely to be less susceptible to changes in the rate of return to capital. Furthermore, 
there is likely to be an increased accounting of positive external effects in ‘socialised’ 
investment decisions, raising the general investment rate.  
 The degree of capital mobility. When capital is highly mobile, private investment is likely 
to be highly sensitive to the local rate of return.179 Additionally, when capital mobility is 
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low, the rate of savings and investment is highly correlated, and policies designed to 
increase the rate of savings therefore also tend to raise the rate of investment.180  
 The nature of firm ownership and management. According to Post-Keynesian theories of 
the firm under financialisation, increased shareholder power can create a compulsion to 
disperse profits as dividends, rather than retain profits for reinvestment. In contrast, 
managers with secure tenure, who are judged by their long-term performance, are more 
likely to commit to investments with a long pay-off.181 
 The nature of firm financing. When firms are dependent on retained profits, reduced 
profit share can curtail profits via reducing firm funds. This is not the case when reliable 
and affordable external finance is available. Likewise, market financing such as equity 
and corporate bonds may be more sensitive to firm profitability than bank credit, 
especially when banks are state owned or regulated in order to be explicitly counter-
cyclical in their lending patterns.182 
 The degree of risk perception, and mechanisms for risk sharing. Volatility in key 
determinants of firm profitability, combined with limited abilities to spread or insure 
against risk can lead to large risk premiums being attached to productive investment. 
This concept can be applied to industrial relations, where wage volatility and an absence 
of coordinated bargaining can inhibit investment. When wage rises are linked to 
productivity or profitability, the risk of supply and demand shock driven profit squeezes 
is attenuated. Additionally, when the state is a large investor, and especially in the 
context of insufficient demand, it is somewhat self-insured across its investment 
portfolio. Even if a large proportion of government investments have a low or negative 
                                                          
180
 This is the canonical Feldstein-Horioka hypothesis. See M. Feldstein and C. Horioka, “Domestic Savings and 
International Capital Flows,” Economic Journal 90 (1980): 314-29; Nicholas Apergis and Chris Tsoumas, “A 
survey of the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle: What has been done and where we stand,” Research in Economics 63, 
no. 2 (June 2009): 64-76; Soyoung Kim, Sunghyun H. Kim, and Yunjong Wang, “Saving, investment and 
international capital mobility in East Asia,” Japan and the World Economy 19, no. 2 (March 2007): 279-291; 
Cheng Li, “Savings, investment, and capital mobility within China,” China Economic Review 21, no. 1 (March 
2010): 14-23. 
181
Engelbert Stockhammer, “Financialisation and the slowdown of accumulation,” Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 28, no. 5 (2004): 719-741; Engelbert Stockhammer, “Shareholder value orientation and the 
investment-profit puzzle,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 28, no. 2 (2006), p193-215; Engelbert 
Stockhammer, Neoliberalism, Income Distribution and the Causes of the Crisis, Discussion Paper (Research on 
Money and Finance, 2010); A. Bhide, “The hidden costs of stock market liquidity” 34, no. 1 (1993): 31-51; 
Thomas Dallery, “Post-Keynesian Theories of the Firm under Financialization,” Review of Radical Political 
Economics 41, no. 4 (December 1, 2009): 492 -515; Eckhard Hein, “Shareholder Value Orientation, Distribution 
And Growth-Short- And Medium-Run Effects In A Kaleckian Model,” Metroeconomica 61, no. 2 (2009): 302-
332; W. Lazonick and M. O’Sullivan, “Maximising shareholder value: A new ideology for corporate 
governance,” Economy and Society 29, no. 1 (2000); Till Van Treeck, “Reconsidering the Investment–Profit 
Nexus in Finance-Led Economies: An ARDL-Based Approach.,” Metroeconomica 59, no. 3 (July 2008): 371-404. 
182
Andrew Henley and Euclid Tsakalotos, “Corporatism, profit squeeze and investment,” Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 15, no. 4 (December 1, 1991): 425 -450. 
101 
 
return, these are likely to be balanced by positive returns in other areas, and the positive 
tax receipts that result from the multiplier and consumer surplus effect.183  
 The effectiveness and credibility of counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy. When stable 
and growing demand is demonstrated over some time, and is explicitly guaranteed or 
promoted by policy, the perception of the risk of severe demand shocks is likely to be 
reduced.   
These variables can be deployed to explain comparative growth. For example, in their 
periods of rapid growth, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan employed industrial policies that would 
be classified as pro-investment in terms of the variables mentioned above. The same 
variables can be employed to partially explain the rapid growth within China, where 
economic policy is explicitly designed to increase and stabilise investment, in order to drive 
capital deepening.184 In addition, there is evidence that within western industrialised 
countries, various forms of corporatism is associated with a reduced dependence of 
investment on short and long--run profitability. This may explain why the social-democratic 
European countries have been able to maintain acceptable growth levels even when various 
potentially profitability reducing redistributive policies have been employed. In particular, 
these countries appeared to be less affected by profit-squeezes in the period 1972-85, in 
comparison to more liberal-market economies such as the United-States and Britain. Figure 
25 reproduces data contained in Henley and Tsakalotos (1991), showing the varying 
sensitivity of investment to reductions in profitability during 1954-86.185 
The degree to which the relationship between growth and equity is determined by industrial 
policy is well demonstrated by the experience of Korean and Taiwanese industrialisation. In 
both Korea and Taiwan, growth and industrialisation was associated with relatively 
egalitarian outcomes, and there is evidence that industrial and investment policy designed 
to promote and stabilise investment was responsible for this outcome.186 According to 
Seguino (1999): 
                                                          
183
 Considering trade between the government and private sector, a negative shock to the government sector 
terms of trade via-a-vis the private sector will tend to reduce government sector revenue, but increase private 
sector profits and hence taxation income. When the marginal rate of corporate taxation is sufficiently high, the 
whole national capital stock can essentially become part of the government investment portfolio. In the 
opposite case of a large rise in the government sector terms of trade, there is a case for reducing prices on 
government output purchased by the private sector, consistent with maximising the social return to 
investment (inclusive of the consumer surplus). When the consumer is the private sector, a large proportion of 
any losses in government revenue will be recovered from increased taxes on private sector profits.  
 
184
 Dic Lo, “China’s Quest for an Alternative to Neo-liberalism: Market Reform, Economic Growth, and Labor,” 
The Kyoto Economic Review 76 (2007): 193-210. 
185
 Categories are; pluralism: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, US; weak corporatism: Italy, Spain, UK; medium 
corporatism: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Switzerland; strong corporatism: Austria, 
Netherlands; Norway; Sweden; concertation without labour: France, Japan 
186
 See Dennis L. Chinn, “Distributional Equality and Economic Growth: The Case of Taiwan,” Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 26, no. 1 (October 1, 1977): 65-79; Dennis L. Chinn, “Review: Growth, 
Equity, and Gini Coefficients: The Case of Taiwan,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 30, no. 4 (July 
102 
 
the argument is not that profitability does not matter, but simply that the policy 
environment can alter the relationship between profits and investment, in some cases 
in salutary ways- salutary, that is, insofar as the relationship between growth and equity 
is concerned . . .Macro models show that, in open economies with liberalised capital 
flows, when a more equitable distribution of income is attempted, firms respond at 
times hyper-sensitively to diminutions in profitability, thereby threatening the stability 
of the system and economic growth . . . In spite of South Korea’s semi-openness to 
trade in which wages can have a potentially strong negative effect on aggregate 
demand via the effect on export demand, wage growth that exceeds productivity 
growth does not appear to bring down the system. Rather, firms are corralled by the 
state’s complex set of policies and institutional arrangements to respond to higher 
wages with productivity advances.187 
A similar argument is put in the 1997 United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, Trade and Development Report: 
The relationship between inequality and accumulation is greatly influenced by the 
extent to which profits are saved and invested. An examination of sources of capital 
accumulation show that corporate profits are often the principal source of investment 
in industry, while the contribution of voluntary household saving to productive 
investment is relatively small. However, the extent to which profits are saved and 
reinvested varies considerably among countries. It is argued that high retention and 
reinvestment of profits foster accumulation and growth at minimal inequality in terms 
of personal income distribution. What distinguished East Asian newly industrialised 
economies (NIEs) from other developing countries is not so much an exceptionally high 
rate of household saving [as hypothesised to rise with inequality in traditional accounts] 
as a considerably higher propensity of corporations to save and invest profits.188 
From a welfare-maximising policy standpoint, variability in the profit-investment 
relationship enables policy interventions to raise appreciably the level of investment 
for a given level of profit share. Furthermore, asset redistribution and egalitarian 
wages and transfer policy can reduce the level of inequality associated with a given 
functional distribution. Thus, high levels of investment can be achieved at very-low 
levels of personal inequality. This scope for policy intervention enables any possible 
negative equality-growth relationship operating via the physical investment channel to 
be attenuated or nullified even at very low levels of inequality, and suggests that the 
welfare optimum level of inequality is likely to be very close to the level associated 
with distributional efficiency.  
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Figure 25 Profit elasticity of investment by labour/industrial policy regime, 1954-86 
 
4.3.2 Financialisation, corporate financing and control, and the profitability-
investment function 
 
One major determinant of the profit-reinvestment rate is the nature of firm financing 
and control. Put simply, the financial sector and equity markets can act either to 
bolster corporate investment via net inflows of financial capital, or alternatively as a 
parasitic institution which draws funds out of the corporate sector, via dividends and 
interest payments. A series of papers have argued that reliance on equity markets and 
high levels of shareholder power reduce the firm reinvestment rate, and increase the 
share of post-tax profits that are paid out as dividends.189 This effect can be 
exacerbated by highly dispersed share ownership, where the inability to properly 
monitor firms leads to the dividend rate being utilised as a default proxy for firm 
performance. In this case, there is a powerful incentive for managers concerned with 
share valuation to raise the dividend rate, even if this is at the expense of forgone 
investment in high value projects.190This effect will be especially strong if these 
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projects have a payoff horizon longer than the likely management tenure. 
Additionally, high levels of shareholder power and diversified holdings increase the 
risk of hostile takeovers, which has been shown to increase the risk premium on 
corporate lending.191 Conversely, a strong bank-firm relationship can improve 
corporate governance and lower financing costs.192  
A negative relationship between the degree of market firm financing and the profit 
reinvestment rate can be observed in cross country comparisons. Such a comparison is 
given for 12 mostly emerging countries in figures 26 and 27.193 Additionally, a long 
term reduction in the firm reinvestment rate and corresponding increase in the rate of 
dividend dispersion can be observed in the US, where the role of equity markets has 
been especially pronounced.194 The onset of a rapid rise in the dividend disbursement 
rate appears around the early 1980’s, coinciding with the election of Reagan, which 
might be considered a turning point in the transition towards a neoliberal or 
financialised economic structure in the US.195 These dynamics are illustrated in figures 
28-30.  
This analysis suggests that reform of the financial system designed to encourage bank 
lending, suppress equity markets, and reduce the dividend disbursement shift upward 
the investment-profitability function. Specifically, upward pressure on the 
reinvestment rate could be achieved by legislative limits on, and higher taxation of 
dividends, investment tax credits, and low interest loans linked to investment and 
output targets.  
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Figure 26 Market financing and the firm investment rate 
 
Figure 27 Bank and capital-transfer financing and the firm investment rate 
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Figure 28 Corporate dividends as a percentage of GDP, US 1947-2011 
 
Figure 29 Corporate dividends as a percentage of post-tax profits, United States 1947-2011 
(without inventory and capital consumption adjustment) 
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Figure 30 Corporate dividends as a percentage of post-tax profits, United States 1947-2011 
(with inventory and capital consumption adjustment) 
 
4.3.3 The profitability-investment function in the United States and China 
 
In this section, I conduct an empirical investigation of the relationship between profitability 
and investment. Investment functions are estimated for both the Chinese and US national 
economies. This analysis reveals significant, structurally determined variation in investment 
functions across space and time.  
Only a small proportion of the exceptionally high rate of physical capital accumulation in 
China can be attributed to the high rate of return, in comparison to the United States. The 
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estimating the correlation of the deviation from the long run trends, again with a 1 year lag 
on the investment data. The estimate obtained by utilising both the short and mid-run 
relationships, for both the United State and China is shown in figures 31-35.196 The residual 
for the US model is shown in Figure 36, showing a clear inverted U relationship.  
The cross section result reported for China was obtained by taking a cross section of the 
average pre-tax (the post-tax rate is unavailable) rate of return to capital and rate of 
accumulation at the provincial level, over the period 1978 to 2007. Additionally this analysis 
was run as a rolling cross section of annual data; the results of this analysis are shown in 
figure 37. The lack of data on post-tax returns at the provincial level precludes direct 
comparison of the investment level for a given rate of return at the Chine provincial level 
vis-a-vis the US national economy, but the sensitivity of investment can be calculated via the 
estimation of a power function.  Utilising the power estimates of the long-run investment 
functions, estimates for the long run elasticity of investment with respect to profitability are 
obtained. These results are compared to the estimate for the United States obtained by 
Henley &Tsakalotos (1991) in figure 38.  
 
Figure 31 long-run profitability-capital accumulation relationship in China and the United 
States, (correlation of 7 year moving averages) 
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Figure 32 Chinese investment function: Cross section of Chinese provinces, 1978-05 
 
Figure 33 Predicted and actual rate of non-residential fixed capital accumulation, Chinese 
national economy 
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Figure 34 Predicted and actual rate of corporate capital accumulation, US, 1929-2009 
 
 
Figure 35 Predicted and actual rate of capital accumulation in Chinese national economy, 
from aggregated provincial estimates  
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Figure 36 Residual rate of capital accumulation: US 1929-2009 
 
 
Figure 37 Chinese investment function, 1978-07: rolling provincial cross-sections, linear 
estimate 
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Figure 38 Estimates of the profit elasticity of investment, U.S and China 
 
 
4.3.3.2 Discussion of results 
 
Compared to the United States, China has a much higher rate of fixed capital investment 
that cannot fully be explained by the somewhat higher post-tax rate of return to capital. 
Additionally, the sensitivity of investment to profitability in China is very low in comparison 
to both the Unites States and other western economies, as shown by a far lower profit 
elasticity of investment in comparison to estimates for both the Unites States, and other 
countries, as presented in figures 32 and 19.  
This variability in the investment function can plausibly be attributed to structural and policy 
factors. In particular, there are a series of factors which can plausibly explain both the high 
and stable level of investment in China 
 State owned enterprises (SOE) have access to cheap and unconstrained credit and 
are not expected to pay dividends to the state.197 They are therefore able to retain 
and reinvest a large proportion of their profits, and augment these with net capital 
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inflows from the financial sector. Additionally, a key explicit or implicit KPI for SOE 
managers is firm expansion.198 
 The constraints of shareholder power discussed previously are not nearly as strong 
in China, where equity markets are not integral to firm financing and control, even 
within the private sector.  
 Capital mobility within China is rather low, so provided that the provincial or national 
savings rate is high, so too will be investment, even if the rate of return is lower than 
in other regions or time periods. This capital immobility lowers the gradient of the 
profitability-investment function, and may also raise the general level of investment 
and savings by more strongly incentivising savings at the provincial government 
level.199  
 The state acts as a large counter-cyclical investor, and as a result the Chinese 
economy has successfully weathered a series of major crisis, including the East-Asian 
financial crisis, the dot-com crash, and the GFC. Investors in China can therefore 
plausibly expect the risk of major profit depressing demand shocks to be slim.200  
 The high level of national saving, and effective government control of the credit 
expansion rate, ensures that both the economy as a whole, and especially large firms 
are not credit constrained, either due to savings constraints or uncontrolled private 
credit tightening.201  
That a still largely state-directed economy has a stable rate of capital accumulation is not a 
great surprise; however a major question is the extent to which this virtue can be retained 
in the face of an increased role for the market in the Chinese economy. In this regard, it is 
useful to examine the results presented in figure 31. This figure shows that from 1978 till 
1995, the sensitivity of investment to profitability was increasing, as shown by an increased 
coefficient on the pre-tax rate of return. However, from 1995 onwards this sensitivity 
diminished, and in years around 2000 the coefficient on the rate of return became negative. 
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From this point the coefficient has risen, but in 2007, the Y intercept, or rate of 
accumulation associated with a rate of return of zero in a linear estimation, was close to 10 
percent, higher than the value for 1978. Although data is unavailable beyond 2007, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the Chinese post GFC stimulus package, which contained large 
investments in infrastructure, has pushed higher the investment residual.  
This outcome can be explained by a resurgent role of the state in setting a high target for 
capital deepening and policies such as the ‘Go West’ investment program designed to 
increase investment in low income western and central provinces.202 In short, the process of 
market reforms in China has not lead to an increased sensitivity of investment to 
profitability. This suggests that modification to the investment function is possible in  
market economies, although state regulation and intervention on the scale, (although not 
necessarily form) of that existing in China, or for that matter employed in Korea, Japan  or 
Taiwan in their state-capital high growth phases, may be necessary to achieve a similar 
investment –profitability function. It also suggest that in China, and other economies that 
adopt a similarly ‘socialised’ investment regime, wage rises, or increased government 
consumption on social services that are funded via capital taxation will not lead to sharp 
diminution in the rate of fixed capital accumulation via profit squeeze effects. Thus, 
although China’s level of inequality is high and rising, its structure of accumulation makes 
egalitarian redistribution economically viable. 
The role of economic structure in determining the rate of capital accumulation is also 
illustrated by the results presented in figure 29. In this case, the positive impact of economic 
regulation can be seen in the existence of a positive residual in the US investment function 
in the period 1944 to 1980, which might be characterised as an era of modestly regulated 
capitalism. Aside from the period 1992-2000, roughly coinciding with both the Clinton 
presidency and the IT investment boom, there has been a general decline in the investment 
residual since 1980, with the indicator in free fall since 2004. This decline in the residual 
would be consistent with some variants of financialisation theory, which predict a reduced 
profit retention and reinvestment rate, as outlined in section 4.3.2.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has assessed the equality-growth relationship from the standpoint of designing 
welfare maximising economic policy and structural reform.  Due to the  variability of the 
functions which determine the equality-growth relationship and a lack of countries which 
have had very-low levels of inequality, the inequality –growth relationship cannot be fully 
determined from empirical studies. However, existing empirical studies, alongside 
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theoretical insights, suggest that inequality is not associated with strong negative growth 
effects at common levels of inequality. On the contrary, equality may be growth promoting 
at moderate to high levels of inequality. Once the growth-equality relationship is 
decomposed, a very positive assessment of the likelihood of achieving a simultaneous 
increase in equality and growth is obtained. In particular, reforms which increase asset and 
wage equality, promote human capital formation, especially at the bottom of the income 
distribution, but do not negatively impact on profit-share and hence physical capital 
accumulation via the profitability-investment link are likely to unambiguously lead to 
increased labour productivity and growth. Furthermore, modifications to the investment-
profitability function, which raise and stabilise the level of investment can both improve the 
efficiency and regularity with which profits lead to investment and growth, and help 
mitigate any potential negative growth effects, operating  via egalitarian policy induced 
profit squeezes. Comparative analysis of the profitability-investment relationship in China 
and the US suggest that this function is highly variable, and that large increases in the rate 
of investment can be achieved for a given rate of return to capital, via investment 
promoting structural reform.  This analysis suggest that very large welfare increases can be 
achieved by reforms which simultaneously increase income inequality and growth, by 
achieving an increase in physical and human capital formation at the expense of 
consumption at the upper end of the income distribution.  
5 Summary of findings and suggested avenues 
for further research 
 
5.1 Summary of findings and policy implications 
 
In a famous 1994 paper critical of the East-Asian growth strategy, arguably defined by 
growth driven by large factor inputs and unexceptional productivity growth, Paul Krugman 
claimed that the ‘East-Asian miracle’ was no more than a story of deferred consumption on 
a mass scale: 
‘The newly industrializing countries of the Pacific Rim have received a reward for their 
extraordinary mobilization of resources that is no more than what the most boringly 
conventional economic theory would lead us to expect. If there is a secret to Asian 
growth, it is simply deferred gratification, the willingness to sacrifice current satisfaction 
for future gain.’203 
Such a conclusion stems from approaching the intertemporal optimisation problem from 
the perspective of a representative agent model. Once the distribution of income and 
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consumption enters the analysis, East-Asian growth once again appears as a miracle of 
sorts. In this context, what matter alongside the aggregate rate of savings and consumption 
is whose consumption is decreased in order to fund factor accumulation, and who benefits 
from the growth process. When the sacrifices of forgone consumption are concentrated at 
the upper end of the income spectrum, and the benefits from growth widely spread, the 
opportunity costs of investment in terms of the welfare losses can be minimised, and the 
future welfare gains from growth maximised. What differentiated Korea, Taiwan and Japan 
from most of Africa and Latin America in their high growth phases was not lower absolute 
levels of consumption at the bottom and middle of the income spectrum, but a much lower 
level of rentier income and luxury consumption- which may have a near zero or negative 
marginal social utility and therefore represent no social opportunity cost at all.204  This 
example very clearly outlines the need to incorporate distributional efficiency 
considerations into welfare calculations.  
Chapters 1-3 of this thesis have outlined a method for calculating the relationship between 
distributional efficiency and income inequality. Although the accuracy of these calculations 
are limited by the available empirical evidence, the conservative estimates presented here 
suggest that inequality can greatly reduce the welfare outcomes for a given level of mean 
income. This finding has incredibly egalitarian implications- the unweighted average of total 
welfare losses from inequality is calculated to be equivalent to 47% of GNI. In the absence of 
a strong negative equality –growth relationship, this result would suggest that welfare 
maximisation requires a dramatic reduction in income inequality, with the potential gains to 
such egalitarian reform being in rough proportion to the existing level of inequality.  
Chapter 4 assessed the theoretical and empirical evidence on the nature of the equality-
growth relationship. On theoretical grounds, there are likely to be contradictory and non-
linear effects from modifications to the personal distribution of income. Crucially, the likely 
effects are greatly modifiable by policy design. When inequality is reduced via asset 
redistribution, and egalitarian wage and taxation polices which do not reduce profit share, 
no negative growth effect is likely.  When profit share and the return to capital is reduced, 
investment promoting reforms that shift upwards the investment-profitability relationship 
can offset any likely reduction in physical capital accumulation. A combined egalitarian and 
investment promoting structural reform package could simultaneously increase 
distributional efficiency and growth, leading to large welfare gains.  
Combined, this analysis suggests that the welfare optimal post-transfer income distribution 
is a relatively low level, likely between a Gini index of 0.15 and 0.25. Complementary 
investment promoting and stabilising polices and asset redistribution can drive both the 
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level of the welfare optimum higher, and reduce the level of inequality associated with this 
optimum, by reducing the strength of any possible link between inequality and investment. 
With no political constraints to policy implementation, there is likely to be no necessary 
strong growth-equality trade off at any relevant equality level, and the long-run welfare 
optimum is likely to be close to the level associated with distributional efficiency 
maximisation. Furthermore, the presence of environmental constraints will tend to lower 
further the level of inequality associated with the welfare optimum, and reduce the distance 
from the level of inequality associated with distributional efficiency maximisation, as any 
inequality induced reduction in distributional efficiency will require a greater level of output 
and resource throughput to achieve the same welfare level.  
 
5.2 Suggested areas of further research  
 
This thesis has drawn on a large body of literature, and augmented the finding of this 
literature with some novel estimation methods and original empirical work. However, it 
cannot be considered to be more than a very preliminary pilot study. Rather than 
concentrate on a particular issue relevant to income distribution and welfare outcomes, this 
thesis has sketched a broad framework for incorporating distributional concerns into 
welfare calculations, and demonstrated that the key questions raised by such an endeavour 
are capable of being fruitfully addressed by theoretical and empirical analysis. Although the 
answers given here are incomplete, there is little doubt that targeted empirical and 
theoretical investigations can fill in the gaps. These gaps are large, and a number of 
suggestions are presented for research which could help provide more satisfactory and 
precise answer to some relevant questions.  
5.2.1 Suggested areas for further empirical analysis 
 
The following are suggested as important avenues for future empirical research: 
 Harsanyi lottery type estimates of inequality and risk aversion, with explicit 
accounting for external effects, including crime, poor health etc. These external 
effects can be bundled with the distribution or entered as a separate variable. 
 Harsanyi lottery type studies in developing countries or cross country studies with 
countries with differing income levels, which would allow the income gradient of 
positional effects to be ascertained. 
 Empirical studies on the growth equality relationship, with controls on the functional 
distribution of income and/or rate or return to capital. 
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 Cross country estimates of investment functions, preferably with controls on rates of 
capacity utilisation, the real interest rate, and possibly including variables such as the 
form of firm financing.  
 Cross country estimates of the relationship between inequality and income level, 
and various measures of transaction costs, including advertising, financial and retail 
sector size etc.  
 The incorporation of environmental inputs and externalities into growth measures, 
and estimation of the magnitude of any inequality-environmental degradation 
relationship. Ideally, the cost of environmental degradation should be subtracted 
from GDP in welfare calculations and cross country comparisons of economic 
performance.   
5.2.2 Suggested areas for further theoretical analysis  
 
The following are suggested as important targets for future theoretical analysis 
 
 Derivation of an inequality augmented Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model of 
intertemporal optimisation. Utilising the method outlined in chapters 1-3, 
distributional efficiency losses can be calculated, and then treated as a form of 
‘investment’ that needs to pay a return in terms of greater growth. Theoretically, it 
should be possible to calculate the ‘rate of return to inequality’ when a negative 
growth-equality relationship exists, and this can be incorporated into a standard 
time preference model in which welfare is maximised over an infinite horizon.  
 Construction of a flow-of funds type growth model, where distribution affects the 
rate of human and physical capital accumulation, and where physical-human capital 
complementarity and savings constraints (ideally including international credit flows) 
are explicitly modelled.  
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Appendix A 
Table 27 Inequality adjusted GNI per capita and direct and indirect inequality induced welfare losses for 137 countries 
Country  G-I G-C $GNI $H MLD A 1 A 1.5 A 3 A 3.6 DAI$ DAH$ TAI$ TAH$ DA$ TA$ DL$ TL$ DL TL 
Luxembourg 0.26 0.24 $59,580 $4,494 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.19 0.22 $49,523 $4,186 $44,521 $3,487 $53,709 $48,008 $5,871 $11,572 10% 19% 
Norway 0.25 0.24 $55,410 $4,885 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.21 $45,736 $4,571 $41,400 $3,852 $50,306 $45,252 $5,104 $10,158 9% 18% 
Sweden 0.24 0.22 $37,810 $3,432 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.15 0.18 $31,603 $3,245 $29,051 $2,808 $34,847 $31,859 $2,963 $5,951 8% 16% 
Switzerland 0.34 0.32 $47,090 $4,469 0.14 0.13 0.19 0.34 0.39 $34,561 $3,886 $28,026 $2,712 $38,448 $30,738 $8,642 $16,352 18% 35% 
Denmark 0.27 0.25 $38,310 $3,770 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.21 0.24 $30,742 $3,488 $27,363 $2,856 $34,231 $30,219 $4,079 $8,091 11% 21% 
Austria 0.28 0.26 $38,400 $3,792 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.22 0.26 $30,543 $3,489 $26,955 $2,816 $34,032 $29,771 $4,368 $8,629 11% 22% 
Germany 0.28 0.26 $36,840 $3,724 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.22 0.26 $29,190 $3,424 $25,730 $2,757 $32,614 $28,487 $4,226 $8,353 11% 23% 
Finland 0.27 0.25 $35,910 $2,910 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.21 0.24 $29,372 $2,693 $26,142 $2,205 $32,064 $28,347 $3,846 $7,563 11% 21% 
Belgium 0.31 0.29 $36,640 $3,437 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.28 0.32 $28,203 $3,082 $23,956 $2,329 $31,285 $26,285 $5,355 $10,355 15% 28% 
Netherlands 0.31 0.29 $36,690 $3,944 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.29 0.33 $27,662 $3,524 $23,367 $2,638 $31,186 $26,005 $5,504 $10,685 15% 29% 
Canada 0.32 0.30 $37,280 $3,844 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.32 0.36 $27,667 $3,388 $22,893 $2,448 $31,055 $25,341 $6,225 $11,939 17% 32% 
Australia 0.36 0.34 $38,510 $3,353 0.17 0.15 0.22 0.39 0.45 $27,435 $2,842 $21,409 $1,856 $30,277 $23,265 $8,233 $15,245 21% 40% 
Japan 0.31 0.29 $32,880 $2,750 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.29 0.34 $25,328 $2,449 $21,291 $1,818 $27,777 $23,109 $5,103 $9,771 16% 30% 
Iceland 0.28 0.26 $29,950 $3,320 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.23 0.27 $23,371 $3,044 $20,511 $2,433 $26,415 $22,944 $3,535 $7,006 12% 23% 
France 0.33 0.31 $33,940 $3,679 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.32 0.37 $24,912 $3,231 $20,508 $2,314 $28,143 $22,821 $5,797 $11,119 17% 33% 
Cyprus 0.29 0.27 $30,160 $1,825 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.25 0.29 $24,553 $1,659 $21,277 $1,297 $26,212 $22,574 $3,948 $7,586 13% 25% 
Ireland 0.33 0.31 $33,030 $3,494 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.32 0.37 $24,386 $3,075 $20,134 $2,213 $27,461 $22,347 $5,569 $10,683 17% 32% 
U.K. 0.35 0.33 $35,620 $3,051 0.15 0.14 0.21 0.37 0.42 $25,877 $2,617 $20,560 $1,763 $28,494 $22,323 $7,126 $13,297 20% 37% 
U.S. 0.43 0.41 $45,640 $7,437 0.25 0.22 0.31 0.53 0.59 $26,231 $5,788 $18,011 $3,036 $32,020 $21,047 $13,620 $24,593 30% 54% 
Singapore 0.45 0.43 $49,430 $1,833 0.29 0.25 0.35 0.58 0.64 $30,999 $1,377 $20,189 $660 $32,376 $20,848 $17,054 $28,582 35% 58% 
Spain 0.33 0.31 $31,480 $2,735 0.14 0.13 0.18 0.34 0.39 $23,434 $2,387 $19,104 $1,681 $25,821 $20,785 $5,659 $10,695 18% 34% 
Italy 0.34 0.32 $31,910 $2,771 0.14 0.13 0.19 0.35 0.40 $23,520 $2,402 $18,984 $1,663 $25,922 $20,647 $5,988 $11,263 19% 35% 
Slovenia 0.28 0.27 $26,980 $2,129 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.24 0.28 $21,701 $1,945 $18,950 $1,541 $23,646 $20,491 $3,334 $6,489 12% 24% 
Czech Republic 0.26 0.24 $24,050 $1,661 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.19 0.22 $20,198 $1,551 $18,221 $1,299 $21,748 $19,520 $2,302 $4,530 10% 19% 
South Korea 0.32 0.30 $27,250 $1,651 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.30 0.34 $21,443 $1,467 $17,962 $1,082 $22,910 $19,044 $4,340 $8,206 16% 30% 
Greece 0.34 0.32 $28,500 $3,010 0.14 0.13 0.19 0.34 0.39 $20,670 $2,617 $16,761 $1,826 $23,287 $18,588 $5,213 $9,912 18% 35% 
Malta 0.26 0.24 $23,070 $4,197 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.19 0.22 $16,967 $3,909 $15,253 $3,256 $20,876 $18,510 $2,194 $4,560 10% 20% 
Slovakia 0.26 0.24 $22,110 $1,619 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.19 0.22 $18,443 $1,509 $16,599 $1,260 $19,952 $17,859 $2,158 $4,251 10% 19% 
New Zealand 0.36 0.34 $28,050 $2,525 0.17 0.15 0.22 0.39 0.45 $19,885 $2,138 $15,491 $1,393 $22,023 $16,884 $6,027 $11,166 21% 40% 
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Country  G-I G-C $GNI $H MLD A 1 A 1.5 A 3 A 3.6 DAI$ DAH$ TAI$ TAH$ DA$ TA$ DL$ TL$ DL TL 
Hungary 0.27 0.26 $19,260 $1,433 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.22 0.26 $15,753 $1,319 $13,919 $1,067 $17,072 $14,986 $2,188 $4,274 11% 22% 
Israel 0.39 0.37 $27,010 $2,012 0.20 0.18 0.26 0.45 0.51 $18,471 $1,644 $13,648 $978 $20,115 $14,626 $6,895 $12,384 26% 46% 
Croatia 0.29 0.27 $19,240 $1,553 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.25 0.29 $15,327 $1,412 $13,281 $1,104 $16,738 $14,385 $2,502 $4,855 13% 25% 
Portugal 0.39 0.36 $24,050 $2,419 0.19 0.18 0.25 0.44 0.50 $16,189 $1,994 $12,117 $1,213 $18,183 $13,329 $5,867 $10,721 24% 45% 
Trinidad 0.39 0.37 $23,760 $1,237 0.20 0.18 0.26 0.45 0.51 $16,734 $1,015 $12,433 $609 $17,749 $13,043 $6,011 $10,717 25% 45% 
Estonia 0.35 0.33 $19,120 $1,113 0.15 0.14 0.20 0.37 0.42 $14,330 $956 $11,403 $646 $15,286 $12,049 $3,834 $7,071 20% 37% 
Poland 0.35 0.33 $18,200 $1,078 0.15 0.14 0.20 0.36 0.42 $13,669 $928 $10,913 $630 $14,597 $11,543 $3,603 $6,657 20% 37% 
Lithuania 0.36 0.34 $17,380 $1,318 0.16 0.15 0.22 0.39 0.44 $12,555 $1,118 $9,813 $733 $13,673 $10,546 $3,707 $6,834 21% 39% 
Latvia 0.37 0.35 $17,400 $1,100 0.17 0.16 0.23 0.41 0.46 $12,559 $925 $9,677 $591 $13,484 $10,268 $3,916 $7,132 23% 41% 
Romania 0.32 0.30 $14,480 $840 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.30 0.34 $11,426 $746 $9,571 $551 $12,172 $10,121 $2,308 $4,359 16% 30% 
Bulgaria 0.30 0.28 $13,290 $986 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.26 0.30 $10,592 $892 $9,119 $690 $11,485 $9,809 $1,805 $3,481 14% 26% 
Belarus 0.29 0.27 $12,880 $730 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.25 0.28 $10,556 $665 $9,171 $522 $11,220 $9,693 $1,660 $3,187 13% 25% 
Russia 0.41 0.39 $18,260 $1,038 0.23 0.20 0.29 0.49 0.55 $12,269 $828 $8,741 $463 $13,097 $9,203 $5,163 $9,057 28% 50% 
Turkey 0.37 0.35 $13,480 $798 0.17 0.16 0.23 0.41 0.46 $9,780 $671 $7,542 $430 $10,451 $7,972 $3,029 $5,508 22% 41% 
Uzbekistan 0.37 0.35 $12,800 $134 0.17 0.16 0.23 0.41 0.46 $9,768 $113 $7,533 $72 $9,880 $7,605 $2,920 $5,195 23% 41% 
Kazakhstan 0.31 0.29 $10,160 $554 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.30 0.34 $8,064 $493 $6,769 $365 $8,557 $7,134 $1,603 $3,026 16% 30% 
Mauritius 0.39 0.37 $13,020 $681 0.20 0.18 0.26 0.45 0.51 $9,151 $558 $6,786 $334 $9,709 $7,120 $3,311 $5,900 25% 45% 
Bosnia 0.26 0.25 $8,830 $929 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.20 0.23 $7,087 $864 $6,356 $717 $7,951 $7,073 $879 $1,757 10% 20% 
Chile 0.40 0.38 $13,260 $959 0.21 0.19 0.27 0.47 0.53 $8,987 $778 $6,566 $454 $9,765 $7,020 $3,495 $6,240 26% 47% 
Albania 0.29 0.27 $8,260 $582 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.25 0.29 $6,662 $529 $5,780 $415 $7,191 $6,195 $1,069 $2,065 13% 25% 
Macedonia 0.39 0.37 $11,000 $503 0.20 0.18 0.26 0.45 0.51 $7,785 $412 $5,773 $247 $8,197 $6,020 $2,803 $4,980 25% 45% 
Argentina 0.45 0.43 $14,030 $1,062 0.28 0.25 0.35 0.57 0.64 $8,484 $800 $5,551 $386 $9,285 $5,937 $4,745 $8,093 34% 58% 
Azerbaijan 0.37 0.34 $8,980 $561 0.17 0.16 0.22 0.40 0.46 $6,526 $473 $5,058 $306 $6,999 $5,364 $1,981 $3,616 22% 40% 
Uganda 0.46 0.43 $12,800 $115 0.29 0.25 0.35 0.58 0.65 $8,185 $86 $5,282 $40 $8,271 $5,322 $4,529 $7,478 35% 58% 
Uruguay 0.46 0.44 $12,800 $979 0.30 0.26 0.36 0.59 0.66 $7,548 $726 $4,819 $336 $8,274 $5,155 $4,526 $7,645 35% 60% 
Iran 0.44 0.41 $11,420 $685 0.26 0.23 0.33 0.55 0.61 $7,238 $527 $4,880 $268 $7,765 $5,148 $3,655 $6,272 32% 55% 
Malaysia 0.48 0.45 $13,650 $621 0.32 0.28 0.38 0.62 0.69 $8,021 $449 $4,938 $195 $8,471 $5,134 $5,179 $8,516 38% 62% 
Venezuela 0.45 0.43 $12,170 $683 0.29 0.25 0.35 0.57 0.64 $7,490 $514 $4,884 $246 $8,003 $5,130 $4,167 $7,040 34% 58% 
Algeria 0.35 0.33 $8,130 $544 0.16 0.14 0.21 0.37 0.43 $5,998 $465 $4,743 $311 $6,463 $5,053 $1,667 $3,077 21% 38% 
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Country  G-I G-C $GNI $H MLD A 1 A 1.5 A 3 A 3.6 DAI$ DAH$ TAI$ TAH$ DA$ TA$ DL$ TL$ DL TL 
Mexico 0.50 0.47 $14,200 $842 0.36 0.30 0.42 0.66 0.73 $7,758 $586 $4,505 $230 $8,343 $4,736 $5,857 $9,464 41% 67% 
Colombia 0.40 0.38 $8,680 $569 0.21 0.19 0.27 0.47 0.53 $5,926 $462 $4,329 $269 $6,387 $4,599 $2,293 $4,081 26% 47% 
Tunisia 0.40 0.38 $7,800 $501 0.21 0.19 0.27 0.47 0.53 $5,317 $406 $3,874 $236 $5,723 $4,109 $2,077 $3,691 27% 47% 
Costa Rica 0.48 0.46 $10,870 $1,165 0.34 0.29 0.40 0.64 0.70 $5,855 $832 $3,533 $349 $6,687 $3,882 $4,183 $6,988 38% 64% 
Egypt 0.34 0.32 $5,790 $261 0.15 0.14 0.20 0.36 0.41 $4,435 $225 $3,557 $154 $4,660 $3,712 $1,130 $2,078 20% 36% 
Thailand 0.43 0.40 $7,650 $328 0.25 0.22 0.31 0.52 0.58 $5,070 $257 $3,510 $137 $5,327 $3,647 $2,323 $4,003 30% 52% 
China 0.40 0.38 $6,860 $309 0.21 0.19 0.27 0.47 0.53 $4,786 $251 $3,497 $146 $5,037 $3,643 $1,823 $3,217 27% 47% 
Dominican Rep 0.45 0.43 $8,080 $465 0.28 0.24 0.34 0.57 0.63 $4,999 $351 $3,282 $171 $5,350 $3,453 $2,730 $4,627 34% 57% 
Turkmenistan 0.41 0.39 $6,580 $146 0.22 0.20 0.28 0.49 0.55 $4,611 $117 $3,304 $66 $4,728 $3,370 $1,852 $3,210 28% 49% 
Armenia 0.35 0.33 $5,370 $224 0.16 0.15 0.21 0.38 0.43 $4,062 $191 $3,207 $127 $4,254 $3,334 $1,116 $2,036 21% 38% 
Tajikistan 0.33 0.31 $4,780 $95 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.32 0.37 $3,857 $83 $3,175 $60 $3,940 $3,235 $840 $1,545 18% 32% 
Jordan 0.39 0.37 $5,700 $496 0.20 0.18 0.26 0.46 0.51 $3,842 $405 $2,836 $241 $4,247 $3,076 $1,453 $2,624 25% 46% 
Jamaica 0.46 0.43 $7,420 $1,231 0.29 0.25 0.35 0.58 0.64 $4,012 $922 $2,601 $438 $4,934 $3,039 $2,486 $4,381 34% 59% 
Panama 0.56 0.53 $12,240 $1,081 0.47 0.38 0.51 0.76 0.82 $5,479 $673 $2,690 $198 $6,152 $2,889 $6,088 $9,351 50% 76% 
Brazil 0.53 0.50 $10,140 $943 0.42 0.34 0.47 0.72 0.78 $4,895 $619 $2,606 $210 $5,515 $2,816 $4,625 $7,324 46% 72% 
Ecuador 0.51 0.49 $8,870 $503 0.39 0.32 0.44 0.69 0.75 $4,694 $342 $2,633 $127 $5,036 $2,760 $3,834 $6,110 43% 69% 
Peru 0.51 0.49 $8,300 $400 0.39 0.32 0.44 0.69 0.75 $4,420 $272 $2,472 $100 $4,691 $2,573 $3,609 $5,727 43% 69% 
Mongolia 0.33 0.31 $3,680 $166 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.32 0.37 $2,888 $146 $2,374 $104 $3,034 $2,478 $646 $1,202 18% 33% 
Georgia 0.41 0.38 $4,690 $499 0.22 0.20 0.28 0.48 0.54 $3,015 $401 $2,169 $228 $3,416 $2,397 $1,274 $2,293 27% 49% 
Indonesia 0.37 0.35 $4,030 $91 0.17 0.16 0.23 0.41 0.46 $3,035 $76 $2,339 $49 $3,112 $2,387 $918 $1,643 23% 41% 
Morocco 0.40 0.38 $4,380 $251 0.21 0.19 0.27 0.47 0.54 $2,994 $203 $2,171 $117 $3,196 $2,287 $1,184 $2,093 27% 48% 
El Salvador 0.50 0.47 $6,390 $427 0.36 0.30 0.42 0.66 0.72 $3,486 $299 $2,038 $119 $3,785 $2,157 $2,605 $4,233 41% 66% 
Ukraine 0.30 0.28 $2,850 $445 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.26 0.30 $2,069 $403 $1,780 $311 $2,472 $2,091 $378 $759 13% 27% 
Sri Lanka 0.45 0.42 $4,690 $193 0.28 0.24 0.34 0.56 0.63 $2,976 $147 $1,969 $72 $3,122 $2,041 $1,568 $2,649 33% 56% 
Moldova 0.33 0.31 $3,020 $341 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.33 0.38 $2,189 $298 $1,789 $211 $2,487 $1,999 $533 $1,021 18% 34% 
Timor-lest 0.38 0.36 $3,500 $126 0.19 0.17 0.24 0.43 0.49 $2,548 $104 $1,924 $65 $2,653 $1,989 $847 $1,511 24% 43% 
Samoa 0.43 0.41 $4,250 $312 0.25 0.22 0.31 0.53 0.59 $2,698 $242 $1,849 $127 $2,941 $1,975 $1,309 $2,275 31% 54% 
India 0.37 0.35 $3,260 $122 0.17 0.16 0.23 0.41 0.46 $2,420 $103 $1,866 $66 $2,523 $1,932 $737 $1,328 23% 41% 
Bhutan 0.47 0.44 $4,930 $274 0.31 0.27 0.37 0.60 0.67 $2,927 $201 $1,840 $91 $3,128 $1,931 $1,802 $2,999 37% 61% 
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Country  G-I G-C $GNI $H MLD A 1 A 1.5 A 3 A 3.6 DAI$ DAH$ TAI$ TAH$ DA$ TA$ DL$ TL$ DL TL 
Botswana 0.62 0.59 $13,160 $1,341 0.63 0.47 0.61 0.85 0.90 $4,590 $714 $1,782 $141 $5,303 $1,923 $7,857 $11,237 60% 85% 
Pakistan 0.31 0.29 $2,670 $63 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.28 0.32 $2,211 $56 $1,876 $43 $2,268 $1,918 $402 $752 15% 28% 
Vietnam 0.36 0.34 $2,780 $211 0.16 0.15 0.21 0.38 0.44 $2,018 $180 $1,585 $119 $2,198 $1,704 $582 $1,076 21% 39% 
Kyrgyzstan 0.30 0.28 $2,190 $123 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.27 0.32 $1,761 $111 $1,499 $84 $1,871 $1,583 $319 $607 15% 28% 
Philippines 0.45 0.43 $3,670 $129 0.28 0.25 0.35 0.57 0.64 $2,314 $97 $1,512 $47 $2,411 $1,559 $1,259 $2,111 34% 58% 
Guyana 0.43 0.41 $3,330 $247 0.25 0.22 0.32 0.53 0.60 $2,103 $191 $1,435 $99 $2,295 $1,534 $1,035 $1,796 31% 54% 
South Africa 0.61 0.59 $10,010 $862 0.62 0.46 0.61 0.84 0.89 $3,605 $463 $1,421 $94 $4,069 $1,514 $5,941 $8,496 59% 85% 
Swaziland 0.50 0.48 $4,450 $287 0.37 0.31 0.43 0.67 0.73 $2,385 $198 $1,366 $76 $2,583 $1,442 $1,867 $3,008 42% 68% 
Yemen 0.36 0.33 $2,330 $142 0.16 0.15 0.21 0.38 0.43 $1,723 $121 $1,357 $80 $1,844 $1,437 $486 $893 21% 38% 
Laos 0.35 0.33 $2,210 $89 0.15 0.14 0.20 0.36 0.41 $1,696 $77 $1,356 $52 $1,773 $1,408 $437 $802 20% 36% 
Congo Rep 0.44 0.42 $3,020 $108 0.27 0.24 0.34 0.56 0.62 $1,935 $82 $1,286 $41 $2,018 $1,327 $1,002 $1,693 33% 56% 
Paraguay 0.53 0.51 $4,410 $281 0.43 0.35 0.47 0.72 0.78 $2,181 $184 $1,152 $61 $2,365 $1,214 $2,045 $3,196 46% 72% 
Guatemala 0.54 0.52 $4,560 $308 0.45 0.36 0.49 0.74 0.80 $2,164 $196 $1,101 $62 $2,360 $1,163 $2,200 $3,397 48% 75% 
Cave Verde 0.51 0.48 $3,550 $174 0.37 0.31 0.43 0.67 0.74 $1,929 $120 $1,102 $46 $2,048 $1,148 $1,502 $2,402 42% 68% 
Mauritania 0.39 0.37 $1,950 $47 0.20 0.18 0.26 0.45 0.51 $1,411 $39 $1,047 $23 $1,450 $1,070 $500 $880 26% 45% 
Angola 0.59 0.56 $5,430 $183 0.55 0.42 0.56 0.81 0.86 $2,310 $106 $1,017 $26 $2,416 $1,043 $3,014 $4,387 56% 81% 
Bangladesh 0.33 0.31 $1,540 $48 0.14 0.13 0.18 0.33 0.38 $1,217 $42 $993 $30 $1,259 $1,023 $281 $517 18% 34% 
Cameroon 0.45 0.42 $2,180 $119 0.28 0.24 0.34 0.56 0.63 $1,364 $90 $902 $44 $1,454 $947 $726 $1,233 33% 57% 
Nigeria 0.44 0.41 $2,090 $136 0.26 0.23 0.33 0.54 0.61 $1,319 $105 $890 $53 $1,424 $943 $666 $1,147 32% 55% 
Nicaragua 0.48 0.45 $2,530 $251 0.33 0.28 0.39 0.62 0.69 $1,400 $181 $860 $79 $1,581 $938 $949 $1,592 38% 63% 
Honduras 0.55 0.52 $3,690 $248 0.45 0.36 0.49 0.74 0.80 $1,743 $158 $883 $49 $1,901 $932 $1,789 $2,758 48% 75% 
Cambodia 0.42 0.40 $1,920 $122 0.24 0.22 0.31 0.52 0.58 $1,249 $96 $867 $51 $1,345 $919 $575 $1,001 30% 52% 
Senegal 0.41 0.39 $1,800 $102 0.23 0.20 0.29 0.50 0.56 $1,205 $81 $855 $45 $1,286 $900 $514 $900 29% 50% 
Benin 0.37 0.34 $1,490 $65 0.17 0.16 0.22 0.40 0.46 $1,105 $55 $856 $35 $1,159 $892 $331 $598 22% 40% 
Bolivia 0.58 0.56 $4,430 $213 0.54 0.42 0.55 0.80 0.85 $1,884 $124 $842 $31 $2,009 $873 $2,421 $3,557 55% 80% 
Tanzania 0.35 0.33 $1,360 $57 0.15 0.14 0.20 0.36 0.41 $1,042 $49 $833 $33 $1,091 $867 $269 $493 20% 36% 
Ghana 0.40 0.38 $1,530 $204 0.21 0.19 0.27 0.47 0.53 $963 $165 $700 $95 $1,128 $795 $402 $735 26% 48% 
Kenya 0.43 0.40 $1,560 $68 0.25 0.22 0.31 0.52 0.58 $1,033 $53 $715 $28 $1,086 $744 $474 $816 30% 52% 
PNG 0.51 0.48 $2,280 $57 0.38 0.32 0.44 0.68 0.74 $1,256 $39 $710 $15 $1,295 $724 $985 $1,556 43% 68% 
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Country  G-I G-C $GNI $H MLD A 1 A 1.5 A 3 A 3.6 DAI$ DAH$ TAI$ TAH$ DA$ TA$ DL$ TL$ DL TL 
Ethiopia 0.30 0.28 $930 $40 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.27 0.31 $761 $36 $651 $28 $797 $678 $133 $252 14% 27% 
Burkina Faso 0.40 0.37 $1,160 $88 0.21 0.19 0.27 0.46 0.52 $788 $72 $579 $42 $859 $621 $301 $539 26% 46% 
Chad 0.40 0.38 $1,160 $94 0.21 0.19 0.27 0.47 0.53 $779 $76 $569 $44 $855 $613 $305 $547 26% 47% 
Mali 0.40 0.38 $990 $65 0.21 0.19 0.27 0.47 0.53 $672 $53 $488 $30 $724 $518 $266 $472 27% 48% 
Guinea 0.38 0.36 $920 $58 0.19 0.17 0.25 0.44 0.50 $647 $48 $485 $29 $695 $515 $225 $405 24% 44% 
Nepal 0.47 0.45 $1,170 $69 0.32 0.27 0.38 0.61 0.68 $685 $50 $427 $22 $736 $449 $434 $721 37% 62% 
Malawi 0.39 0.37 $820 $50 0.20 0.18 0.26 0.45 0.51 $571 $41 $423 $25 $612 $448 $208 $372 25% 45% 
Rwanda 0.47 0.44 $1,120 $102 0.31 0.27 0.37 0.60 0.67 $640 $75 $402 $34 $715 $436 $405 $684 36% 61% 
Gambia, The 0.50 0.48 $1,260 $75 0.37 0.31 0.42 0.67 0.73 $683 $52 $393 $20 $735 $413 $525 $847 42% 67% 
Zambia 0.51 0.48 $1,300 $68 0.38 0.32 0.43 0.68 0.74 $698 $47 $395 $18 $745 $413 $555 $887 43% 68% 
Guinea Bissau 0.47 0.45 $1,050 $32 0.31 0.27 0.37 0.61 0.67 $637 $23 $398 $10 $660 $409 $390 $641 37% 61% 
Madagascar 0.48 0.45 $980 $261 0.32 0.27 0.38 0.62 0.68 $444 $189 $275 $83 $634 $357 $346 $623 35% 64% 
Mozambique 0.47 0.45 $870 $50 0.32 0.27 0.38 0.61 0.68 $509 $36 $316 $16 $546 $332 $324 $538 37% 62% 
Namibia 0.73 0.70 $6,340 $384 1.02 0.64 0.78 0.95 0.97 $1,290 $139 $280 $10 $1,429 $290 $4,911 $6,050 77% 95% 
Lesotho 0.63 0.60 $2,040 $119 0.67 0.49 0.64 0.87 0.91 $700 $61 $255 $11 $761 $266 $1,279 $1,774 63% 87% 
Niger 0.51 0.48 $660 $40 0.37 0.31 0.43 0.67 0.74 $354 $28 $202 $11 $382 $213 $278 $447 42% 68% 
Haiti 0.59 0.57 $1,150 $69 0.57 0.43 0.57 0.82 0.87 $463 $39 $198 $9 $502 $207 $648 $943 56% 82% 
Burundi 0.42 0.40 $390 $49 0.24 0.22 0.31 0.52 0.58 $237 $38 $164 $21 $275 $185 $115 $205 29% 53% 
Congo Dem 0.44 0.42 $300 $31 0.27 0.24 0.34 0.56 0.62 $179 $24 $119 $12 $202 $131 $98 $169 33% 56% 
Central African 
Republic 
0.61 0.59 $750 $32 0.62 0.46 0.60 0.84 0.89 $284 $17 $112 $4 $301 $116 $449 $634 60% 85% 
Sierra Leone 0.63 0.60 $800 $104 0.66 0.49 0.63 0.86 0.91 $257 $54 $95 $10 $311 $105 $489 $695 61% 87% 
Unweighted 
average 
0.40 0.38 $12,956 $1,051 0.24 0.20 0.28 0.47 0.52 $9,299 $897 $7,427 $622 $10,196 $8,048 $2,759 $4,907 28% 47% 
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Glossary for table 20 
G-I Gini Index of income Inequality  
G-C Gini Index of consumption Inequality  
$GNI GNI per capita, $2005 PPP adjusted  
$H Health expenditures, $2005 PPP adjusted 
MLD Mean Log Deviation of unwarranted income inequality 
A 1 Atkinson Index,   =1 
A 1.5 Atkinson index,      
A 3 Atkinson index,     
A 3.57 Atkinson Index,       
DAI$ Non-health expenditures, adjusted for direct inequality losses 
DAH$ Health expenditures, adjusted for direct inequality losses 
TAI$ Non-health expenditures, adjusted for total inequality losses 
TAH$ Health expenditures, adjusted for total inequality losses 
DA$ Total income, adjusted for direct losses 
TA$ Total income, adjusted for total losses 
DL$ Direct losses, in $2005 PPP 
TL$ Total Losses, in $2005 PPP 
DL Direct losses, as % GNI 
TL Total Losses, as % GNI 
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